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But no language consists of signs that only call attention to things without saying anything about them—that is, without asserting or denying something. All languages we know have a fairly stabile vocabulary, and a grammatical structure. No language is essentially exclamatory (like ah! and oh!), or emotional (like whining and yodelling), or even imperative.[2] The normal mode of communicative speech, in every human society, is the indicative; and there is no empirical evidence, such as a correlation of increasing discursiveness with increasing culture, to support the belief that it was ever otherwise.

Language may be used to announce one's presence, to greet people, to warn, to threaten, to express pain or joy, or even for directing action.[3] Whenever people speak of "animal language" they refer to such uses of observable signs among animals.[4] Leaving aside, for the moment, the alleged "language" of social insects,[5] we may use the term *vocal signs* among animals.

Now, it is an obvious commonsense assumption that human language has grown from some such lower form of vocal communication. But common sense is a very tricky instrument; it is as deceptive as it is indispensable. Because we use it, and have to use it, all the time, we tend to trust it beyond its real credentials, and to feel disconcerted if its simple interpretations of experience fail. Yet commonsense conceptions of the nature and origin of human speech have always led into dilemmas, and will until the problem of its beginning and development has been generally given up.

Even methodology develops its commonsense principles. One of these is that, if you would find the important relationships between two phenomena, you should begin by checking what the phenomena have in common. So, in comparing the vocal communications of animals and men respectively, we find that all the things animals communicate by sound may also be communicated by human language; and it seems reasonable enough that those things which human language can do and animal vocalization cannot, have been added to the primitive animal language, to make the greatly elaborated system of verbal intercourse.[6] But the finding of these common elements leads no further. Commonsense methodology, like the commonsense assumptions, produces nothing more than what we already knew—by common sense.

So it may be in order to question our obvious premises, and even depart from the method of seeking common factors in animal and human communication. Instead of noting points of similarity, let us consider the cardinal difference between human and animal language. That difference is in the *uses* to which utterances are put. All those functions that animal and human utterances share

[2] Note, however, H. J. Pos, "Réflexions sur le problème de l'origine du langage," *Acta Psychologica* (1950), who maintains that the *primary* forms of language were imperative and vocative.

[3] John Dewey, in *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, 1925), says that primitive signs "become language only when used within a context of mutual assistance and direction. The latter are alone of prime importance in considering the transformation of organic gestures and cries into names, things with significance, or the origin of language" (p. 175).

[4] See, for example, J. B. S. Haldane, "Animal Communication and the Origin of Human Language," *Science Progress*, CLXXI (1955), 385-401; and especially, Julian Huxley and Ludwig Koch, *Animal Language* (London: Country Life, Ltd., 1938).

[5] K. v. Frisch, *Bees: their Vision, Chemical Senses, and Language* (Ithaca, New York, 1950). Also, *The Dancing Bees* (New York, 1955).

[6] This is the view expressed by Charles Morris in *The Nature of Mind* (Houston, Texas, 1929) and in *Signs, Language and Behavior* (New York, 1946); also by J. Dewey, *op. cit.*, and elsewhere.

—calling, warning, threatening, expressing emotion—are essential uses of animal sounds, and incidental uses of human speech. The functions of animal vocalization are self-expression and sometimes, perhaps, indication of environmental conditions (like the bark of a dog who wants to be let in). The chief function of speech is denotation.

Animal language is not language at all; and, what is more important, *it never leads to language.*[7] Dogs that live with men learn to understand many verbal signals, but only as signals, in relation to their own actions. Apes, that live in droves and seem to communicate fairly well, never *converse.*[8] But a baby that has only half a dozen words begins to converse: "Daddy gone." "Daddy come? Daddy come." Question and answer, assertion and denial, denotation and description—these are the basic uses of language.

The line between animal and human estate is, I think, the language-line; and the gap it marks between those two kinds of life is almost as profound as the gap between plants and animals. This makes it plausible that we are not dealing with just a higher form of some general animal function, but with a new function developed in the hominid brain—a function of such complexity that probably not one, but many subhuman mental activities underlie it.

The complexity of living forms and functions is something that we are apt to underestimate in speculating on the origins of psychological phenomena. In textbook accounts the facts have to be generalized and simplified to make them comprehensible to beginners; but as soon as you tackle the monographic literature presenting actual cases of growth, maturation, and the conduct of life, and follow actual analyses of function and structure, especially in neurology, the complexity and variability of vital processes is brought home to you with great force. Consider only the chemical activities, that differ enough from any one organism to another to produce the so-called "individuality factor."[9] Or think of the structural organization of the brain; in the small brain center known as the "lateral geniculate body" where the optic nerve ceases to be one bundle of fibres and fans out toward the cortex of the occipital lobe, anatomists have found scores of so-called "boutons," points of reception or emission of electrical impulses, directly on nerve-cells, besides the synaptic con-

[7] As L. Boutan remarked in his article on the vocal habits of gibbons, "les animaux n'ont pas un langage rudimentaire. Leur langage n'est pas un langage. . . ." ("Le pseudo-langage. Observations effectées sur un anthropoide, le gibbon [Hylobates Leucogenys-Obilby]," *Actes de la Soc. Linnéenne de Bordeaux*, LCVII (1913), 5-77.)

[8] See R. M. Yerkes and H. W. Nissen, "Prelinguistic Sign Behavior in the Chimpanzee," *Science*, N.S. LXXXIX (1939) 585-587. The upshot of the reported experiments is "that delayed response, in the absence of spatial cues or with misleading cues, is either extremely difficult or impossible for most chimpanzees. . . . There is abundant evidence that various other types of sign process than the symbolic are of frequent occurrence and function effectively in the chimpanzee" (p. 587). Perhaps the title: "*Non*linguistic Sign Behavior . . ." would have been more accurate.

Despite such observations, the authors of *Animal Language* do not hesitate to attribute conversation to monkeys, and even to animals below the primates, nor to refer to their repertoire of sounds as a vocabulary having direct affinities with human speech. "The gregarious baboons," writes Mr. Huxley, who composed the text, "are very conversational animals. Most of its communications, both in the pack and in its component family groups, are effected by voice" (Huxley and Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 55). And more remarkable still: "The sea-lions, . . . as befits their social and intelligent nature, are noisy animals, and possess a considerable vocabulary, although the different sounds are all variations on one theme—the familiar, rather raucous bark. Mr. Koch believes that sea-lions also express different meanings (as do the Chinese) by merely changing the pitch of their note" (*ibid.*, p. 49).

[9] Cf. Leo Loeb, *The Biological Basis of Individuality* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1945).

nections of the branching axons and dendrites of those same cells.[10] The potentialities of such a brain for different courses of activity run into billions and trillions, so that even if inhibiting mechanisms eliminate a hundred thousand connections at a time, the range of possible responses, especially in the crowded circuits of the forebrain, are as good as infinite.

It is very wholesome for a philosopher who tries to conceive of what we call "mind" to take a long look at neurological exhibits, because in psychological studies we usually see and consider only the integrated products—actions and intentions and thoughts—and with regard to speech, words and their uses. Words seem to be the elements of speech; they are the units that keep their essential identity in different relational patterns, and can be separately moved around. They keep their "roots" despite grammatical variations, despite prefixes and suffixes and other modifications. A word is the ultimate semantic element of speech. A large class of our words—most of the nouns, or names—denote objects, and objects are units that can enter into many different situations while keeping their identity, much as words can occur in different statements. This relation gives great support to the conception of words as the units of speech.

And so, I think, they are. But this does not mean that they are original elements of speech, primitive units that were progressively combined into propositions. Communication, among people who inherit language, begins with the word—the baby's or foreigner's unelaborated key word, that stands proxy for a true sentence; but that word has a phylogenetic history, the rise of language, in which probably neither it nor any archaic version of it was an element.

I think it likely that words have actually emerged through progressive simplification of a much more elaborate earlier kind of utterance, which stemmed, in its turn, from several quite diverse sources; and that none of its major sources were forms of animal communication, though some of them were communal.

These are odd-sounding propositions, and I am quite aware of their oddness, but perhaps they are not as fantastic as they sound. They merely depart rather abruptly from our usual background assumptions. For instance, the idea that a relatively simple part of a complex phenomenon might not be one of its primitive factors, but might be a product of progressive simplification, goes against our methodological canons; ever since Thomas Hobbes set up the so-called genetic method of understanding, we have believed that the simplest concepts into which we could break down our ideas of a complex phenomenon denoted the actual elements of that phenomenon, the factors out of which it was historically compounded. Locke's construction of human experience from pure and simple sense data, Condillac's fancied statue endowed with one form

[10] Cf. W. H. Marshall and S. A. Talbot, "Recent Evidence for Neural Mechanisms in Vision Leading to a General Theory of Sensory Activity." In H. Klüver's *Visual Mechanisms* (1942), pp. 117-164. "In the cat, optic tract endings in the geniculate divide into several branches and as many as forty ring-shaped boutons have been seen on single radiation cells which may come from as many as ten optic tract fibers. Each fiber also divides to form synapses with several radiation cells. In addition to bouton contacts the radiation cells have numerous dendritic processes, with which the optic tract endings make apparently more numerous synapses . . . than with the radiation cells themselves" (p. 122).

Cf. R. Lorente de Nó, "Vestibulo-Ocular Reflex Arc," *Arch. Neurol. and Psychiat.*, XXX (1933), 245-291. "On each cell in the nervous system numerous synapses, sometimes several thousand, are found. The synapses are always of different kinds, occasionally of ten or more" (p. 279).

of perception after another, and in our own time Bertrand Russell's "Logical atomism," all rest on this belief.[11] But close empirical study of vital processes in nature does not bear it out. A great many advanced behavior patterns *are* elaborations of simpler responses, but some are simplifications of very complicated earlier forms of action. The same hold true of the structures that implement them. When the reflex arc was discovered, physiologists felt themselves in possession of a key to all animal response, for here was a simple unit that could be supposed to engender all higher forms by progressive elaboration. But Herrick and Coghill, through careful studies of salamanders in their larval stages,[12] found that the reflex arc is not a primitive structure ontogenetically at all, but is preceded by much more elaborate arrangements in the embryo, that undergo simplifications until a unified afferent-efferent circuit results. This finding was corroborated by Lorente de Nó.[13]

A principle that is operative in the development of an individual is at least possible in the larger development of a stock. There is nothing absurd about the hypothesis that the simple units in a very advanced function, such as human speech, may be simplifications within an earlier more intricate vocal pattern.

Most theories of the origin of language presuppose that man was already man, with social intentions, when he began to speak.[14] But in fact, man must have been an animal—a high primate, with a tendency to live in droves like most of the great apes—when he began to speak. And it must have been rather different from the ancient progenitors of our apes, which evidently lacked, or at least never possessed in combination, those traits that have eventuated in speech.

What were those traits? Speech is such a complex function that it has probably not arisen from any single source. Yet if it developed naturally in the hominid stock, every one of its constituents must have started from some spontaneous animal activity, not been invented for a purpose; for only human beings invent instruments for a purpose preconceived. Before speech there is no conception; there is only perception, and a characteristic repertoire of actions, and a readiness to act according to the enticements of the perceived world. In speech as we know it, however, there seems to be one flowing, articulate symbolic act in which conventional signs are strung together in conventional ways without much trouble, and similar processes evoked in other persons, all as nicely timed as a rally of pingpong. Nothing seems more integral and self-contained than the outpouring of language in conversation. How is one ever to break it down into primitive acts?

It was from the psychiatric literature on language—on aphasia, paraphasia, agrammatism, alexia, and kindred subjects—that something like a guiding principle emerged. The most baffling

[11] A belief which has, indeed, been challenged a good many times; but it seems to be ingrained.

[12] C. J. Herrick & G. E. Coghill, "The Development of Reflex Mechanism in Amblystoma," *J. of Comp. Neurol.*, XXV (1915).

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 247. Here the simplification serves for economy; but Gerhardt v. Bonin, in his essay "Types and Similitudes," *Philosophy of Science*, XIII (1946), 196-202 observes that "the paleontological evidence has presented cases, such as the ammonites, where evolution produced at first more and more complicated, and later simpler and simpler forms" (p. 198).

[14] E.g., Lord Haldane, *op. cit.*, says, "A *Pithecanthropus* child which gave the danger call or the food discovery call without due cause was probably punished" (p. 398). But animals do not punish their young for mischief done; the "cuffing" a cub may receive from its mother is always interference with its momentary annoying act, to stop it. The concept of a *deed*, and hence praise and punishment, belong to human life.

thing about the cerebral disturbances of speech is, what strange losses people can sustain: loss of grammatical form without any loss or confusion of words, so the patient can speak only in "telegraph style," or contrariwise, loss or confusion of words without loss of sentence structure, so speech flows in easy sentence-like utterances, but only the prepositions, connectives, and vocal punctuations are recognizable; the informative words are all garbled or senseless.[15] Lewis Carroll's

> 'T was brillig, and the slithy toves
> Did gyre and gimble in the wabe

illustrates this separation of sentence form and verbal content. There may be inability to understand spoken language, but not inability to understand printed or written language,[16] yet without any defect of hearing; or the other way about—inability to read, but not to understand speech—without any ocular trouble.[17] There are cases of alexia for words but not for letters,[18] and the recognition, naming and using of numbers is often intact where neither letters nor words can be recognized.[19] Furthermore, some brain injuries leave the victim able to repeat words spoken for him, but not to speak spontaneously, and others make him unable to repeat words just heard, but not unable to utter them in spontaneous speech. There are even several cases on record of persons in whom a cerebral lesion caused inability to name any inanimate object, but not inability to name living things, and call people by their proper names, and, conversely, cases of inability to name persons, animals, or any parts of them, but not to find the words for inanimate objects like watches and slippers.[20]

In the face of these peculiar, sometimes really bizarre exhibits, it occurred to me that what can be separately lost from the integral phenomenon of speech may have been separately developed in the prehistoric, prehuman brain. Here is at least a working notion of a new way to break down the verbal process, that might yield a new conception of what has gone into it.

In singling out such elements, and trying to trace them back to some plausible—though of course hypothetical—prehuman proclivities, one meets with the surprising fact that some of these habits, that may be supposed to have prepared speech, actually exist in the animal kingdom, and are even quite highly developed, sometimes in relatively low animals. But they are far from any kind of speech. They are raw, unassembled materials, that would be needed in conjunction, as a foundation, if speech were to arise. In the pre-human primate they must have coincided at some time to provide that foundation.

This principle of analysis takes us much further back into preparatory phases of mental development than the usual anthropological approach to the problem of speech, which reaches back only to the supposed archaic forms of genuine language. Not only mental activities, but some grosser somatic conditions that made them possible, must

[15] See esp. M. Isserlin, "Über Agrammatismus," *Ztschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat.*, LXXV (1922), 332-410.

[16] H. Kogerer, "Worttaubheit, Melodientaubheit, Gebärdeagnosie," *Ztschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat.*, XCLL (1924), 469-483. Also H. Liepmann and M. Pappenheim, "Über einen Fall von sogenannter Leitungsaphasie mit anatomischem Befund," *Ztschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat.*, XXVII (1915), 1-41.

[17] All these special forms are listed in J. M. Nielsen's *Agnosia, Apraxia, Aphasia* (New York, 1936; 2nd ed., 1946).

[18] Goodhart & Savitsky, "Alexia Following Injuries of the Head," *Archives of Neurol. & Psychiatry*, XXX (1933), 223-224.

[19] F. Grewel, "Acalculia," *Brain*, LXXV (1952), 397-407.

[20] J. M. Nielsen, "Visual Agnosia for Animate Objects. Report of a Case with Autopsy," *Trans. Amer. Neurol. Assoc.* (1942), pp. 128-130.

have met in the animal stock that produced the human race. For instance, the continuity of language requires a bodily mechanism that can sustain a long process of vocalization. Not all animals can do that; it is interesting that the chimpanzee, which is nearest to man in mental capacity, cannot sustain a vowel sound; also it rarely produces a pure and simple sound. Its larynx is too complicated, and it has more than one source of air supply for it, and no fine control of a single set of bellows to mete out its vocal power.[21] The gibbon has a simpler larynx, more like ours, and also the requisite propensity to utter long, chant-like ululations in chorus: that is, it has the physical powers of vocalization, and the habit of using them in a gathered company—two prerequisites for speech.[22] But its brain is too inferior to endow its joyful noise with anything but self-expression and mutual stimulation to keep it up.

Another condition of speech is the epicritical ear, that distinguishes one sound from another, beyond the usual distinction of noises according to their sources—that is, beyond distinguishing them as calls of other creatures, as footsteps, perhaps as the splash of water, and for the rest either as meaningless rumbles and creaks, or not at all. The epicritical power of hearing requires a highly specialized cochlea and a distribution of the auditory nerve in the brain that is not found in all the higher animals, but occurs in several birds—an anomalous development in a relatively low type of brain. Those birds that imitate the whistles of other birds and the sounds of human speech, whereby we know they have a highly analytic hearing (which anatomical findings bear out),[23] have something more that is relevant to our own powers: the control of the vocal apparatus by the ear, which seems to be rudimentary in most animals, although the mechanisms of hearing and sound-making are always associated—even in the cricket, that has its peripheral organs of hearing in the thighs.[24] The kind of feedback that molds an utterance according to sounds heard, and makes formal imitation possible, is another specialization beyond the epicritical receptor organ. Dogs have the fine receptor, the ear that discriminates articulate sounds within a general category, for they can respond selectively to quite a gamut of verbal signals, and Pavlov found their discrimination of tonal pitch superior to man's; but dogs never show the slightest impulse or ability to imitate foreign sounds.

So we find several prerequisites for speech—sustained and variable vocalization, the tendency to responsive utterance, the epicritical hearing and fine control of vocalization by the ear that implement imitation—prefigured in the behavior patterns of widely different animals. Yet none of those animals use language. These traits are only some of its conditions, and even they do not coincide in any one species. In the protohuman primate they must have coincided—not only with each other, but with some further ones as well, that may or may not occur in other creatures.

The decisive function in the making of language comes, I think, from quite another quarter than the vocal-auditory complexes that serve its normal expres-

[21] See G. Kelemen, "Structure and Performance in Animal Language," *Archives of Otolaryngology*, L (1949), 740-744.

[22] L. Boutan, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 30-31.

[23] Otto Kalischer, "Das Grosshirn der Papageien in anatomischer und physiologischer Beziehung," *Abhandlungen der königl.-Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, IV (1905), 1-105. A study based on ten years' work of training, operating, retraining, finally autopsying some 60 talking parrots.

[24] Louis Guggenheim, *Phylogenesis of the Ear* (Culver City, California, 1948). See p. 78.

sion. That other quarter is the visual system, in which the visual image—the paradigm of what, therefore, we call "imagination"—almost certainly is produced.

How a visual image is engendered and what nervous mechanisms participate in its creation no one has yet described; I have gathered a few ideas on the subject, but they need not detain us here. The important thing is that images are the things that naturally take on the character of symbols. Images are "such stuff as dreams are made on"; dreams have the tendency to assume symbolic value, apparently very early in our lives; and the peculiar involutions of meaning in their imagery, the vagueness of connections, the spontaneity of their presentations and the emotional excitement of any very vivid dream, may well reflect the nature of primitive symbolic experience.

The old problem, how words became attached to objects as their distinctive names, and how they became generalized so they denoted kinds of things rather than individuals, may find its solution if we can give up the notion that primitive man *invented* speech, and agreed on names for things and other basic conventions. I do not believe names were originally assigned to things at all; *naming* is a process that presupposes speech. Now that we have language, we can give names to new comets, new gadgets, and constantly to new babies. But in the making of speech, I think it more likely that definite phonetic structures were already at hand, developed in another context, and that meanings accrued to them—vaguely and variably at first, but by natural processes that tended to specify and fix them. Such meanings were not pragmatic signal values of specific sounds for specific things; several eminent psychiatrists to the contrary notwithstanding,[25] primitive denotation was not like using a proper name. When words took shape, they were general in intent, from the beginning; their connotations inhered in them, and their denotations were whatever fitted this inherent sense.

Now that I have thus pontificated on what happened, let me explain why I think something like this must have happened, and how it would account for the greatest of all mysteries of language—the fact that language is symbolic, when no animal utterance shows any tendency that way. The biological factors that caused this great shift in the vocal function were, I believe, the development of visual imagery in the humanoid brain, and the part it came to play in a highly exciting, elating experience, the festal dance. (How prehuman beings advanced from animal behavior to formalized tribal dance is another relevant subject I cannot broach here.) The mental image was, I think, the catalyst that precipitated the conceptual import of speech.

As I remarked before, images are more prone than anything else we know to

[25] For instance, Sylvano Arieti, with whose views of symbol formation I agree in some respects (as will shortly be apparent), holds that in a primordial family a baby might babble "ma-ma" and associate the utterance "with the mother or with the image of the mother"; and that "if a second sibling understands that the sound ma-ma refers to mother, language is originated. . . . But at this level the sound ma-ma refers only to a particular mother . . . and not to any mother. In other words, the symbol ma-ma denotes, but does not possess much connotation power." "The Possibility of Psychosomatic Involvement of the Central Nervous System in Schizophrenia," *J. of Nervous & Mental Disease*, CXXIII (1956), 321-333. See esp. p. 32. Also J. S. Kasanin, "The Disturbance of Conceptual Thinking in Schizophrenia," in *Language and Thought in Schizophrenia*, ed. by J. S. Kasanin and N. D. C. Lewis (U. of Calif. Press, 1944): "—when the child says 'table' or 'chair' he does not mean tables or chairs in general, but the table or chair which is in his house or which belongs to him."

become symbols; they have several attributes that work together to make them symbolic. So it was another of the evolutionary coincidences that the Calibans who preceded us suffered a peculiar specialization in their visual systems, so that we produce mental images without even trying—most successfully, in fact, while we sleep.

There is a reason, of course, why this should be a hominid specialty, and we can at least guess what caused our odd and rather impractical habit of *visualizing*, with and without stimulation from the end-organs, the eyes. The human brain presumably developed, like any animal brain we know, as a mediating organ between afferent impulses and their efferent completion, that is, their spending themselves in action. In animals, typically, every stimulation that takes effect at all is spent in some overt act, which may be anything from a reflex twitch of the skin to a directed act of the whole aroused creature. But the messages which come into our brains are so many and various that it would be impossible and exhausting to spend each afferent impulse in overt action. So a great many, especially the countless visual impressions we take in, have to be finished within the brain; the cerebral response is the formation of an image. This automatic process may occur in animals, too, but sporadically and at a lower intensity, and therefore without further consequences. If animals have images, I don't think they are bothered by them or use them; such passing visions may be like our after-images, automatic products of sensory stimulation.[26]

[26] This difference in the frequency, intensity, and clarity of images in human and animal brains, is strikingly corroborated and anatomically explained in Niessl v. Mayendorf's article, "Über den vasomotorischen Mechanisms der Halluzinationen," *Ztschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat.*, CXIV (1928), 311-322.

In human beings, however, image making has become a normal conclusion for acts of focussed gazing. Since, in the waking state, it is easier to look at things than not to, image-production is generally effortless and unintentional, and in the normal course of development soon becomes so rich that there is a constant play of imagery. Every impression is apt to produce an image, however briefly and incompletely, and out of this welter a few more definite visualizations emerge at intervals.

The several characteristics that make the mental image prone to become symbolic are, in the first place, this spontaneous, quasi-automatic production; secondly, a tendency of image-making processes to mesh, and pool their results; then, their origin in actual perception, which gives images an obvious relation to the sources of perception—things perceived—a relation we call "representation"; furthermore, the very important fact that an image, once formed, can be reactivated in many ways, by all sorts of external and internal stimulations; and finally, its involvement with emotion. Let us consider what each of these traits has to do with the making of the primitive symbol, and with the enlistment of the vocal organs for its projection.

A biological mechanism that is about to assume a new function is usually developed at least somewhat beyond the needs of its original function; that is, its activity has a certain amount of play, sometimes called "excess energy," which allows unpredictable developments. A new departure is not likely to be based on rare occurrences, for to become established it has to survive many miscarriages, and that means that it has to begin over and over again—that is, the conditions for it have to be generous. So, in a brain where imagination was

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to take on a new and momentous function—symbolization—the production of images had to be a vigorous business, generating images all the time, so that most of them could be wasted, and the symbolic activity could still begin again and again, and proceed to various degrees, without interfering with the normal functions of the brain in the whole organic economy. So the normality and ease of image producing met one of the first requisites for the rise of a higher function.[27]

The second important feature of mental images for symbol making is the fact that the processes of imagination seem particularly prone to affect each other, to mingle and mesh and share their paths of activity, inhibiting or reinforcing nervous impulses in progress, and especially inducing all sorts of neighboring reactions. Consequently their products tend to fuse; images that share some features fuse into one image with emphasis on those features, which thereby are stressed, and dominate the welter of other characters that, for their part, are weakened by fusion. Images, therefore, modify each other, some dominate others, and all tend to become simplified. Emphasis is what gives contours and gradients and other structural elements to images. Emphasis is the natural process of abstraction, whereby our visual representations are made to differ from the direct perceptions that started them. Rudolph Arnheim, in his book, *Art and Visual Perception*,[28] has gone quite deeply into the distinctions between the laws of perception and those of representation. The point of interest here is that the power of abstract symbolic thinking, which plays such a great part in later human mentality, rests on a relatively primitive talent of abstractive seeing that comes with the nature of the visual image.[29]

The third major condition is simply the fact that images stem from percepts, and the process of their derivation is an original continuity of a peripheral event, the effect of a visible object on the eye, with the further nervous events that terminate in the formation of an image in the brain. The eye is the end-organ of the visual apparatus; what goes on behind the retina, and especially, perhaps, beyond the chiasma, is the rest of our seeing, with all its reverberations and complications and their astounding effects. The recognition of an image as something connected with the external world is intuitive,[30] as the response to external things in direct visual perception, which all seeing animals exhibit, is instinctive. This recognition of images as representations of visible things is the basis on which the whole

[27] This fact is mentioned by P. L. Short in his paper, "The Objective Study of Mental Imagery," *Brit. J. of Psychol.*, XLIV (1953), 38-51, where he writes: ". . . in thinking, it is the images that occur most readily and habitually that are important, not the ones thought to be most 'intense' or 'vivid' at a given moment. The mere emergence of very vivid images may not be associated at all with the tendency to have and to use images" (p. 38). He also notes the importance of the connection between percepts and centrally produced images.

[28] (University of California Press, 1954.)

[29] Some interesting comments on abstractive seeing may also be found in Leo Steinberg's paper, "The Eye is a Part of the Mind," *Partisan Review*, XX (1953), 194-212. (Reprinted in *Reflections on Art*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958.) There are also various studies of the neural processes involved in such sensory abstraction, e.g., D. M. Purdy's "The Structure of the Visual World," *Psychol. Rev.*, XLIII (1936), 59-82, esp. Part III; Fred Attneave's technological essay, "Some Informational Aspects of Visual Perception," *Psychol. Rev.*, LXI (1954), 183-193; Norbert Wiener's *Cybernetics* (New York, 1948); and esp. in a study by W. H. Marshall and S. A. Talbot, "Recent Evidence for Neural Mechanisms in Vision Leading to a General Theory of Sensory Acuity," in H. Klüver's *Visual Mechanisms* (1942), pp. 117-164.

[30] Cf. D. Forsyth, "The Infantile Psyche, with Special Reference to Visual Projection," *Brit. J. of Psychol.*, XI (1920-21), 263-276.

public importance of symbols is built—their use for reference. But there must have been another coincidence to make that happen.

This crucial fourth factor is really part of that lability of imagination, and openness to influence, that we have already remarked; but more precisely, it is the fact that the occurrence of an image may be induced by a great many different kinds of stimulation, either from outside the organism or from within.[31] Often one cannot tell what evokes a mental image; sometimes a whole situation that often recurs will always do it; for instance, whenever you step out on a pier and smell salt water you may have an image of your first sail boat. Even the salt smell alone may invoke it. So may the mention of the boat's name. Those are more specific stimuli, but there can be all kinds. This readiness to occur in a total context, but also to be touched off by small fragments of that context encountered in other settings, is the trait that frees the mental image from its original connection with peripheral vision, that is, from the thing it first represented. Add to this the tendency of images with traits in common to fuse and make a simplified image —that is, to become schematic—and you see how much of our image-making would become casual acts of ideation, without any specific memory bonds to perceptual experiences. Not only the images themselves that share a schematic character, but also their representational functions fuse; any one of them can represent the original percept of any other; that is, as representations whole families of them can stand proxy one for another. Any image of a grasshopper can represent any grasshopper we have actually seen, that was not so distinctive that it created an image too different to fit the schema. If such an oddity appears we form an image of a *special kind* of grasshopper. With its liberation from perception the image becomes general; and as soon as it can represent something else than its own original stimulus, it becomes a symbol. Schematic similarities in otherwise distinct images make it possible to recall one object through the image of another. Thus, for instance, the outline of the new moon is like that of a small curved boat. We can see the moon as a canoe, or a canoe as a moon. Either assimilation reinforces the perception of shape. This is the natural process of abstraction. We speak of the sickle, the bowl, the disc of the moon in its various phases. In developed thinking we know whether we are talking about the moon or about a boat—that is, we know which image is standing proxy for the other; but studies in the symbolic functions occurring in dream and myth and some psychoses give support to the belief that this is a sober insight which was probably not very early.[32] At the level of prehuman image-mongering, the question is rather how one image, even without sensory sup-

[31] D. Forsyth, *op. cit.* (p. 265): "The visual organ . . . transmits a centripetal wave of excitement which is registered in the mind as a memorative impression of the excitation. This visual memory becomes associated with inner (somatic) excitations, and can subsequently be activated from either of the two directions in which it has established excitatory connections. . . ."

[32] The sources substantiating this proposition are too scattered and numerous to quote. One of the first explicit statements of it is found in an article which has become a classic—Herbert Silberer's "Über die Symbolbildung," *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische u. psychopathologische Forschungen*, III (1912), 661-723, republished in English translation, unfortunately with some deletions, in David Rapaport's anthology, *Organization and Pathology of Thought* (New York, 1951). Silberer wrote: "A people which speaks in metaphors does not experience what it says as metaphoric; the symbols it uses are regarded by it not as symbols, but rather as realities. . . ." (Rapaport, p. 212). They certainly all contradicts the claim of J. P. Sârtre in *L'Imagination* (Paris, 1948), p. 104, that one never mistakes a phantasy image for a percept: "Aucune image, jamais, ne vient se mêler aux

port, becomes dominant over others, so that they are its symbolic representatives in imagination.

Here, the mechanism seems to be the connection of imagery with emotion. In the complex of images, the one most charged with emotion becomes the dominant image which all the others repeat, reinforce and represent within the brain itself, even below the level of awareness—in the limbo of what Freud called "the dream work," whereby the significant images, the symbols for conception, are made.

These are, I think, the main physical and behavioral factors that must have existed conjointly in the one animal species that has developed speech: the power of elaborate vocalization, the discriminative ear that heard patterns of sounds, the nervous mechanisms that controlled utterance by hearing of inner and outer sounds, and the tendency to utter long passages of sound in gatherings of many individuals—that is, the habit of joint ululation—with considerable articulation that recurred at about the same point within every such occasion; and, in these same beings, the high mental activity that issued in visual image-making. The gatherings were probably communal rituals, or rather, awesome aesthetic precursors of genuine ritual, the ululations the vocal elements in primitive dance. This idea was propounded long ago by J. Donovan,[33] but no one seems to have paid much attention to it. I adopted it in an early book, *Philosophy in a New Key*, and the more I reflect on it the more I think it is sound. It was Donovan's idea that words were not primitive elements in human utterance when it became symbolic, but that meaning first accrued to longer passages, which were gradually broken or condensed into separate bits, each with its own fixed sense. But what he did not say—and I did not see, twenty years ago—was how conceptual meaning accrued to any vocal products at all. I certainly never realized what part the private mental image played in preparing the way for symbolic language—that the whole mechanism of symbolization was probably worked out in the visual system before its power could be transferred to the vocal-auditory realm. Now, with that helpful surmise, let us see how the transfer would be possible, and not too improbable.

In the elaborate development of tribal dance all individuals of the primitive horde became familiar with the vocal sounds that belonged to various sequences of steps and gestures, some perhaps mimetic, others simply athletic, but working up to climaxes of excitement. The "song," or vocal part of the dance, became more and more differentiated with the evolution of the gestic patterns. At high points there were undoubtedly special shouts and elaborate halloos. In the over-stimulated brains of the celebrants, images must have been evoked at these points of action and special vocalization—images that tended to recur in that context, until for each individual his own symbolic images were built into the familiar patterns of tribal rituals. A dance passage takes time and energy and usually several persons to produce, but the vocal ingredient can be produced with little effort and a minimum of time by any individual. To remember the dance would bring the vocal element to his throat; as the memory of playing "London Bridge" will usually cause a child to hum the tune,

choses réelles" (p. 109). And further: ". . . il m'est impossible de former une image sans savoir en même temps que je forme une image . . . ." (p. 110).

[33] "The Festal Origin of Human Speech," *Mind*, O.S. XVI (1891), 498-506, and XVII (1892), 325-339.

"Lon-don Bridge is fal-ling down,"

with no thought of a bridge or a fair lady, but of the game. So people could reactivate their emotional symbolic images by a snatch of the festal songs. If the dance-action is, say, swinging a club, or even feels like that familiar and expansive act, the various images evoked will be of a club, or clubs, or raising or swinging clubs, or cracking them against each other. It is the image that symbolizes the activity and the objects involved in it. The image is the magical effect of the sound pattern when it is intoned apart from the dance.

The image is a pure conception; it does not signalize or demand its object, but denotes it. Of course, this denotative symbol, the image, begets no communication, for it is purely private. But the things imaged are public, and the sounds that activate images are public; they affect everybody by evoking images at roughly the same moments of dance-action. Within a fairly wide range it does not matter how different the private images are. They are equivalent symbols for the act or the objects that mark those stations in the ritual where the vocal bits belong, which may be uttered out of context by some individual; and suddenly meaning accrues to the phrase, other beings *understand*, especially if a connoted object is physically at hand, apart from its ritual context.

I suspect that the first meanings of such secularized vocalization were very vague; swing a club, hit a man with a club, kill man and beast, whirl and hit, get hit, wave a club at the moon—may all have belonged by turns to one long utterance, in which the separate articulate parts need not have had any separable meanings.[34] But once such passages were used to evoke ideas, their vocalization would quickly become modified; especially by reduction to the *speaking voice*, which can utter its sounds with more speed and less effort than any singing voice. This everyday utterance would tend to emphasize vowels and consonants—that is, mouth articulations—to replace distinctions of pitch. Some languages have kept tonal distinctions, without precise pitch, as semantic devices. But in most human speech tones serve only for punctuation and emotional coloring.

The great step from anthropoid to anthropos, animal to man, was taken when the vocal organs were moved to register the occurrence of an image, and stirred an equivalent occurrence in another brain, and the two creatures referred to the same thing. At that point, the vocal habit that had long served for communion assumed the function of communication. To evoke ideas in each other's minds, not in the course of action, but of emotion and memory—that is, in reflection—is to communicate *about* something; and that is what no animals do.

From then on, speech probably advanced with headlong speed; the vaguely articulated phrases of the gathered horde contracted around their cores of meaning and made long, rich, omnibus words, and broke up into more specifically denotative words, until practically the whole phonetic repertoire was formalized into separable bits, and language entered the synthetic stage of making sentences out of words—the reverse of its pristine articulative process. The new motive of communication must have driven it like wildfire. At this stage if not before, the actual evocation of images became dispensable. We do not need vision to learn speech. The symbolic function has passed to the act of

[34] In the 1957 ed. of the *Encyclopoedia Britannica*, *s.v.* "Language," Otto Jespersen voices the same opinion.

speech itself, and from there finally to the word itself, so that even hearing may be prosthetically replaced. For when verbalization is complete, people have not only speech, but language.

I think there were other uses of speech-like utterance, too—the principle of tracking down the elements of language that may be separately lost by cerebral impairment even today, leads in many directions. Proper names may not have had the same origin as genuine nouns, and numerals are something different again; onomatopoetic words, too, seem to have had their own genesis, apart from the main source of language. But under the influence of language all utterances tended to become words. This is still the case. For instance, our expletives, that have no real verbal meaning in present-day language, always fall under its influence: only a German says "ach"—most Americans cannot even pronounce it; he says "au" where an American says "ouch"; and who but a Frenchwoman would say "ou-la-la"?

Once communication got started, the rise of human mentality may have been cataclysmic, a matter of a few generations wherever it began at all. It must have been an exciting and disconcerting phase of our history. We have traces of it even to this day in the holy fear in which many people hold divine names, blessings, curses, magic formulae—all verbal fragments, imbued with the mystic power of thought that came with speech.

In looking back over all these processes that must have come together to beget language, I am struck by a few outstanding facts: in the first place, the depth to which the foundations go on which this highest of all creature attainments is built; secondly, the complexity of all living functions—for every one of those preparatory traits was itself a highly integrated complex of many nervous processes; thirdly, the fact that not one of the constituents in the new and fateful talent was a mode of animal communication. It seems most likely that the office of communication was taken over by speech, from entirely different activities, when speech was well started; but undoubtedly communication was what henceforth made its history. Finally, it is a notable fact that the two senses which hold the greatest places in the human cortex, sight and hearing, were both needed to produce language; neither a sightless nor a deaf race could have evolved it. If man could either hear no evil or see no evil, he could speak no evil; nor yet any good.

A RE-EVALUATION OF CAMPBELL'S DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE

Lloyd F. Bitzer

THERE is some question about the merit of the Rev. Dr. George Campbell's discussion of evidence in Chapter Five of his *Philosophy of Rhetoric,* first published in 1776. Writing about fifty years later, Richard Whately claimed that Campbell was totally misguided, and more recently C. W. Edney expressed a similar judgment. In this paper, I wish to discuss Campbell's doctrine of evidence and the chief criticisms by Whately and Edney. I wish to suggest, too, that Campbell's treatment of evidence deserves more attention and respect than it has received, for it represents an important solution to what is sometimes called the problem of knowledge.

The problem of knowledge may be stated as a question: Precisely how does the practitioner of rhetoric *know* that the sentences he writes and utters are true? One answer is that he knows a sentence is true when he knows that sufficient evidence supports or verifies it. This answer is adequate practically. But it is inadequate theoretically, for it raises and leaves unanswered this further question: Precisely what are the legitimate kinds of evidence? This question, though not ordinarily asked of the practitioner, is often and properly asked of the theorist.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, when Campbell began writing his rhetoric, some philosophers had declared that the mind possesses no legitimate evidence for some of the most important "truths" it claims to know. Locke discredited innate ideas as a source of evidence and attempted to base knowledge exclusively upon experience. However, his critics pointed out that experience supplies no clue as to the nature of material or spiritual substance and no satisfactory means of distinguishing between ideas which resemble objects and ideas which do not. Locke's universe contains material objects, ideas, and minds, but it is impossible to know whether any set of ideas accurately represents objects. Bishop Berkeley, who saw clearly the sceptical tendencies in Locke's philosophy, tried to re-establish knowledge on the principle that *"esse est percipi"*—to be is to be perceived, or known. In Berkeley's universe, there are no material objects—only spirits and their perceptions and notions. He dismisses material substance as an empty and useless term, on the grounds that it cannot be known. The things we experience—tables, chairs, events, etc.—are perceptions provided by God, and knowledge is possible as long as God continues to supply our perceptions regularly.

Although the contributions to scepticism of Locke and Berkeley were unintentional, David Hume's philosophy systematically undermined nearly every form of evidence. In his *Treatise of*

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Human Nature, published in 1739-40, Hume argues that we have no evidence for believing in anything other than our own private states of mind. We have no evidence for the existence of spiritual or material substance, no evidence for the existence of God or the soul, and no evidence that events are causally related. Belief, he holds, is more a function of feeling than of evidence. Summarizing his position, Hume doubts the ability of human understanding to arrive at a single true proposition:

> I have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life.[1]

The implications of Hume's view are obvious: The rhetor has no certain evidence for his propositions; his own beliefs and those of his audience are products of feeling rather than of evidence and reason; he cannot ever know that the belief or action he urges is truly good or bad.

Campbell's doctrine of evidence emerged out of this context of scepticism—an unfavorable context, surely, for a theorist whose aim was to provide for the truth of statements in rhetorical discourse. Unwilling to accept Hume's conclusions, Campbell adopted elements of the common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid (*Enquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense,* 1764). Both men argued that when philosophical conclusions contradict propositions which common sense knows to be true, the conclusions must be false. In Reid's view, common-sense knowledge is the foundation of sound philosophical speculation. In Campbell's view, as we shall note, common-sense knowledge occupies in rhetoric an equally important place.

Campbell begins Chapter Five of *Philosophy of Rhetoric* with a definition of truth. "Logical truth," he says, "consisteth in the conformity of our conceptions to their archetypes in the nature of things." We recognize this conformity, and hence the truth of our statements, by intuition or by deduction—two broad types of evidence.[2]

Intuitive evidence he divides into three kinds: evidence from pure intellection, evidence from consciousness, and evidence from common sense. Evidence from pure intellection confirms statements akin to the axioms of mathematics, such as "the whole is greater than a part" and "two plus two equals four." Once we pay attention to the meaning of the terms in these and similar statements, we assent to their truth. Evidence from consciousness verifies statements such as "I now see a blue patch on a red field" and "I feel a rough surface." All such statements we know are true simply because consciousness contains the data these statements refer to.

The third and most important kind of intuitive evidence is the kind supplied by common sense. Common sense, according to Campbell, is "an original

[1] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40), Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sec. 7. For Hume's sceptical views regarding reason and sense knowledge, see especially Bk. I, Pt. IV, Secs. 1 and 2.

[2] Campbell's discussion of evidence in Chap. V is orderly, with chapter divisions devoted to separate kinds of evidence. Sec. I concerns intuitive evidence; within this section, Pt. I concerns pure intellection, Pt. II consciousness, and Pt. III common sense. Sec. II treats deductive evidence; within this section, Pt. I concerns the distinction between demonstrative and moral evidence, Pt. II treats experience, and Pt. III consists of discussion of the kinds of moral evidence: (1) experience, (2) analogy, (3) testimony, and (4) calculation of chances. Subsequent references in my discussion of Chap. V will be made only in cases which might otherwise be unclear. At most points, however, the reader will find the preceding divisions adequate.

source of knowledge common to all mankind." It verifies many of the same principles Hume had said were incapable of proof. It is evidence for principles such as these: "Whatever has a beginning has a cause"; "The future will resemble the past"; "There are other intelligent beings in the universe beside me"; and "The clear representations of my memory, in regard to past events, are indubitably true." Such principles cannot be confirmed through reason; neither can they be confirmed through the senses. But they must be true, for "it is impossible, without a full conviction of them, to advance a single step in the acquisition of knowledge especially in all that regards mankind, life, and conduct."

Campbell next considers deductive evidence, which is either demonstrative or moral and is constructed out of intuitive truths. Demonstration consists of an uninterrupted series of truths secured intuitively by pure intellection. We find in mathematics the purest use of demonstrative evidence. Moral evidence is founded on truths given intuitively by consciousness and common sense. It is of three kinds: experience, analogy, and testimony. Experience is a habit of mind by which we generalize perceptions which usually occur together. The certainty of generalizations given by experience depends on the number and uniformity of instances. Analogy is "founded on some remote similitude" and is, therefore, relatively weak. The testimony of other persons is the third kind of moral evidence, and it is trustworthy if we have no reason to doubt or mistrust it. Campbell concludes his discussion of types of evidence with calculation of chances, a mixture of the demonstrative and the moral. Let us consider now the chief criticisms against Campbell's analysis of evidence.

Mr. C. W. Edney, writing in *Speech Monographs*, maintains that Campbell was confused in his analysis of evidence and that common-sense truths are no other than inductive inferences:

> There seems to be no question but that Campbell confused the "intuitive" perception of truth with the "rational" acquisition of truth. We have noticed that he classified such generalizations as "the course of nature will be the same tomorrow as it is today" as "intuitive" truths. Actually, generalizations of this kind are inductive inferences. . . . The same may be said of other examples of "intuitive" truths furnished by our author.[3]

However, it can be shown that Campbell was not confused at all; that some propositions be analyzed as he maintained, or in some similar way, is one condition of human knowledge about external reality.

Near the close of his discussion of evidence, Campbell presents a peculiar argument about memory which is, perhaps, the most damaging of sceptical arguments and which dramatizes the necessity for our having the intuited truths Campbell believes we do have. We know that reports of memory are sometimes fallible, his argument goes, yet without belief in the reports of memory we cannot arrive at a single deductive truth:

> It was observed of memory, that as it instantly succeeds sensation, it is the repository of all the stores from which our experience is collected, and that without an implicit faith in the clear representations of that faculty, we could not advance a step in the acquisition of experimental knowledge. Yet we know that memory is not infallible; nor can we pretend, that in any case there is not a physical possibility of her making a false report. Here, it may be said, is an irremediable imbecility in the very foundation of moral reasoning.[4]

The imbecility, Campbell continues,

[3] Clarence W. Edney, "George Campbell's Theory of Logical Truth," *Speech Monographs*, XV (1948), 28.

[4] Chap. V, Sec. II, Pt. IV.

is not confined to moral reasoning; it affects all reasoning, even the demonstrations of pure mathematics. Mathematical demonstrations proceed from step to step, and the series involves too many steps for the understanding to view all at once. Therefore, memory must be relied on, and it is just as likely to fail the mathematician as the physicist or theologian or layman.

This argument may seem so trivial as to be dismissed. Yet it haunts the philosophic mind. Memory must be reliable in specifiable instances, else we can never be certain of anything other than what we immediately perceive or what we know intuitively from pure intellection. If memory is not reliable, we cannot trust testimony, analogy, experience, or demonstration—the sources of evidence for philosophy, religion, history, rhetoric, and all sciences. The problem is crucial for the philosopher: How can we know that this or that fact is *accurately* remembered? Campbell answers: "The clear representations of memory, in regard to past events, are indubitably true." But how can this principle be proved? It cannot, since the principle itself is a necessary condition for every demonstration, including induction. If it cannot be demonstrated, then what assurance have we that the principle is true? Campbell answers that we know it intuitively; it is a truth supplied by common sense.

The case is the same for the other truths of common sense, including "The future will resemble the past," a principle Mr. Edney thinks is an inductive generalization.[5] In Campbell's view, induction rests upon the principle that "the unknown resembles the known; or which is equivalent, that the future will resemble the past." This principle cannot be established inductively, for we have no experience, and therefore no knowledge, of future events. Furthermore, the principle itself must be presupposed before induction can take place. We cannot, then, prove inductively that "The future will resemble the past," because this very principle already stands as a premise of the proof. What reason have we for believing in a principle for which no proof, inductive or deductive, can be offered? "I have every reason to believe in it," replies Campbell. By *reason*, he means "not an argument, or medium of proving but a ground in human nature on which a particular judgment is founded."[6] The ground in human nature is, of course, common sense.

We may better appreciate the importance of Campbell's common-sense evidence when we recall that the principles which he analyzes as common-sense truths are some of the very ones doubted by Hume. To some extent Campbell agreed with Hume: Neither sense knowledge nor reason confirms the principles of common sense. If there is no other source of evidence, then the wildest claims of sceptics cannot be refuted:

> It is, perhaps, physically possible that the course of nature will be inverted the very next moment; that my memory is no other than a delirium, and my life a dream; that all is mere illusion; that I am the only being in the universe, and that there is no such thing as body.[7]

But no person, he says, can seriously entertain such doubts without making a shambles of human knowledge and impairing his own sanity. Fortunately, we need not entertain such doubts, because the principles of common sense "are truths so plain, that no man can

[5] The view expressed by Edney represents one side of the controversy over induction. For a statement of the opposite view, see Chap. VI of Bertrand Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy* (London, 1913).

[6] Chap. VI, concluding note.

[7] Chap. V, Sec. I, Pt. III.

doubt of them"; their *plainness,* which we intuit,[8] is evidence of their truth:

> What ground of assent beyond their own plainness ought we to seek; what beside this can we ever hope to find, or what better reason needs be given for denominating such truths the dictates of common sense?[9]

Common-sense principles are certain, and they guarantee an intelligible universe in which rhetoric may be both useful and sound.

We may have reservations about Campbell's solution of the problem of knowledge, and we may doubt that he successfully refuted scepticism, but there are no grounds for suspecting that he was himself unclear about his purpose and method. Campbell knew exactly what he was doing when he claimed there are certain truths which common sense supplies and which cannot be known by any other source.

Another criticism is found in Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric.* Whately thought Campbell ignorant of logic and therefore handicapped in the development of his ideas:

> His great defect, which not only leads him into occasional errors, but leaves many of his best ideas but imperfectly developed, is his ignorance and utter misconception of the nature and object of Logic. . . . Rhetoric being in truth an off-shoot of Logic, that Rhetorician must labour under great disadvantages who is not only ill-acquainted with that system, but also utterly unconscious of his deficiency.[10]

Mr. Edney makes a similar point in his article. Not only was Campbell poorly informed about logic, but he neglected the role of logical proof in rhetorical persuasion and was a dabbler in epistemological disputes:

> It is to be regretted that Campbell was not better informed as to the nature of logical proof. Had he been so informed he might have had more to contribute to the theory of the discovery of proof in a communicative situation.
>
> As it is, the exposition of "logical truth" prepared by Campbell is what one would expect from an eighteenth-century Englishman who was interested in the epistemological aspects of the philosophy of his day but who was relatively unacquainted with the theory of logical proof.[11]

There are two answers to these criticisms. First, in Campbell's analysis of the rhetorical process, persuasion hinges most upon the communication of "lively and glowing ideas" and least upon logical proof.[12] By design, his rhetoric contains no detailed discussion of argument. Therefore, to say that Campbell was deficient in logic or that he neglected logical proof is not valid criticism. If his *system* is adequate theoretically and practically, then any alleged deficiency or neglect is inconsequential. The criticisms by Whately and Edney may become valid when it is shown that Campbell's system is inadequate due to his deficiency or neglect; to my knowledge, however, no such inadequacy has been shown.

The second answer is that the philosophical issues of Campbell's age were not primarily logical, but epistemological. The sceptical arguments of the period were not designed chiefly to destroy the forms of logical proof—nearly every sceptic would grant that given true premises and validity, necessarily true conclusions will follow. Rather, scepticism claimed that the premises are unknowable. It seems, therefore, that Campbell's interest in evidence, as the source of certain knowledge, was

[8] The sense in which common-sense truths are "intuited" is clarified by Campbell as follows: "If any person . . . should not think the term intuitive so properly applied to the evidence of the last mentioned, let him denominate it, if he please, instinctive: I have no objection to the term; nor do I think it derogates in the least from the dignity, the certainty, or the importance of the truths themselves. Such insincts are no other than the oracles of eternal wisdom." (Sec. I, Pt. III)

[9] Sec. I, Pt. III, note.

[10] Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric* (London, 7th ed. rev., 1846), Introduction, Sec. 2.

[11] Edney, p. 32.

[12] Chap. VII, Sec. IV.

just the thing he should have been interested in. Campbell attempted to solve the most difficult problem he could have chosen: How does the practitioner of rhetoric get true propositions?

Campbell believed that a primary duty of the theorist is to provide a rationale for the utterance of true propositions by practitioners of rhetoric. This belief places him in that tradition of rhetoric which is perhaps the noblest, but surely the most ambitious —a tradition which includes Plato and St. Augustine. Each of these men attempts to solve the problem of knowledge, as that problem relates to the language of rhetoric. Yet their solutions are quite different. The practitioner of a Platonic rhetoric must in some way apprehend those eternal truths which reside in the world of "Forms." The practitioner of an Augustinian rhetoric must accept a set of religious truths which are revealed. The practitioner of Campbell's rhetoric, however, need only possess a good stock of intelligence and "common sense." *There are certain common-sense principles which are intuitively certain and which provide the underpinnings for a multitude of other truths.* This is the distinctive feature of George Campbell's analysis of evidence.

MEMORY: THE LOST CANON?

Wayne E. Hoogestraat

THIRTY-TWO years ago there appeared in the *QJS* an article entitled "Hippias and the Lost Canon of Rhetoric." The author of that article, Bromley Smith, reviewed the literature of rhetoric from the ancients to the date of his writing, tracing the treatment of memory through the ages. After his extensive review, Smith concluded that in reality the canon of memory, as represented by Hippias, had been lost, or at least had disappeared from the literature of public speaking.

According to Smith, by the time of the British rhetoricians Blair, Campbell, and Kames (eighteenth century) the canon of memory had been dropped. He further stated that Whately, Hill, and Genung (nineteenth century) failed to give any notice to the subject. These and other observations caused Smith to conclude that memory is a lost art: "Thus after two thousand years the principle taught by Hippias has vanished from the art of public speaking."[1]

Memory, to Smith, was represented by Hippias of Elis, a polymath who gave instruction in the training of memory. Hippias is reported to be the first to consider the training of the memory as an essential in the education of an orator. This is accepted by Thonssen and Baird, who cite Smith:

> Tradition has it that Simonides discovered the memory, but undoubtedly Hippias was the first man who "considered the training of the memory as essential discipline in the education of an orator."[2]

Instruction in the training of memory may have disappeared from rhetoric and public speaking as Smith contended. But, as he says, "Memory itself remains and is highly essential, yet it has lost its ancient importance."[3] The term memory continues to appear in rhetorics and public speaking texts. Our query then is, how are these writers treating memory? Have we defined the ancient canon too narrowly, in that it might include more than the "training of memory"? And what relationship does present-day "memory" bear to the ancient canon of memory?

1.

Memory as one of the classical divisions of rhetoric receives a rather complete treatment beginning with Cicero and Quintilian. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* gives us no insight into the canon of memory. (He has a separate work, of course, *De Memoria Et Reminiscentia.*) From Cicero's early work *De Inventione* we gather only a brief definition: "Memory is the firm mental grasp of matter and words."[4]

In *De Oratore,* Cicero begins his section on memory by relating the story of Simonides who supposedly identified the dead of a certain disaster by the seating arrangement of the group before the disaster. Simonides recalled the place where each had been sitting and thus

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1 Bromley Smith, "Hippias and a Lost Canon of Rhetoric," *QJS,* XII (1926), 136.

2 Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism* (New York, 1948), p. 39.

3 Smith, p. 144.

4 Cicero *De Inventione,* i. 7.

identified the bodies. This incident is reported as the discovery of memory. Cicero concludes his narrative with this reference to Simonides: "Admonished by this occurrence, he is reported to have discovered that it is chiefly order that gives distinctness to memory."[5]

In the brief coverage in *De Oratore*, Cicero mentions the great value of memory in oratory, commenting on the excellence of being able to recall all of the "cause" complete with arguments, opinions, instructions, and arrangement of the language. He mentions artificial memory as that which results from practice. His method for impressing matters upon the memory is as follows:

> The memory of things is the proper business of the orator; this we may be enabled to impress on ourselves by the creation of imaginary figures, aptly arranged, to represent particular heads, so that we may recollect thoughts by images, and their order by place.

Cicero further explains his visual imagery method of memory:

> For Simonides, or whoever else invented the art, wisely saw, that those things are most strongly fixed in our minds, which are communicated to them, and imprinted upon them, by the senses; that of all the senses that of seeing is the most acute; . . . that what we are scarcely capable of comprehending by thought we may retain as it were by the aid of visual faculty. By these imaginary forms and objects, as by all those that come under our corporeal vision, our memory is admonished and excited: but some place for them must be imagined; as bodily shape cannot be conceived without a place for it. That I may not, then, be prolix and impertinent upon so well-known and common a subject, we must fancy many plain distinct places, at moderate distances; and such symbols as are impressive, striking, and well-marked, so that they may present themselves to the mind, and act upon it with the greatest quickness.

An interesting allusion is noted in Cicero's remark: "But the memory of words, is less necessary for us." This brief reference and the foregoing examples tend to indicate that memory to Cicero was no simple matter of committing words to memory. Rather it was mental storing and recalling of materials and proofs, memory of the structure of the case and the arrangement of the oral presentation, and finally, though not always necessary, the word for word memory of the prepared oration.

The *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, which appeared about the time of Cicero's *De Inventione*, presents a comparatively complete treatment of the canon of memory. In this work memory is introduced as the treasure-house of ideas:

> Now let me turn to the treasure-house of the ideas supplied by Invention, to the guardian of all parts of rhetoric, the Memory.[6]

The *Ad Herennium* reports two kinds of memory: "one natural, and the other the product of art." The presentation here also makes reference to images and backgrounds as the system of artificial memory. The backgrounds are depicted as "wax tablets" and the images are described as letters written on these tablets. This concept recurs frequently in later writings. This work presents a rather lengthy scheme for fixing matter in the memory. The scheme consists of properly arranging the backgrounds for recall, or giving an orderly arrangement to the mental visualization of the ideas. An interesting account of this system of artificial memory in operation follows:

> Often we encompass the record of an entire matter by one notation, a single image. For example, the prosecutor has said that the defendant killed a man by poison, has charged that the motive for the crime was an inheritance, and declared that there are many witnesses and accessories to this act. If in order to facilitate our defence we wish to remember this first point, we shall in our first background form an image of the whole matter. We shall

[5] Cicero *De Oratore*, ii. 86.

[6] [Cicero] *Ad C. Herennium*, trans. Harry Caplan (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), iii. 16.

picture the man in question as lying ill in bed, if we know his person. If we do not know him, we shall yet take some one to be our invalid, but not a man of the lower class, so that he may come to mind at once. And we shall place the defendant at the bedside, holding in his right hand a cup, and in his left tablets, and on the fourth finger a ram's testicles. In this way we can record the man who was poisoned, the inheritance, and the witnesses. In like fashion we shall set the other counts of the charges in the background successively. (iii. 20.)

This system of mnemonics is also suggested for the memorization of words and verse, though the writer acknowledges that this is more difficult:

. . . I do not disapprove of memorizing words. I believe that they who wish to do easy things without trouble and toil must previously have been trained in more difficult things. Nor have I included memorization of words to enable us to get verse by rote, but rather as an exercise whereby to strengthen that other kind of memory, the memory of matter, which is of practical use. (iii. 24.)

Thus it appears that the author of the *Ad Herennium* did not consider memorizing of words to be of central importance. Also it is apparent that he held to the theory of "transfer of training," by strengthening the memory of matter by practice in the memorization of words.

Among the ancients, Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory* provide the most complete coverage of the canon of memory. A good deal of Quintilian's advice on the subject duplicates that found in Cicero's *De Oratore* and the *Ad Herennium*. However, Quintilian does make several additional contributions. He recognizes the value of memory to the orator:

. . . and all the study of the orator, of which we have hitherto been speaking, is ineffectual unless the other departments of it be held together by memory as by an animating principle. (xi. 2. 1.)

He presents order and arrangement as strong adjuncts to memory:

But for fixing in the memory what we have written, and for retaining in it what we meditate, the most efficacious, and almost the only, means, are *division* and *arrangement*. He who makes a judicious division of his subject, will never err in the order of particulars; for, if we but speak as we ought, there will be certain points, as well in the treatment as in the distribution of the different questions in our speech, that will naturally be first, second, and so on; and the whole concatenation of the parts will be so manifestly coherent, that nothing can be omitted or inserted in it without being at once perceived. (xi. 2. 36, 37.)

As to the possibility of improving memory through training, Quintilian is in agreement with Cicero. However, in mentioning the use of a system of establishing "places," or backgrounds, as mentioned in the *Ad Herennium*, he is not completely convinced of its value. Rather, Quintilian would stress clear arrangement as the chief aid to memory, and practice as the chief means of improving the memory. He favors memorizing the entire speech prior to delivery, though he allows that some do not possess this ability. In relation to the mode of speaking Quintilian makes an interesting comment on extempore speaking:

The ability of speaking extempore seems to me to depend on no other faculty of the mind than this; for, while we are uttering one thought, we have to consider what we are to say next; and thus, while the mind is constantly looking forward beyond its immediate object, whatever it finds in the meantime it deposits in the keeping as it were of the memory, which, receiving it from the conception, transmits it, as an instrument of intercommunication, to the delivery. (xi. 2. 2.)

Recorded in the *Institutes* is an observation currently advanced on committing matter to memory. Quintilian observes that "It is astonishing how much strength the interval of a night gives it; and a reason for the fact cannot be easily discovered" (xi. 2. 43).

Several observations can be made

concerning the canon of memory as treated by Cicero, Quintilian, and the author of the *Ad Herennium*. To these writers memory was far more than the mere memorization of speeches for delivery. It was also the storehouse of knowledge and evidence for the speaker. It was a means of providing an orderly arrangement during delivery. And included in the total scope of the ancient canon of memory was the improvement of memory through specific training.

2.

Let us take a quick, eclectic look at memory as treated between the ancients and our contemporaries. In *De Doctrina Christiana* (about 426 A.D.), St. Augustine follows a two-fold division rather than the five classical divisions of rhetoric. These two divisions are (1) discovering the thoughts, and (2) the means of expressing the thoughts. Such an arrangement leaves no place for the consideration of memory.[7]

Alcuin (794) devotes a brief dialogue to the subject of memory. His observations are borrowed from Cicero, as he freely admits. The following excerpt gives the flavor of Alcuin's discussion of memory:

Charlemagne: What, now, are you to say about memory, which I deem to be the noblest part of rhetoric?

Alcuin: What indeed unless I repeat the words of Marcus Tullius that memory is the storehouse of all our experiences, and if it cannot be trained to be the treasury of our thoughts and reflection, if it cannot be used to hold our subject, our very words, then we know that even the most eminent of the speaker's other talents will come to nothing.[8]

Alcuin's only original contribution to discussion of memory is that the orator should avoid drunkenness. Excess, he contends, "does the greatest possible injury to all scholarly pursuits."

Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* (1560)[9] contains another close parallel to the ancients' presentation on memory. Wilson includes the narrative on Simonides, and the usual system of places and images. Even the representation of the memory as "wax tablets" and written images is reproduced in his work. The concept of natural and artificial memory is also present. An illustration of the system of places and images, similar to that found in the *Ad Herennium*, appears in the *Arte of Rhetorique*, though Wilson does invent his own case. He observes that there is more forgetting in cold or moist weather, and that old men and children have but weak memories. He locates the memory as being in the "hinder" part of the head, because, as he states, people struck in that portion often have trouble even remembering their own names.

As Bromley Smith reported, the eighteenth and nineteenth-century English rhetoricians ignored the canon of memory. Neither Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, nor Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric* give any consideration to memory. George Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric* includes one section on the hearers as endowed with memory, but finds no space for memory as it applies to the speaker.

Nineteenth-century American rhetoricians also ignored memory. Adams S. Hill, in *The Principles of Rhetoric*, (rev. ed., 1895) is concerned with grammar, composition, and rhetorical excellence. He does not include memory or delivery. Genung's *Working Principles of Rhetoric* (1900) has no mention of memory as relating to the speaker.

[7] Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, trans. Sister Therese Sullivan (Washington, D.C., 1930).

[8] *The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne*, ed. and trans. Wilbur S. Howell (Princeton, 1941), p. 137.

[9] Ed. G. H. Mair (Oxford, 1909), 214-215.

The most significant thing about the canon of memory from the time of the ancients to Genung is that no important new information or concepts were added; quite the reverse is true. The ancient canon diminished before the eighteenth-century rhetoricians, who pronounced it quite dead in rhetorical literature.

3.

Random reading indicates that the term memory reappears with considerable frequency in contemporary public speaking texts. This trend can be noted as early as Winans' *Public Speaking* (1915) and Woolbert's *The Fundamentals of Speech* (1920). Although these writers definitely favor use of the extemporaneous mode of delivery, they give attention to memory. Basic in Winans' system was study and memorization of a declamation. The selection was to be studied not as a recitation, but as something the declaimer could give as though it were his own at a point of excellence. Details on how to memorize are given.[10] Woolbert describes the dangers of memorized speaking in general; he feels this type of speaking is not likely to be adapted to the particular audience. However, he does list occasions for which memorized speaking is best suited:

> Thus it can be said that the memorized speech is best adapted to occasions the setting and tone of which are thoroughly predictable; it is servicable only when the speaker can look ahead and know what his audience will be like, how they will react, and how he can best influence them. And such occasions are, as has been said, the contest, the memorial occasion, the church service, and the situations where accurate phrasing is a supreme virtue.[11]

Sarett and Foster, *Basic Principles of Speech* (1936), treat memory from two standpoints—memorizing selections from literature, and memory as it is used in extemporaneous speaking. Concerning the word for word memorization of selections from literature they suggest a twelve-step system, which in essence consists of first learning the structure of the selection, determining the central idea of each paragraph, then learning the sequence of ideas, and finally memorizing the words. According to them memory also plays an important part in the extemporaneous speech. They suggest that the speaker memorize the first three or four sentences of the introduction. Of greater concern, however, is preparation of an outline and memorization of the outline: "One of the best safeguards against the panic that possesses a speaker when he is at a loss for ideas is a clear outline, logically organized, sufficiently detailed and stamped on the mind."[12]

One of the more detailed treatments of memory found in a contemporary public speaking textbook is presented by Lionel Crocker in his *Public Speaking for College Students*. In this text a chapter is given to memory. This section is introduced with a reference to the "ancients"; however, after this introduction the author proceeds to treat memory in terms of present-day extempore speaking, and with a good deal of originality. The following quotations indicate the nature of Crocker's suggestions on memory in extempore speaking:

> In extempore speaking it is wise to memorize the opening and closing sentences.
>
> In extempore speaking careful division and organization are essential to the facile working of the memory.
>
> . . . the main thoughts can often be put into alliterative form. A talk on some phase of col-

[10] James Albert Winans, *Public Speaking* (New York, 1915), p. 167.

[11] Charles Henry Woolbert, *The Fundamentals of Speech* (New York, 1920), p. 272.

[12] Lew Sarett and William T. Foster, *Basic Principles of Speech* (Boston, 1936), p. 53.

lege life might use the three words "campus," "college," and "career." Another device that helps the memory is to take a subject, such as "The Ships of Life," and talk about "friendship," "apprenticeship," and "stewartship."[13]

In addition to his aids to memory in the extemporaneous speech, Crocker suggests memorizing some of the materials, particularly literary allusions: "Extemporaneous speaking can be improved by a judicious use of memorized passages, of memorized outlines, and well-chosen quotations" (p. 95).

Following the practice of Winans, W. M. Parrish, in his *Speaking in Public*, gives detailed advice on memorizing a declamation,[14] and insists that memorization is a good method of delivery:

> Fixing the exact wording of a speech in advance, and delivering it as memorized word for word, a common method among the ancients . . . is a practice seldom followed nowadays except in oratorical contests. And this is cause for regret. If a speech is important, it ought to be carefully phrased, and any one can give more fitting expression to his thought in the leisure of his study than amid the nervous tensions of the platform (p. 203).

Recent texts of public speaking appear to devote an increased amount of attention to memory. Some include separate sections or even whole chapters on this subject. Gray and Braden, *Public Speaking: Principles and Practice*, include one chapter entitled "Memory." The memory process, according to these authors, consists of three closely associated phases: ". . . first, memorizing or learning the material; second, retention for a period of time; and third, remembering or reproducing at the moment of need."[15] This, then, sheds a new light upon the concept of memory. It is inseparably associated with the learning process and as such takes on an increased importance in public speaking. These authors maintain that memory is an essential element in all three methods of speaking—impromptu, extemporaneous, and memorized. On impromptu speaking they state:

> At such a time there can be no doubt that a large storehouse of information, a broad background of reading and experience, are invaluable in meeting the impromptu situation.

On extemporaneous speaking Gray and Braden advance advice from Quintilian:

> Quintilian observed that "the ability of speaking extempore" depends on "no other faculty of mind" than memory.

They discourage verbatim memorization:

> Therefore, at the moment of presentation the speaker must recall only his organization, his supporting materials, and his planned mode delivery, but not the verbatim language which he uttered in rehearsal.

These authors advise memorizing main points, using parallel wording of main points, and oral practice as aids to memory in extemporaneous speaking. They also suggest associating the thought with physical activity or manipulation of a visual aid to facilitate remembering. In total they present a rather complete list of suggestions, or a system, for facilitating the mental retention and recall of the plan, evidence, and ideas used in extemporaneous speaking.

Several contributions to the current literature on the canon of memory appear in Bryant and Wallace's *Fundamentals of Public Speaking*. These authors make incidental references to memory and devote one brief chapter to "Improving Concentration and Memory." In this chapter three pages are given to a detailed plan for improving the concentration and memory with relationship to a particular speech. This system does not differ widely from those presented

[13] Lionel Crocker, *Public Speaking for College Students* (New York, 1941), pp. 86, 87.

[14] Wayland Maxfield Parrish, *Speaking in Public* (New York, 1947), p. 267.

[15] Giles Wilkeson Gray and Waldo W. Braden, *Public Speaking: Principles and Practice* (New York, 1951), pp. 461 ff.

by other writers, though it does go into greater detail by suggesting specific procedures in the memory strengthening process. An interesting exercise appears in this work. It is suggested that the student, after careful research, prepare a speech on some aspect of memory. Several specific subjects are suggested. Bryant and Wallace summarize their work on memory with two observations indicating the interdependence of the idea and its recall:

(1) Language and ideas are so interdependent that they cannot be separated. The sharper and stronger the ideas, the more easy and ready is the word.

(2) The stronger, deeper, and more vivid the idea, the easier it is remembered.[16]

Several contemporary authors present reasonably complete treatments of memory. Those included in this section were chosen because they seem to present the most thorough coverage of the subject. To those already mentioned one final text, William Norwood Brigance's *Speech Communication*,[17] should be added. Brigance offers suggestions for memorizing the sequence of ideas, from reading the outline to final rehearsal.

From this brief review of contemporary textbooks it can be observed that though the treatment of memory disappeared from the eighteenth and nineteenth-century rhetorics it definitely is an important item of consideration among modern authors. Memory, as presented today, is far more than memorizing of speeches word for word. Rather it is inseparably related to the entire learning process preceding the presentation of the speech. Today memory is considered extremely important in extemporaneous speaking. Current authors also advance systems for utilizing the memory to its fullest capacity. In short the treatment of memory today includes material, method, and means.

Memory, the fourth canon of rhetoric, has always been and apparently will always be an essential part of public speaking. It operated long before Simonides and Hippias, though its users may not have been concerned with isolating and describing the matter now called memory. Historically the treatment of the canon of memory by rhetoricians moved from a position of importance at the time of the ancients to a state of omission by the eighteenth and nineteenth-century rhetoricians, but has been resuscitated by contemporary writers in the field of public speaking.

As personified by Hippias, memory referred to the training of memory. To the ancients it was the storehouse of knowledge, the repository of the idea, the arrangement, and frequently the word for word mental recollection of the written oration. It was always accompanied by a method or scheme for facilitating or even strengthening the memory.

To the moderns memory is intrinsic in the learning process. It is not limited to memorized speaking; indeed it is most important in extemporaneous speaking. As operating in this type it includes the mental grasp of subject matter, a mental impression of the arrangement, and to some extent even a mental schedule of the delivery.

Though two thousand years have passed, the fourth canon maintains its position as a focal element in public speaking. Today, as in Cicero's time, memory continues to be "the proper business of the orator."

[16] Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, *Fundamentals of Public Speaking* (New York, 1953), p. 77.

[17] William Norwood Brigance, *Speech Communication* (New York, 1955), pp. 40-41.

THE DANGEROUS SHORES: FROM ELOCUTION TO INTERPRETATION

Wallace A. Bacon

WHEN Thomas Sheridan defined *elocution* in the second of his famous eight lectures delivered in London in 1762, he said that it was "the just and graceful management of the voice, countenance, and gesture in speaking."[1] His concern was largely with pronunciation, accent, emphasis, tones, pauses, pitch, and gesture. Of these, he singled out tones and gesture as the "pleasurable aspects of delivery," related particularly to the emotions; the other elements he related particularly to the expression of ideas. Tones, he said, are the auditory aspects of emotion, and gestures are the visible aspects of emotion; for Sheridan, each passion had its own tone as well as its peculiar look or gesture. Although he stated very clearly the great significance of tones and gesture, Sheridan devoted only two of the eight lectures to these elements. The bulk of his attention went to the expression of ideas.

Sheridan's position was not in this respect new. The basic significance of meaning was expressed a century earlier by William Holder, for example,[2] and by Isaac Watts in 1720[3] and by John Mason in 1748.[4] In his own time, Sheridan was by no means alone in emphasizing the importance of ideas, for John Walker,[5] William Enfield,[6] Joseph Priestley[7] (to pick three names almost at random) were equally alive to the role of meaning in the whole art of speaking and reading. The eighteenth-century term *elocution* embraced not alone the classical concept of "style of composition," but the whole conveyance of meaning through style of composition *delivered,* and it was neither a "mechanical" nor a "natural" view, but simply a conventional and normative view, which recognized that Sense was the determining element, and that

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[1] *A Course of Lectures on Elocution* (London, 1762).

[2] In *Elements of Speech* (London, 1669), Holder described the art of speaking as "A sensible Expression and Communication of the Notions of the Mind by several Discriminations of utterance of voice, used as Signes. . . ." (p. 17). Holder has been too much overlooked by those interested in the history of elocution.

[3] *The Art of Reading and Writing English: Or, The Chief Principles and Rules of Pronouncing our Mother-Tongue* . . . (London, 1720). I have seen only the second edition of this work, dated 1722.

[4] *An Essay on Elocution, or, Pronunciation* . . . (London, 1748). See also *An Essay on the Action Proper for the Pulpit* (London, 1753).

[5] Walker's *Elements of Elocution* (London, 1781), published in a series of editions, became one of the best-known manuals for teaching elocution. It was described as being "the Substance of a Course of Lectures on the Art of Reading, delivered at several Colleges in the University of Oxford," in an advertisement suffixed to Walker's later *The Melody of Speaking Delineated* . . . (London, 1787).

[6] William Enfield's *The Speaker,* a remarkable anthology for its time, went through a series of editions beginning in 1774. To it was prefixed an essay on elocution. Enfield published as a sequel to the work another volume entitled *Exercises in Elocution* (Warrington, 1780).

[7] Priestley discusses language, oratory, criticism, grammar, and liberal education in a series of volumes. I am thinking here primarily of *A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar* (Warrington, 1762).

all passions must arise from and be fixed by that element. Giles W. Gray reinforced this point in his article, "What Was Elocution," in the previous issue of *QJS*.

Much modern discussion of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century teachers of the art of speaking and reading —for they did not normally distinguish between these arts, but regarded them as nearly identical—has confused our view of these teachers by dividing them artificially into "natural" and "mechanical" schools. To be sure, some were mechanical in their methods of teaching and some few were not. But *all* stressed the significance of meaning in the act of reading and speaking, and none claimed that effects could be obtained or should be obtained apart from the text being read or spoken. Quite properly, teachers of reading and speaking, from classical times to the present, have at least bowed in the direction of the text.

Perhaps, rather than saying that earlier teachers *stressed* the significance of meaning, it ought to be said that they *recognized* it. It is also true that once having recognized it, they often took off speedily on their own vehicles for expressing it, scarcely looking behind them again to see whether it was following them. Nevertheless, meaning has always been at the center of the art of elocution, even when the center became only a point from which to move. It is worth urging the fact simply because teachers of interpretation are sometimes led to say nowadays that the recognition of the significance of meaning is a modern contribution to the study.

But when one has said that the elocutionists recognized the importance of meaning and has said again that teachers today recognize the importance of meaning, he may be saying two things rather than one thing. When Sheridan thought of meaning, he was not thinking of meaning as modern teachers of interpretation think of it. Perhaps one can illustrate the change most sharply by putting against Sheridan's definition of elocution ("the just and graceful management of the voice, countenance, and gesture in speaking") a modern view of interpretation as the study of literature through the medium of oral performance.[8] Both definitions reveal interest in the fundamental contributions of the oral performance. (It is important to underscore the fact that in neither is literary appreciation viewed apart from delivery.) But Sheridan's definition uses the text as a point of departure whereas the other uses the text as a point of return. And this, very simply, seems to be the clear line of change from the eighteenth century to our own time in the teaching of oral reading. The single additional fact to be noted is that interpretation tends (though not absolutely) to restrict its materials to works of imaginative literature, in keeping with its position in the liberal arts-humanities tradition in educational institutions.

The two definitions cited above point to a polarity which can be discussed in terms of a metaphor of the young Troilus in Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*. The poles here are, of course, text on the one hand and delivery on the other.[9] These are, in elocution and in interpretation, the two "dangerous shores" between which, or on which, any ship can founder. The double character of the subject can be stated in a whole

[8] See the preface to *Literature as Experience* (New York, 1959) by Wallace A. Bacon and Robert S. Breen.

[9] Troilus has another set of poles in mind. As Shakespeare puts it (II.ii.61-65):

> *Troilus.* I take today a wife, and my election
> Is led on in the conduct of my will;
> My will enkindled by mine eyes and ears,
> Two traded pilots 'twixt the dangerous shores
> Of will and judgment. . . .

series of compounds: scholarship-showmanship, reason-passion, logic-emotion —even, in the eyes of some observers, in the pair dull-exciting. Or in the old pair, natural-mechanical.

All these bifurcations are simply underscoring the dilemma which exists, has always existed, and always will exist in the art of reading; the whole art consists, has always consisted, and always will consist in a union of the two elements. It has not in the long run worked to overlook the basic and determining character of the text being read; neither will it work to overlook the essential significance of the oral performance. Literary appreciation for the silent reader and literary appreciation for the oral performer are in some respects vitally distinct, and teachers of interpretation, as separate from teachers of English, must keep their eyes and ears on the distinctions.

It is necessary to underscore this remark. Unless the text in oral performance is both audible and alive, the reader has not learned what oral interpretation is meant to teach him. There are three things involved—not just audibility and life, but the text which is meant to be audible and alive. The thing read is, on the whole, the interpreter's excuse for being.

When the modern student of interpretation talks of the meaning of a literary text as the thing which it is his responsibility to convey, he is not talking simply about lexical meaning, as Sheridan and his contemporaries largely were. His keen interest in and awareness of psychology has made him very sensitive to the interlacing of motives, attitudes, and tensions in literature, and to the ambiguities, ironies, and ambivalences of literary works. The language of literature is a wonderfully complex and efficient thing—wonderfully because its intricacy is a very exciting and compelling fact; indeed, it is almost incredible, sometimes, how sharp a distillation of experience can be bound into words. The fact is as true of Robert Frost as of—whom?—Shakespeare. This is not a matter simply of difficulty of comprehension.

Interpretation today seems to be moving in the direction of the thing read, not in the direction of the person reading. This is not because the person reading is unimportant—it is the function of teachers to educate students—but because it is possible to feel that the best way to educate students is to teach subjects. If it is true to say that works of literature are both pleasurable and valuable to human beings, then is seems also true that the fullest kind of reading of works of literature is the most pleasuable to human beings, then it seems reading. And if interpretation is concerned not only with an "awareness" of the poem or story or play, but with the student's own active participation in the text by way of the oral reading, then it is possible to feel that interpretation provides the student with the fullest kind of reading. But the point is that the participation is participation in the life of the text—and such participation can follow only from understanding (deliberate or intuitive) of the text. Understanding (even informed intuition) involves knowledge. As Lily Bess Campbell[10] suggested in reply to Mark Van Doren, the study of literature often involves more than "a whole heart and a free mind," and there are many teachers of interpretation who are too timid in venturing out into the world of scholarship and criticism for the kind of solid assistance which that world can often

[10] *Shakespeare's "Histories," Mirrors of Elizabethan Policy* (The Huntington Library: San Marino, California, 1947), p. 3.

supply. The teacher who reads no more than the students in his class—and who does not know where to go to find more to read—will not necessarily find that such reading makes him a full man.

For some people, such close reading of texts as a *full* reading demands will always seem a little dull. Some people will feel sure that such reading must necessarily result in dull performances—but they can very easily be shown to be wrong. It is not a matter of arguing for "scholarship" as opposed to "entertainment," but rather of suggesting that the good reading is exciting because it is really full. And fullness must be judged in terms of the text being performed, not simply in terms of reading techniques, though one must grant the importance of techniques and the value of techniques, which must not be sacrificed. It would be a mistake for interpretation to follow certain practices in the teaching of public speaking, in which an interest in something called "content" has led to a corresponding decrease of interest in something called "delivery," to the ultimate disservice of "content." Or to follow certain practices in the teaching of the dramatic arts, where the theatre becomes a theatre-museum. *Both* shores, as Troilus recognized, are dangerous. The approach to both shores is over shallows.

One way of illustrating the recent direction in interpretation is to point to the changes in the titles of courses in curricula in the field, and to the change in the nature of the topics listed in convention programs over the past fifteen years. In curricula ranging from the freshman year through the doctoral program—though the statement is naturally more applicable to some schools than to others—there has been a clear increase in the degree of emphasis placed upon the study of literature. One finds courses devoted to literary forms, to literary periods, to single authors; there are courses in the general aesthetics of literature and interpretation; there are increasing numbers of seminars in interpretation.

It is not unusual to find, on the whole, that the greater interest in the texts being performed has led to a greater interest in performance, and to larger audiences for performances. More students read; more people come to listen. The range of things read is wide, the kinds of performance varied. It would be a mistake to equate the value of interpretation with the size of audiences, of course. Little would be gained if, with increased audiences, the quality of performance and literature decreased. Too much interest in the audience is as bad as too exclusive interest in text—another way of looking at the dangerous shores.

The current interest in text has not taken form out of thin air, to be sure. Interest in meaning has always been with us; but besides this, nineteenth century interest in psychology contributed to eighteenth century interest in language and delivery a serious concern with the mechanisms involved in the body's representation of literary texts. Words, attitudes, movements, tones, rhythms—all these are thought of now as forms of gesture, as ways of communicating meaning from the mind and heart outward. S. S. Curry and Charles Wesley Emerson, in this country, explored, as fully as their knowledge of psychology would permit, the mechanisms of conveying meaning *via* the body and the voice. Both men valued meaning, though for them as for the men preceding them meaning was a limited term. In our own century, Solomon Clark, Robert L. Cumnock, Hiram Corson, and others—in our own time, Gertrude Johnson, C. C. Cunningham,

and Wayland M. Parrish have carried us further. Frank Rarig related the psychology of the reader to the psychological interests in the literary text and hence performed a uniquely valuable service. There are many others—few are named here and those only from among the teachers officially retired from teaching. The development has been steady if gradual.

But interpretation *today* is interpretation with something of a difference. Psychology, the new criticism (which is no longer new, and no longer reigns), the nature of contemporary literature, and the nature of teachers and students now entering into the study of our subject have all combined to point sharply and incisively to the literary text as the source of all the problems with which students and teachers of interpretation are concerned. How to body forth the whole complex structure which is the work of literature? Many teachers have come more and more to recognize that all other questions spring from this. What the poem or the story or the play means is not something to be extracted or abstracted from the literary structure, but something to be felt and understood fully only within the structure. Enjoyment is the final aim—but enjoyment in a full rather than in a reductive view. The wonderful thing is that such a pleasurable activity is also so finely instructive to us as human beings. If one values teaching the reading of Shakespeare to students, it is because he thinks Shakespeare has so much to say to them and to him, and because learning how to enter into a full exploration of the text of Shakespeare seems to him the best way of learning how to *listen* to Shakespeare. Learning how to hold a book, how to enunciate clearly, how to project, how to modulate tones, how to place characters, how to control stage fright—all these now become of importance in relation to the *life* of the literary text. The student's eye is not on development of an instrument, or of a personality, only, but on life as literature conveys it. Too great a satisfaction with self is not the best of preparations for the study of letters.

The teacher who has come to value advanced courses dealing with a limited number of writers has doubtless found that the extensive and intensive study of one man has increased the expressive range of interpreters with regard to that one man. Once they have been persuaded of the close correlation of mind and body, voice and spirit, most students will find that an increase in the intellectual range is the surest way to an increase in the whole emotional range. Meaning, for them, becomes not lexical meaning, not abstracted or extracted meaning, but whatever is included in *both* sides of that dichotomy we have been observing—intellect-emotion. And it is served not simply by "mechanical" means, not simply by "natural" means, but by both sides of *that* dichotomy. It employs not simply scholarship, not simply performance techniques—but both sides of *that* dichotomy. The teachers who pay lip service to performance but really care only about discussion of literary texts are not properly meeting their obligations as teachers of interpretation. The teachers who pay lip service to literature but really think of it only as something to perform are not meeting their obligations—and there are many such teachers.

Interpretation moves, as it has always moved—and as all the performing arts are always likely to move—between two dangerous shores. One may be wrecked on either. But all the seas between are navigable, and the voyage is wondrous.

O'NEILL'S SEARCH FOR A "LANGUAGE OF THE THEATRE"

Robert F. Whitman

THERE were always those who saw Eugene O'Neill's more extreme experiments in dramatic technique as an unfortunate aberration, and viewed with pity the prospect of a man who could write such powerful "theatre" as *Anna Christie* or *Desire Under the Elms*, dissipating his energies pursuing some illusory Theatre of Tomorrow in *The Fountain* or *Lazarus Laughed*. And when, in the last plays, he apparently returned to the essentially realistic form of his early work, it was looked on by many as a return to sanity. But O'Neill was never one to go backwards; and the fact that many of his experimental plays failed to win the critical acceptance of the earlier, more conventional, works would never in itself have led him to revert to a form he felt he had outgrown. He was always exploring, always hoping to find a medium of communication that would satisfy his needs both as a dramatist and as a man. The search led him into strange ways, and down dead ends; but the diversity and violence of both his techniques and his subject matter tend to hide some of the unifying threads which bind together all his work.

In his letter to George Jean Nathan regarding *Dynamo* he said that he wished to "dig at the roots of the sickness of today as I feel it—the death of the old God and failure of science and materialism to give any satisfactory new one for the surviving primitive religious instinct to find a meaning for life in, and to comfort its fears of death with. It seems to me that anyone trying to do big work nowadays must have this big subject behind all the little subjects of his plays. . . ."[1] O'Neill would settle for nothing less than "big work," and the apparently sensational aspects of his plays, the crime, moral degeneracy in general, cynicism, all escapes from reality, whether through insanity or drink or drugs, were for him simply the overt symptoms of this "sickness of today."

But O'Neill felt that he, as much as anyone, was a victim of this "sickness," and that he knew whereof he spoke. His plays are, in a very real sense, a continuous record of his soul-searching. *Long Day's Journey Into Night* is the most frankly autobiographical of them; but to a degree they all are—not in the events, perhaps, but in the conflicts which are presented and in the view of life taken. Nor, in this sense, is there very much development in O'Neill's writing. The problem does not change—"finding a meaning for life and comfort for the fears of death." There *is*, however, a very real development in his awareness of the complexity of the problems he is facing, and of the possible areas where an answer might be found—a development reflected in the changing ways he approaches the basic questions of life. Each play, then, is a new attempt

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[1] *The American Mercury*, XVI (January 1929), 119.

to come to grips with the same old problem.

A "new approach" for O'Neill, however, was not simply a question of new plots or subject matter, but of new techniques. In one of the early playbills of the Provincetown Playhouse he stated that he hoped to create a "new language for the theater." Like most artists' comments on their own work, this is at least half rationalization. He was also trying to create a "new language for O'Neill."

The search led him into many and varied manners of speech: realism, expressionism, naturalism, symbolism, fantasy, poetry, alone and in various combinations, as well as experiments with devices from older dramatic traditions. But behind the apparent diversity was a single impulse: to find an idiom in which to express the human tragedy. And whatever other characteristics O'Neill may have possessed, or lacked, he had a firm grasp of one essential element of tragedy—the eternal conflict between Man's aspirations and some intransigent, ineluctable quality in life which circumscribes and limits him, and frustrates the realization of those dreams which seem to make life worth living.

Almost all of O'Neill's heroes—those that are in the least sensitive—are baffled and hurt by the blank impalpable wall which hems them in, from the Yank of *Bound East for Cardiff*, dying in the fo'castle of a freighter fog-bound in the North Atlantic, or the other Yank, in *The Hairy Ape*, for whom the fog of anonymity is just as real and even more terrifying, to all of the characters who make the Long Day's Journey Into Night. There are exceptions, of course: thick-skinned materialists like Marco Polo, who are too obtuse to question that they have found the earthly paradise; stern, monolithic figures, like Ephraim Cabot, who through a hard life and a hard God has become a hard man, almost a part of the rugged stones and soil of his New England farm; or the mystics, like Lazarus, who, with his vision of a supra-mortal unity and sanity, has simply risen above the whole problem. But the vast majority of the characters are painfully aware that reality is never sufficient to their demands upon it, and that the chalice of life is cursed by some inexorable poison which will frustrate our fondest hopes and turn dreams to dust in our grasp.

The sense of having been betrayed by life runs through virtually all the plays and "there ain't much . . . that'd make yuh sorry to lose it."[2] Robert Mayo clings to the hope that "Life owes us some happiness after what we've been through. It must! Otherwise our suffering would be meaningless—and that is unthinkable" (III, 150). Unthinkable, perhaps, but by the end of *Beyond the Horizon* it seems all too possible. For several characters life is only a "rotten dirty joke"; and Mary, in *Days Without End* cries: "I only know I hate life. It's dirty and insulting—and evil. I want my dream back—or I want to be dead with it!" (III, 550). Christine, in *Mourning Becomes Electra* says wistfully: "Why can't all of us remain innocent and loving and trusting? But life won't leave us alone. It twists and wrings and tortures our lives with others' lives until—we poison each other to death!" (II, 73). The members of the Tyrone family "poison each other to death," and Edmund has more insight into the truth than he would like. But it is his mother who gives the motif its most explicit and most poignant utterance: "None of us can help the things life has done to

[2] *Bound East for Cardiff*, in *The Plays of Eugene O'Neill* (3 vols.; New York, 1947), I, 486. References for all the plays up to and including *The Iceman Cometh*, hereafter cited in the text, are to this edition.

us. They're done before you realize it, and once they're done they make you do other things until at last everything comes between you and what you'd like to be, and you've lost your true self forever."[3]

Whether the individual's struggle with life ends in Dion Anthony's self-destruction or Nina Leeds' apathetic surrender or Lavinia Mannon's triumphant acceptance, the inescapable limitations inherent in existence provide the root of his tragedy. In all but the earliest plays, however, O'Neill tends to take this quality of life as "given," to accept the fact that the harm is "done before you realize it," and to turn his attention to the conflicts which this sense of disillusionment and betrayal sets up within the individual. Characteristically, the impulse towards the ideal, frustrated by life, brings cynicism and despair; the impulse towards faith, frustrated by life, leads to scepticism; the impulse to love, frustrated by life, leads to hate or smothering possessiveness; the impulse to create, frustrated by life, becomes destructive. Both sets of impulses, however, usually exist together, struggling with each other, tearing the possessor to pieces in their mortal opposition. It is this that provides the central tensions of almost all of O'Neill's plays, and the history of his development as an experimenter in dramatic technique is the history of his efforts to objectify this conflict.

Speaking of his early sea plays, O'Neill said that it was "the impelling, inscrutable forces behind life which it is my ambition to at least faintly shadow at their work in my plays."[4] The "force" was essentially external to the individual, and something which he had to fight against—or accept. And both alternatives are represented in the early one-acters. In *Bound East for Cardiff* the "inscrutable forces" are suggested by the fog which surrounds the play, and in which Yank blindly faces death. He is lost, and he knows it, but there is something more than pathos in the way he looks back over an aimless life, trying to find some kind of sense to it. Yank is not exceptionally brave or humble or frightened—he is a little of all three, a "little" man, broken by life and cast aside, without knowing where he is or why. But at the end of the play, when the fog clears, there is also the suggestion that with death came an answer which gave meaning to existence.

A quite different note is caught in the voice of Smitty, in *Moon of the Caribbees*. Baffled though he may have been, Yank did not complain; but throughout the speeches of Smitty there is a whine of self-pity that stands in sharp contrast to the "impelling," eternal forces shadowed forth in the peace of the sea, the moon, and the mournful, primitive chant of the natives. The only actions in which he engages are negative, in rejecting the advances of a native girl, or in drowning his "memories" in alcohol, the most degrading and self-defeating gesture of romantic *weltschmerz*. Smitty is in a fog of his own making. The beauty and sadness and power of life are there, if he could see and respond. But it is too late; in his frustration by life he has been blinded, turned in upon himself, cut off from what is vital and real. Smitty, for all that he is a somewhat shadowy figure, is a type—or represents a phenomenon—in which O'Neill remains interested throughout his work.

Robert Mayo, the hero of O'Neill's first full length play, *Beyond The Horizon*, is like Smitty a bit of a weakling,

[3] *Long Day's Journey Into Night* (New Haven, 1956), p. 61. Further page references for the play are to this edition.

[4] From a letter to Barrett Clark, quoted by Mr. Clark in his *Eugene O'Neill, The Man and His Plays* (New York, 1947), p. 59.

but he is also capable of something more than self-pity. He is described as having "a touch of the poet" in him, and his aspirations go far beyond Smitty's maudlin pangs of guilt and self-disgust. Early in the play he tells his brother, ("Pointing to the horizon—dreamily"):

> Supposing I was to tell you that it's just Beauty that's calling me, the beauty of the far off and unknown, the mystery and spell of the East which lures me in the books I've read, the need of the freedom of great wide spaces, the joy of wandering on and on—in quest of the secret which is hidden over there, beyond the horizon? (III, 85.)

O'Neill has little patience with Mayo himself. His longings are "too conscious, intellectually diluted into a vague, intangible wanderlust. His powers of resistance, both moral and physical, would also probably be correspondingly watered. He would throw away his instinctive dream and accept the thralldom of the farm for—why, for almost any nice little poetical craving—the romance of sex, say."[5] But while his aimless yearning to wander may have been romantic self-delusion, the alternative suggested by Mayo's brother, that "you might as well stay here, because we've got all you're looking for right on the farm," O'Neill characterizes as "thralldom." He himself had a profound sympathy with this intense desire for something more, something better, than life can offer, and its inevitable frustration lies at the heart of his vision of man's tragedy.

In these early plays the conflict between human aspirations, whether "immortal longings" or romantic self-delusion, and the forces which prevent their realization is suggested as much by the setting as by the action itself. In *Bound East for Cardiff* it is in the fog which surrounds the dying Yank, in *Moon of the Caribbees* is the distance between Smitty and his surroundings, and in *Beyond the Horizon* it is symbolized by the dark ring of hills which hems in the world of the farm, and the petty demands and frustrations that sap the life of Robert Mayo, and shut out the beauty and wonder of the sunset and the sea and freedom which lie beyond. All of these devices are fairly successful, but insofar as they *are* "things," physical elements in the setting, they seem to suggest that the inhibiting, limiting force lies somehow *outside* of the individual.

It is perfectly possible that this is the way O'Neill saw it at the time. Certainly the barrier between Mayo and the realization of his dreams is part of "life," for he can surmount it only through death. But in death Mayo is freed not only from life, but from himself. It is true that he is beaten down by existence, by the nagging demands of a wife and child, of domineering parents, of economic necessity, and by his own incompatibility with the way of life he has chosen; but the point is that he *did* choose it. Mayo does not fail because he had dreams, or because some power wholly outside himself frustrated them, but because he sold them for something less. As he is dying he makes one last attempt to reach the encircling hills: "I thought I'd try to end as I might have—if I'd had the courage—alone—in a ditch by the open road—watching the sun rise" (III, 167).

The fact that the forces which prevented the realization of Robert Mayo's dreams lie within himself, rather than externally in the "world," or in "fate," does not necessarily make them any less inevitable, for they may well be inherent elements in human nature. But if the essential conflict is, as it would seem, between two antithetical impulses in Mayo's nature, this is not adequately suggested by his controlling symbol, the

[5] Quoted by Clark, p. 66.

surrounding hills. In the plays which follow *Beyond the Horizon*, however, we can see O'Neill's efforts to discover a more effective method of indicating the inner nature of this struggle.

The Straw is in the same realistic tradition as *Beyond the Horizon*, but its symbols, if they deserve the name, are much less overt. The sanitorium, in which most of the action takes place, with its suggestions of hopelessness and decay, is analogous to the world enclosed by the hills; but there is an important reversal in the implications of the "inside-outside" relationship. When he leaves the sanitorium, Stephen, the play's hero, is still prisoner to his own egotism, and he wastes his energies in purposeless wandering and self-indulgence. It is only after his return, and after he has found himself by discovering in the dying Eileen something outside his own ego to which he can give himself, that he achieves any kind of self-fulfillment. In other words, he finds the road to "beyond the horizon" not outside his nature, or outside of life, but *within*.

The question of whether man's inability to achieve self-fulfillment springs from some quality in himself or from the nature of the world around him is handled even more explicitly in *Anna Christie*. The sea, with the sinister shroud of fog in which it hides its malignant purposes, suggests all the awful and mysterious forces of nature which thwart man and his hopes. Throughout the play Chris Christopherson, Anna's father, blames the sea for all that has gone wrong in his life, and at the climax of the action, when his failure as a father has become painfully evident, he knows where the fault lies: "It's dat old davil, sea, do this to me! It's her dirty tricks!" (III, 62). The play ends on much the same note, with Chris muttering: "Fog, fog, fog, all bloody time. You can't see vhere you vas going, no. Only dat ole davil, sea—she knows!" (III, 78).

This use of the fog is very much like that in *Bound East for Cardiff*, and from Chris's point of view it still symbolizes a force which baffles his will, and renders his hopes impotent. But it is made perfectly evident in the action of the play that his recriminations against the sea and the fog are simply rationalizations of his own inadequacies, his justification for his fear of life and failure as a man. They become, therefore, without losing any of the mystery or sense of inevitability which we associate with the sea, projections of forces at work within Chris himself. The conflict in Chris which has thus been created is evident in his grudging love for the sea, which slips out in nostalgic reminiscences of his days as bosun on a sailing ship. He has tried to effect a compromise between his instinctive yearning for the freedom of the sea and his fear of its, and life's, dangers by taking a job which lies half way between land and sea, but which is neither fish nor fowl, as captain of a coastal coal barge. But compromise is not resolution, except in the sense that the two antithetical impulses leave him in a state of suspension: a mild, ineffectual little man, beaten by life and whining that it is all the sea's fault. Partly because *Anna Christie* represents a considerable reworking of an earlier play, *Chris Christopherson*, and the dramatic focus has shifted from father to daughter in the process, much of the effectiveness of this split in Chris's character has been lost.

O'Neill solved the problem of emphasis and focus more than adequately in *The Emperor Jones*. It is a one man play, and in Brutus Jones we have a powerful dramatic characterization of an individual destroyed by two conflicting impulses in his nature. There

is on the one hand the arrogant, flamboyant, self-confident Emperor, contemptuous of the servility and superstitiousness of his own race, his head filled with the conviction that "for de big stealin' day makes you Emperor and puts you in de Hall o' Fame when you croaks," a lesson learned "in ten years on de Pullman ca's listenin' to de white quality talk" (III, 178); on the other is the bewildered, frightened Negro, victim of his past, both racial and personal.

The Emperor Jones is the first of O'Neill's frankly experimental plays, and while his exploration of expressionistic techniques can probably be attributed to several factors, one of the most important is certainly that it permitted him to explore inner conflicts with greater flexibility and clarity. The essential realism of the early plays allowed for the use of symbolism; but, as we have seen, such "inanimate actors" as the sea and the fog, or visual symbols in the setting, such as the dark ring of hills, too much throw the emphasis on a struggle between the individual and some element in life outside himself. The "visions" in *The Emperor Jones*, which are neither hallucinations nor projections of Jones' "thoughts," reveal the inner springs of his nature as they come in conflict with his assumed, outward character. But the role is not consciously "put on"—Jones thinks of himself as a bold and unscrupulous exploiter, albeit a fraudulent emperor—nor is he at all aware of the impulses which finally destroy him. Since he is dealing with hidden, subconscious elements in man's nature, O'Neill doesn't beat around the bush, trying to slip sly hints into a "realistic" medium, but presents them directly and dramatically.

There are in the play several dramatic devices, almost inanimate actors, which are external to Jones and which do not pertain directly to his nature. But the pulsating rhythm of the native drums, which dominates the action, rapidly becomes a tangible projection of Jones' rising panic—a fact that has led some commentators to see the play simply as a study in the effect of fear on a half-civilized Negro. There is the brooding, mysterious, Great Forest in which Jones loses himself—to find himself. It is not just a place *where* something happens to Jones; it is part of *what* happens to him, a primeval, elemental force which literally and figuratively strips him of the superficies of civilization. This is not a play about fear; panic is simply the "acid test" which reduces Jones to his essential nature as Man. Nor is Jones' race important; it is simply that, in the Negro, man's journey from savagery to "civilization" has been tremendously foreshortened. The play is, in essence, the story of "the failure of science and materialism"—the values implicit in "de white quality's" society—"to give any satisfactory new [God] for the surviving primitive religious instinct to find a meaning for life in, and to comfort its fears of death with."

It would be foolish to suggest that all, or even the majority, of O'Neill's plays can be fitted into some neat and air-tight formula, or even that they are all "about" the same thing. Nevertheless, many of them possess a basic pattern not unlike that of *The Emperor Jones*. Man, having lost the faith in life and the sense of belonging which were once the concomitants of his primitive oneness with nature, is cast adrift in a storm of conflicting and mutually destructive impulses with no solid faith, no courage of his convictions, no stable set of values to give direction or meaning to them. And, as in that play, the

technical devices which O'Neill chooses to employ are his attempt to reveal, as directly as is possible on the stage, both this disassociation or antagonism between man and the world in which he finds himself, and the inner conflicts which this disharmony leaves him prey to.

The most obvious illustration of this is the play which in both subject and technique is what O'Neill himself termed "the direct descendant of *The Emperor Jones*": *The Hairy Ape*. The dramatist described Yank, the hero of the play, as "a symbol of man, who has lost his old harmony with nature, the harmony which he used to have as an animal and has not yet acquired in a spiritual way."[6] The expressionistic techniques are on the whole better integrated than in the earlier play, for the disassociation, the inner conflict, and the futile reversion to a more primitive orientation are all suggested by the action and setting without recourse to interpolated "visions."

When the play opens, Yank, like Brutus Jones, is a creature of twentieth-century America. Its values are his values: it lives on steel, he *is* steel, he "belongs." He can be happy as a machine, because the world *is* a machine. The inhuman, mechanistic nature of Yank's universe is powerfully represented by the below-deck setting in which we first see him, which with its harsh metallic clanging, the robot-like movements, and the impersonal "brazen" chanting of commands is reminiscent of the factory scene in *Gas I* of Kaiser's trilogy. But his faith in this world is shattered when a scared, sickly girl, whose only claim to superiority is that her father is a steel magnate, insults him. That she can do this, and get away with it, raises not only doubts as to his importance in the scheme of things, but also the very un-machine-like feelings of hurt pride, revenge, and hate. In the remaining scenes, Yank tries to assert his individuality, his right to "belong," by getting some vague kind of "revenge." But he is faced with a world where "belonging" has lost all vitality and become merely going through the proper motions, where he can have no significance because nothing has. Throughout the play Yank is seen as a vital, almost brutal, figure set against a background of an inhuman, dead, meaningless world: the machine-like stokehole, the gaudy but "relentless" marionettes on Fifth Avenue, the implacable steel bars of his cell, or the cold suspicion and fear in the "Wobbly" headquarters. In the last scene Yank has been driven at last to the ape's cage in the zoo, in the hope that he may find there a creature with whom he is in harmony, that there, at least, he will "belong." But this is not the story of a "natural" man, purposeful even in his animality. If the world is empty, so is Yank; if it has lost its harmony with nature, so has he; and his last vain effort to find something which will give meaning to existence ends in death. And again, as in *The Emperor Jones*, it is primarily through his experimental techniques that O'Neill suggests this sense of man's being cut off from the vital fountainhead of nature and her purposes, and the destructive inner conflicts which that purposelessness creates.

The Fountain is by no means a radically experimental play, but there is an element of fantasy in the visions of the fountain, and that symbol lies at the heart of the play. Ponce de Leon, too, wanders in a futile world where wealth and military reputation and power become tawdry and empty, but

[6] From a statement by O'Neill in the New York *Herald Tribune*, Nov. 16, 1924; see Clark, p. 84.

where the absence of other values leaves him cynical and disillusioned. A desperate hope that love will give life meaning sends him off looking for the Fountain of Youth. Lying half-dead at the edge of a small pool in Florida, he "finds" it in a vision, and in the song of the fountain lies the essense of his "discovery":

> Love is a Flower
> Forever blooming
> Life is a fountain
> Forever leaping
> Upward to catch the golden sunlight
> Upward to reach the azure heaven
> Failing, falling,
> Ever returning,
> To kiss the earth that the flower may live.
> (I, 439.)

In this vision of life and death, growth and decay, aspiration and failure as integral parts of the eternal cycles of nature, where all things must pass away to give place to and nourish the new, Ponce de Leon finds his "belonging." And since the "disassociation" of the other plays has been overcome, and the deep tap-roots with which man is nourished have quickened to life, there is in the latter part of *The Fountain* none of that inner, self-destructive conflict which presented O'Neill with dramatic problems elsewhere.

Much the same point could be made about *Lazarus Laughed*, another play which asserts the ultimate unity of man with nature and the triumph of life over death:

> Believe in the healthy god called Man in you! . . . Believe! What if you are a man and men are despicable? Men are also unimportant! Men pass! Like rain into the sea! The sea remains! Man remains! Man slowly arises from the past of the race of men that was his tomb of death! For Man death is not! Man . . . *is*! (I, 359-360.)

Again the conflict is not internal, for Lazarus, thanks to his glimpse beyond the veil, "belongs." But the struggle between this man of vitality and faith in life and the rest of the world, filled with men who through fear and selfishness and conformity have become but dead things, is emphasized by giving the various choruses masks differentiated only as types: the Self-Tortured, the Proud, the Servile, etc. And insofar as the play could be called a tragedy, it is not the tragedy of Lazarus, who triumphs over death in his love of life, but of men who are dead behind their masks from fear of life.

Neither *Lazarus Laughed* nor *The Fountain* is really a tragedy in any sense, however; they both end with an almost mystical affirmation which is too full of joy and acceptance. And if the joy at times sounds a little forced, that is more a comment on O'Neill than on the nature of the play. *Desire Under the Elms*, written between the other two, also ends on a note of affirmation and acceptance—but it is at the same time a tragedy. And the differences between them are instructive. *Lazarus Laughed* and *The Fountain* can end as they do because Lazarus and Ponce de Leon have both had a revelation of The Secret: that the forces in life which seem to frustrate man's aspirations and creative instincts are only illusions, or rather, that the aspiration and the failure are one in the eternal cycles of nature, and therefore creative in a larger sense.

The affirmation which is implicit in the joy of mutual love at the end of *Desire Under the Elms* is not unlike that of Lazarus or Ponce de Leon. What makes the play tragic is the price at which it has been bought, and the needlessness of paying it. Eben and Abbie —and to a lesser extent Ephraim—are torn by much the same conflicting impulses as most of O'Neill's characters. They yearn deperately for beauty and

fulfillment and love, but they are confused and afraid, have no faith in these values, and see in the security of possessing the farm itself the only thing that will give life meaning. Their instinctive impulses, turned awry by fear, become suspicion and hate, that is, destructive. Through the first part of the play Eben and Abbie, in spite of their natural mutual attraction, view each other simply as obstacles in the way of possessing the farm; and while their love ultimately asserts itself, the ghost of their earlier distrust, which they have not the faith to exorcise, is not so easily laid. In the end, it is only through an act of violent self-sacrifice that they are freed from their selfishness and disorientation. Their sin, in O'Neill's terms, is not their love but their lack of faith in it, and the murder which that brought about. For this, perhaps, they must suffer, as all who distrust life suffer; but the note on which they leave the stage is not one of resignation to atonement, but of joy in each other, in love, and in the revelation that death, together, has no fears.

Desire Under the Elms is not noteworthy for its technical experiments. We have again an essentially realistic play employing incidental symbols. There are, for instance, the two elms brooding over the house like Nemesis. It seems apparent that these are intended to suggest the spirit of Eben's mother, once filled with a love of life and beauty, but which had been beaten down and destroyed by Ephraim's materialistic possessiveness, and which only finds fulfillment with the consummation of her son's love for Abbie. But the inner conflicts of the characters are not represented by any special technical devices. They are, rather, implicit in the duality of each character's attitudes towards the others. This duality is resolved, at tragic cost, in the case of Eben and Abbie; for Ephraim, it never is.

The masks of *The Great God Brown* represent a much more drastic experimental device for suggesting a similar internal conflict, although in this case it is not a question of one impulse triumphing over others, but of two antithetical impulses distorting and perverting each other, and destroying the individual in the process. O'Neill himself has defined the "hidden theme" of the play, and the forces which constitute its central tension:

> Dion Anthony—Dionysus and St. Anthony—the creative pagan acceptance of life, fighting eternal war with the masochistic, life-denying spirit of Christianity as represented by St. Anthony—the whole struggle resulting in this modern day in mutual exhaustion—creative joy in life for life's sake frustrated, rendered abortive, distorted by morality from Pan into Satan, into a Mephistopheles mocking himself in order to feel alive; Christianity, once heroic in martyrs for its intense faith now pleading weakly for intense belief in anything, even Godhead itself.[7]

This is not, of course, the whole of the play, but it is sufficient to show its continuity with the others. It should be noted, however—and this suggests one of the dangers to which the mask device is open—that the mask-face relationship is not that of appearance-reality. The mask is not simply a superficial facade which the individual "puts on" to hide from the world, but the perversion of a basic side of his personality or nature. Initially—or ideally—the impulses, that of "intense faith" and that of "creative joy in life for life's sake," Christ and Dionysus, Lazarus and Ponce de Leon, are one and the same. But lacking a strong faith, and hurt and disillusioned by the brutality of life and the insensitivity of men, Dion becomes the battleground in which these two forces, no

[7] From a letter to the New York *Evening Post*, Feb. 13, 1926; see Clark, p. 104.

longer unified, each driven by the other to a negative, life-denying extreme, destroy each other in mortal combat. And it is in the gradual changes in the masks that the nature of the impulses and their distortion is revealed dramatically.

The use of masks in *The Great God Brown* was not entirely successful, partly because, as O'Neill complained, the shifts from mask to "face" were not always immediately visible to the audience, and because they suggested a superficiality he did not intend. O'Neill attacked the problem of how to present this inner conflict dramatically from another direction in *Strange Interlude*. The drama of the Elizabethans, with its asides and soliloquies, had a tremendous advantage over the modern realistic tradition when it comes to representing the "inner" thoughts and conflicts of characters. O'Neill, dedicated to exploring any possible "language" which would permit him to speak through the theatre, felt he could adapt these devices to his own uses and the modern idiom. While *Strange Interlude* is in other respects a conventional realistic play, the free use of asides gives the dramatist a flexibility largely lacking in drama tied to externals. By this device O'Neill can show the "inner" response of a character to a speech or situation immediately and directly. Nor, as in the case of the masks, is the difference between the private and the public speech the distinction between a character's "real" thoughts and some front he puts up to the world. Sometimes, as was true of the masks, the distance between the overt speech and the aside suggests the tensions and conflicts working in the individual. Just as often, perhaps, it is within the aside itself that the struggle and antithesis are revealed. The aside is not required to carry the whole burden of defining the nature of the inner conflict, as to a great extent the masks are in *The Great God Brown*. In much the same manner as in *Desire Under the Elms*, it is in part the other characters who identify and characterize the various impulses which haunt Nina Leeds, driving her on from experience to experience and man to man in a vain search for something to cling to, something to give life meaning. On the other hand, it is her asides that give us the necessary clues to her attitudes towards these characters. For example, in her one moment of triumphant joy she says to herself:

> My three men!—I feel their desires converge on me!—to form one complete beautiful male desire which I absorb—and am whole. . . . Their life is my life—I am pregnant with the three! —Husband . . . lover . . . father . . . and the fourth, [my son]. . . . That makes it perfect! . . . I should be the happiest woman in the world! (I, 135.)

As usual, her happiness does not last, because although her love is made "complete" by including the loves of daughter-lover-wife-mother, the love is divided among four individuals, which leads to antagonism and conflict. The relationships of each of the four could have been shown by externals, as could the fact that they are separate and hostile, but the fact that the unity which they potentially represent is what Nina has been searching for could only be shown by some more intimate exploration of her mind than conventional "realistic" speech could provide.

In another respect too the use of asides and soliloquies permitted greater flexibility than did the masks of *The Great God Brown*. The latter device does not easily permit shades and gradations between the two extremes. Dion is endowed with two relatively distinct "sets" of impulses or characteristics, mask and non-mask, but it is virtually

impossible so show various combinations or modifications of these motives, and rapid vacillation between conflicting impulses becomes mechanically very awkward. The possibilities of this kind of flexibility are demonstrated in *Dynamo*, which employs much of the same kind of "interior monologue" as *Strange Interlude*. The central "inner conflict" of the play is a three-way struggle in Reuben Light among his instinctive yearning for the security of the "old," discarded religion of his parents, his disillusioned rejection of that religion in favor of "facts," a kind of scientific materialism, and an almost mystical reverence for the "life force" of Electricity. In the end, under the pressure of a desperate need to believe in *something*, the three impulses become fused in an insane worship of the Dynamo itself, in which are combined the protective and creative aspects of the Mother, a vital, elemental force lying at the heart of the natural universe, and a mystical Being which satisfied his "primitive religious instinct." The Dynamo becomes, in other words, at once the grotesque projection and the object of those instinctive, fundamental drives which, when guided by a vision of man's relationship to nature and the cosmos, such as is granted Lazarus and Ponce de Leon, can be creatively and satisfyingly fulfilled, but which can also, when aimless and conflicting, become destructive. At the end of the play Rueben, a bewildered, lost child again, shorn of his cynical self-assurance and torn by opposing impulses, hurls himself onto the electrodes of the dynamo, crying: "I don't want any miracle, Mother! I don't want to know the truth! I only want you to hide me, Mother! Never let me go from you again! Please, Mother!" (III, 488). And she doesn't.

In the physical representation of the dynamo, and in the organization of Act Three, which moves us gradually into the dynamo room, the "inner temple" of Rueben's religion—much in the manner of *The Ghost Sonata*—O'Neill's technique is close to expressionism. But it is still primarily through the asides and soliloquies that the forces which produce Rueben's self-destruction are revealed. Earlier in the play, before these forces have gotten organized, so to speak, and taken a hold on Rueben's mind, the interior monologue is used to make clear the extent to which the foundation for his disorientation was laid by his parents. He is disillusioned in both the life-denying God of his father and the over-possessive love of his mother, and rejects them violently; but at the same time he cannot live without them, and it is the need for security and authority on the one hand and love on the other that sends him whoring after strange gods. Science and materialism have failed to replace the "old God" who is dead, and the blind struggle to find meaning for existence in the vacuum which results—the "sickness of today" O'Neill called it—is just the area which the "interior monologue" was designed to probe.

The idea that spiritual dislocation, disassociation from the vital springs of life, and the repression, fear of life, self-centeredness which are its progeny, are part of modern man's inheritance is developed further in *Mourning Becomes Electra*. It is the curse of the Mannon family: "That's always been the Mannons' way of thinking. They went to the white meeting-house on Sabbaths and meditated on death. Life was a dying. Being born was starting to die. Death was being born" (II, 54). And this denial of life, and with it love, is handed down from generation to generation: from old Abe Mannon, who had driven out and crushed his younger brother for loving and marrying a serv-

ant girl; from Ezra, for whom life was only a kind of death, who felt a numbness in his heart "like a statue of a dead man in a town square" (II, 55), and whose loveless marriage drove his wife to find fulfillment in the arms of his misbegotten cousin; to the family's dead end in Orin and Lavinia. Some of them learn that there is something more to life than guilt and justice and death. Ezra returns from the Civil War, where he has seen too much of death, wanting to think about life, hoping to resurrect love from the ashes of his marriage; and Lavinia finds a moment of freedom on a South Sea Island where they "have never heard that love can be a sin." But in each case it is too late; they have both been the agents, and must become the victims, of the Mannon curse. And the Fate of the play is not some external, impersonal force, in the Olympian sense, but the requital given by life to those who repudiate her, and cut themselves off from her sources. And the curse is not on just a particular family, nor for a particular sin; it is the sickness of modern man.

The general framework of the *Oresteia,* with its brooding atmosphere of self-destruction, represents the most important experimental device used by O'Neill in *Mourning Becomes Electra.* But while he used none of the more obvious tricks, such as masks or soliloquies, he characterized the play as "unreal realism." This quality is given the play by the fact that, while he does not *use* masks, he suggests them. The Mannon homestead is described as having a "mask-like" quality, and each of the characters that has come under its influence is described in the stage directions as having a "life-*like*" mask. The malevolent spell of the Mannons drives all vitality and "reality" inwards upon itself, leaving only the appearance of life—until the inner demands break through the shell with all the violence of long repression. O'Neill himself explains that "this mask concept is a dramatic arresting visual symbol of the separateness, the fated isolation of this family."[8]—its separateness not simply from other people, but from life.

O'Neill, however, reinforces the effect of the "masks" with other visual impressions, and it is in the description of the women that the conflict between the instinctive love of life, and "oneness" with it, and the Mannon fear of life and suppression of its impulses is most clearly suggested. Christine "has a fine, voluptuous figure and she moves with a flowing animal grace" (II, 9); she has a "sensual" mouth, lively eyes, and rich copper hair, and her mask is less complete than the others'. Her daughter, Lavinia, is physically a complete copy of her mother—but she is herself a Mannon, and "does all in her power to emphasize the dissimilarity rather than the resemblance to her parent. She wears her hair pulled tightly back, as if to conceal its natural curliness" (II, 10), wears plain black instead of her mother's green, and carries herself in the severe, stiff military manner characteristic of the Mannons.

Christine, as we might gather from her description, is less successful than the true Mannons in suppressing her instincts for freedom and love. Lavinia, however, is of the family stock, and like them dedicated to the suppression of any instinctive "love of life" in herself or in her mother. After she has goaded her brother into executing Christine's lover she herself drives her mother to suicide, and as the fatal shot, the ultimate denial of life, echoes from the house, she stands "stiffly erect, her face

[8] From O'Neill's "Working Notes and Extracts from a Fragmentary Work Diary," in *European Theories of The Drama,* ed. Barrett Clark (New York, 1947), p. 535.

stern and mask-like," muttering implacably: "It is justice! It is your justice, Father!" (II, 123.)

With all the Mannons except herself and her brother dead, Lavinia feels something in herself freed from a great weight that had held it down. She returns with her brother from a visit to the South Seas completely transformed into the image of her mother, in a green dress, her bronze hair loosened, her eyes and face alive again. But in destroying Christine, and the spontaneous love and vitality and "life" which, however repressed, she represented, Lavinia has proved herself too true a Mannon to escape her heritage. Her brother, now the image of their father, fulfills the curse, destroying himself and driving Lavinia, once more stern and stiff and gray, into permanent isolation in the Mannon mansion—the final revenge of life on those who deny it.

The essentially incestuous relationships which control much of the action of the play may send the unwary reader to his Freud, but it will be a fruitless trip. It is true that O'Neill hoped to "get modern psychological approximation of Greek sense of fate" into the play, but he also said that *Mourning Becomes Electra* would have been "almost exactly as it is if I had never heard of Freud or Jung or the others."[9] It is not a play *about* incest or even neurosis —these are just the symptoms of a much more basic disease. Basic, spontaneous, "natural" drives, thwarted by the Mannon "denial of life," find outlet in tortured, abnormal relationships. And these relationships also serve to illuminate the divisive inner conflicts of the major characters. Christine hates Lavinia for being Ezra's child, and loves Orin because he was born when her husband was away. Lavinia is *like* her mother, but loves her father and his stern morality. Orin looks and acts like his father, but loves his mother, even dreaming of fleeing with her to some "island of freedom and peace." In the third play of the trilogy he loves his sister as both mother and lover, symbols of everything that has been repressed by the Mannon in him, and hates her *because* of the father in him. Lavinia, caught between her maternal and paternal heritage, looks at Orin both as child and as father. Finally, as a single symbol of forces bound together yet in mortal conflict, they are (figuratively) man and wife. Orin says: "Can't you see I'm now in Father's place and you're Mother? That's the evil destiny out of the past I haven't dared predict! I'm the Mannon you're chained to!" (II, 155.) And like their parents before them, they destroy each other.

These obviously neurotic relationships, then, like the "masks" worn by the characters and the house, and the Oresteian parallels—in fact, all the dramatic devices that might loosely be called "unrealistic"—serve primarily to emphasize the self-destructive conflicts which are the consequence of the "denial of life" that is the Mannon curse. Unlike the masks or soliloquies or expressionism of some of the earlier plays, however, these techniques are not obtrusive, do not call attention to themselves *as* techniques. In this respect, *Mourning Becomes Electra* marks a new major stage in O'Neill's search for a "language for the theater" and for himself.

Days Without End, a very different play, and employing other techniques, seems to reflect much the same tendency, although in some respects it appears to be the most extreme experiment of all. The central contrivance of the play is the introduction of the two

[9] From a letter to Barrett Clark; see Clark, p. 136.

conflicting impulses of a single individual in the form of two separate characters, the man and a visible "alter-ego"—man's split personality made flesh. John, the hero of the play, is by nature sensitive, loving, artistic, and possesses a faith in life and in God. Disillusioned in both by the death of his mother—as so often in O'Neill, a symbol of "oneness" with life's eternal forces—he gradually builds up a defense against life in the form of an "alter-ego." Ironically named "Loving" (John's last name), this "other self" is callous, cynical, convinced that love is merely lust, that there is "nothing" beyond life, and that death is the only reasonable escape from it. The relationship between John and Loving, as well as parallels with ideas we have noted in the other plays, are best seen in John's descriptions of an autobiographical character in a novel he is writing: "His experience had left an indelible scar on his spirit. There always remained something in him that felt itself damned by life, damned with distrust, cursed with the inability ever to reach a lasting belief in any faith, damned by a fear of the lie hiding behind the mask of truth. . . . Even at the height of his rationalism, he never could explain away a horror of death. . . . And coupled with this was a dread of life, waiting to catch men at its mercy, in their hour of secure happiness—Something that hated life!—Something that laughed with mocking scorn!" (III, 535.) This Something, in the play, is given substance in the figure—whom only he can see—of loving. He goes on to describe how he found in love a temporary refuge from his fear. But his faith in life—or in love—was not strong enough, and the very intensity of his devotion became the source of new terrors. "He came to be afraid of his happiness. His love made him feel at the mercy of that mocking Something he dreaded. . . . That he had again let love put him at the mercy of life!" Loving tries to convince John that he really hates love, and that the only true "freedom" lies in escaping love, and denying life, in death. In the end, with the help of a priest, John finds a renewed faith in life at the foot of the symbol of a love that transcended death, the cross. Loving "dies," and John Loving becomes a complete personality again, unified in the discovery of His truth: "And thy faith shall make thee whole."

The play is not, as some have taken it, necessarily evidence that O'Neill was toying with a return to Catholicism. In *The Great God Brown* he had treated the saintly—or at least ascetic—element in Christianity as "life-denying." What he seems to be getting at is that some kind of faith *in* life is man's only escape from a destructive disassociation *from* life. The particular form of the faith—in theological terms—is unimportant; all that is really necessary is a kind of mystical recognition, like Ponce de Leon's, of man's essential oneness with the elemental and revivifying processes of Nature, whether symbolized by Christ or by the Fountain.

The device O'Neill uses to reveal both the inner conflict and the ultimate reunification of his hero sounds just as mechanical as the masks or the soliloquies; but once Loving has been accepted as a real and powerful force in John's world, he is really no more obtrusive or artificial than any "type" character. O'Neill has, in *Days Without End*, treated much the same theme as he did in *Mourning Becomes Electra*, although here applied to an individual rather than a family; and he does so in a manner that I think is intended to be more true to the psychological "facts of life" than the somewhat misleading neuroses of the earlier play.

Between the publication of *Days Without End* in 1934 and the appearance of *The Iceman Cometh* in 1946, O'Neill worked on four plays. Their exact dates of composition are not known, but they were all written, or revised from earlier sketches, between 1939 and 1943. They have much in common, and can be treated together as the last stage in O'Neill's development as a dramatist.

In technique this group of plays represents a return to the relatively "pure" realism of his earliest plays. There is much the same kind of organic symbolism as in those, but there are none of the more obvious "tricks" of the later plays, no masks, no asides, no fantasy, no expressionism.[10] But to say they are a "return" to an earlier technique is misleading. In the intervening years O'Neill had developed tremendously, both in his subject matter and in the skill with which he handled his material dramatically. In these last plays he is still concerned with the internal conflicts which earlier had inspired some of his more daring, and obtrusive, experiments; but the tendency, which we noted in *Mourning Becomes Electra* and *Days Without End*, to try and find a more "natural" dramatic medium is realized even more completely in *The Iceman Cometh*, *Long Day's Journey Into Night*, *A Moon for the Misbegotten*, and *A Touch of the Poet*.

One of the most striking qualities possessed by all of these plays is the really impressive quantity of alcohol consumed in each of them. If it weren't that thin tea looks like Bourbon, not one of the plays could proceed beyond the second act. This phenomenon might be passed off as irrelevant, or at best attributed to some development in O'Neill's personal life, were it not for the fact that it represents the *technique* which was to serve much the same dramatic function as the more mechanical devices of the earlier plays. A man who is drunk is not *expected* to behave naturally or rationally. And liquor breaks down inhibitions, pulls aside the facade which men build up in self-defense and self-delusion and shows us the tormented, divided spirit within. It is only after they have been drinking that we get any real glimpse of what makes the characters in *Long Day's Journey* "tick," that we see the sense of failure beneath James Tyrone's pride, or the love and fear Jamie hides behind a mask of callous cynicism. In *A Moon for the Misbegotten* it is only because Jim is "far gone" that he can open up the festering abcess of guilt and self-hatred that has in one sense killed him already, and can make the girl who loves him utter the concluding prayer: "May you have your wish and die in your sleep soon, Jim, darling."[11] If it were not for the fact that Con Melody has had more than a touch of the bottle the sudden shifts from his fantastic posing to moments of despair and bitter self-loathing would seem evidence of nothing less than insanity. Liquor, then, serves two functions: it permits the dramatist to show the contrast between a man sober, with his defenses up, and drunk, when his subconscious drives become overt, and allows the rapid juxtaposition of contradictory moods and impulses once a person *is* drunk. It is a device which O'Neill uses

[10] It may be objected that *The Iceman Cometh* is hardly "realistic," and approaches fantasy. It is true that the play was conceived as a sort of "modern morality," and that neither the plot nor the somewhat formalized grouping of characters and patterning of speeches represents any "slice of life." However, in language, setting and structure, it is obviously much closer to *The Long Voyage Home* or *Anna Christie* than to, say, *Dynamo*.

[11] *A Moon for the Misbegotten* (New York, 1952), p. 177.

for much the same purposes as the more radical innovations, to reveal the conflicts which tear his characters apart and frustrate their potentialities as complete human beings, without appearing arbitrary or mechanical.

But if the use of liquor were *only* a device for subconscious revelation it might be considered just as arbitrary as the masks or the asides. But it is something more. These last four plays are often considered as being among the most pessimistic that O'Neill ever wrote—certainly a reversion from the note of almost lyrical optimism and faith on which *Days Without End* closed. Undoubtedly there are more Lovings than Johns in these plays. In fact, the gloomy tone which is so predominant is due in large part to the fact that all of the major characters are "life-deniers"—the Lovings or Mannons or Caligulas of this world. They are afraid of life, and the death-wish is practically ubiquitous. Loving had had a vision of "the one beautiful, comforting truth of life: that death is final release, the warm, dark peace of annihilation" (III, 534). Larry Slade's quotation from Heine in *The Iceman* would stand as the unspoken creed of many characters:

> "Lo, sleep is good; better is death; in sooth,
> The best of all were never to be born."
>
> (III, 591.)

Jim Tyrone, in *A Moon for the Misbegotten*, prays that death will come in his sleep to free him from himself and life. His brother, Edmund, in *Long Day's Journey*, is "a little in love with death." "Who," he says, "wants to see life as it is, if they can help it? . . . You see [it] and you die—that is, inside you—and have to go on living as a ghost," as Jim does in the other play. Larry Slade is even more explicit:

> All I know is I'm sick of life! . . . I'm drowned and contented on the bottom of a bottle. Honor or dishonor, faith or treachery are nothing to me but the opposites of the same stupidity which is ruler and king of life, and in the end they rot into dust in the same grave. All things are the same meaningless joke to me, for they grin at me from the one skull of death. (III, 649.)

The speech also suggests the relationship between this fear of existence and alcohol. Afraid of life, and hating it, but equally afraid of death, men try to find at least temporary escape or forgetfulness by hiding at "the bottom of a bottle." But as alcohol only dulls the pain, and doesn't really free them from themselves, they escape even further into a past that never was or a future that never will be. This is conspicuously true of the inhabitants of Harry Hope's saloon, but it is also true in differing degrees of the others. Mary's dreams of becoming a nun, or a great pianist, her husband's pretensions to being the great Shakespearian actor he *might* have been, Con Melody's fatuous role as the proud and noble hero of Talavera, Jim Tyrone's pose as a hard and cynical playboy, are all refuges from life, and the cheapest ticket is a glass of whiskey—or a shot of morphine.

At one point in *Long Day's Journey* Mary Tyrone says:

> None of us can help the things life has done to us. They're done before you realize it, and once they're done they make you do other things until at last everything comes between you and what you'd like to be, and you've lost your true self forever. (P. 61.)

In case this should be taken as *O'Neill's* justification for Mary, it should be remembered that she is already well on her way into that pipe-dream world which is each character's form of self-justification. It is not a question so much of what life has done to them, but of what they have done to life. Each of them has been disillusioned by something, the death of someone loved,

or the frustration of some dream of wealth or fame. And with no faith equal to the disappointment, afraid that love or "involvement" of any kind would "again . . . put him at the mercy of life," they have turned on her bitterly, betrayed her, and then built up a pipe-dream to excuse their failure as humans, to others and to themselves. And often, when they think they are being most honest about "facing life" they are in fact the most deluded. Larry Slade believes himself to be a detached and cynical observer on the "grandstand of life"; Hickey knows better, but what he doesn't recognize is that his own altruistic murder of his wife, and his equally generous efforts to bring his alcoholic friends back to "reality," spring from his own hatred and fear; Tyrone explains his stinginess, his failure as an actor and as a husband, as things "life" has done to him; Jim debauches himself, turns beauty into sordidness and love into lust, simply to prove to himself that beauty and love have no existence in a meaningless world; and Major Cornelius Melody attributes all his failures to the pride which is the necessary concomitant of being an officer and a gentleman. Edmund describes his mother's retreat into her drug-fantasy as "like a bank of fog in which she hides and loses herself. Deliberately, that's the hell of it! . . . to get beyond our reach, to be rid of us, to forget we're alive! It's as if, in spite of loving us, she hated us!" (p. 139.) Fearing the commitment and responsibility which facing life and love would demand, they are driven to find what Edmund himself sought in the fog: a world where "life can hide from itself" (p. 131).

The real tragedy of these characters is that they have lived so long with their pipe-dreams that they have *become* those dreams; the roles are, in a sense, reality, and when the illusion is pricked—often by some drunken insight or confession—nothing remains for them to cling to, unless it is another dream. Larry Slade is dragged from his perch above life, and is forced to admit: "Life is too much for me. . . . I'm the only real convert to death Hickey made" (III, 727). Hickey himself, who has been described as bringing with him "the breath of death," escapes from his self-exposure into insanity. Jim Tyrone has so poisoned himself and his capacity for love that even Josie cannot save him, and although he finds one night of drunken bliss in her arms, she describes him as "already dead." Cornelius Melody kills the "Major" when he realizes that "it was the Major played a game all his life, the crazy auld loon, and cheated only himself."[12] The Major is replaced by plain Con Melody, the Irish peasant and inn-keeper; but even this is in danger of becoming just another pose, although closer to the truth. When his daughter challenges his new role, Melody is described as "visibly crumbling as he listens until he appears to have no character left in which to hide and defend himself. He cries wildly and despairingly, as if he saw his last hope of escape suddenly cut off" (p. 178). But his wife's love, which is part of the "life" he would hide from, appears in the end to be even stronger than his fear. *Long Day's Journey Into Night* ends with nothing basically changed—although there has been some self-awareness on the part of the characters. Jamie "gives Edmund a strange look of mingled pity and jealous gloating," and Tyrone, "trying to shake off his hopeless stupor," says of Mary: "Oh, we're fools to pay any attention. It's the damned poison. But I've never known her to drown herself in it as deep as

[12] *A Touch of the Poet* (New Haven, 1957), p. 170.

this. Pass me the bottle, Jamie." The play ends with Mary's long monologue from deep inside her "night," the dope-dream of the past. And perhaps she is the luckiest of them all, she and the inhabitants of Harry Hope's "End of the Line Café," who cling gratefully to Hickey's plea of insanity and drift happily back into their alcoholic never-never land, where all struggle is over.

None of these last four plays ends on the note of mystical affirmation of *The Fountain* or *Lazarus* or *Days Without End*. If there is any affirmation at all, it is more like that of *Desire Under the Elms* or *The Great God Brown*, tempered by the tragic fact that the "sickness of today" is so pervasive and so inbred that its cure, if it comes at all, comes too late. The problems dealt with in the last plays are much the same as earlier: the "disassociation" from life, the price which life exacts for her betrayal, and the inner conflicts which the "failure of science and materialism" to provide any solid faith in life has produced. It is primarily O'Neill's methods that are new; for he found in the "escapism" and symptoms of compulsive drinking and drug addiction both an adequate symbol for the "sickness of today" and a realistic device for revealing the destructive clashes of antithetical impulses which are its consequence.

Throughout his life O'Neill sought a dramatic medium with which to explore the human soul. He tried many methods, some of them as radical as anything attempted in the American theatre. He found, however, that these had their limitations, were too mechanical, called attention to themselves rather than to what they were intended to reveal, suggested demarcations that were too black and white, or forces too much outside his characters. But he did not return to the realism which was, after all, his "natural language" until he had found that with it, and the help of alcohol, he could say the same thing better.

LINGUISTIC INTERPRETATION OF SPEECH PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN STUDENTS

Robert Lado

THIS paper is an attempt to illustrate the usefulness of linguistic information in speech work with foreign students learning English. The generalizations are based on rather extensive observations, although for the sake of clarity the evidence is presented as a single composite example.

Let the example be the case of a student whose native language is not English and who is having trouble with English /ɹ/.[1] He makes the following pronunciation mistakes in the form of substitutions of sounds:

/su/	for	/ʒu/	*zoo*
/sibrə/	for	/ʒibrə/	*zebra*
/sɪpər/	for	/ʒɪpər/	*zipper*
/bɪsɪ/	for	/bɪzɪ/	*busy*
/isɪ/	for	/izɪ/	*easy*
/krusər/	for	/kruʒər/	*cruiser*
/aɪs/	for	/aɪz/	*eyes*
/nous/	for	/nouz/	*nose*
/deɪs/	for	/deɪz/	*days*

In order to present the linguistic interpretation in perspective we will first mention some of the considerations that a non-linguistic interpretation would entail.

From the evidence at hand it is clear that the student does not pronounce English /ɹ/ initially, medially, or finally. Should we not be interested in the etiology of the case, we might simply go to work on helping him pronounce /ɹ/. The result, as we shall see, would be beneficial in part but would create new problems.

On the other hand, if we are interested in the causes of this problem for the purpose of treating it more effectively we would presumably look for the following: 1) *Organic causes*: Does the student have any organic defect such as missing teeth, short jaw, etc., that might be causing the distortion? 2) *Auditory acuity:* Does he have an auditory loss of more than twenty-five decibels in the range of /s/ and /ɹ/? 3) *Emotional factors:* Is this a form of baby talk that the student might have preserved for emotional reasons? 4) *Developmental factors:* Did the student learn this pronunciation from his teachers or parents? 5) *Auditory memory span:* Does he have an abnormally short auditory memory span? 6) *Intelligence:* Does he have the intelligence necessary to speak well? 7) *Conditions under which the error occurs:* Does the mispronunciation occur under any and all circumstances or is it restricted to any section of the following scale: isolated sounds, nonsense syllables, isolated words, rehearsed sentences, non-emotional conversation, emotional unguarded speech.[2]

The case under observation would turn out to be normal in all the inquiries and tests. The speech problem would have to be ascribed to the typical

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[1] Symbols enclosed in slant lines represent phonemes, minimal units of speech that distinguish utterances in a language. IPA symbols are used.

[2] For a fuller discussion of the diagnosis of speech distortions see for example C. Van Riper, *Speech Correction, Principles and Methods* (New York, 1947).

problems encountered by speakers of the native language background of the student. We might conclude that the student does not have this sound in his native language and therefore he does not pronounce it in English.

A more searching investigator would notice that in the words *smile* and *smell* the student uses /ɹ/ preceded by an intrusive vowel, that is, he pronounces the words as /ɛzmaɪl/ and /ɛzmɛl/. The observer would modify the diagnosis to indicate that the student pronounces /ɹ/ in these items but that he does not in general have this sound.

Treatment would include a description of voicing, and practice with syllables, words, phrases and sentences that contain the sound. Sometime during treatment, after the student has succeeded in pronouncing /ɹ/, he will seem to overcorrect himself and use /ɹ/ where it does not belong. He might pronounce *same* as /ɹeɪm/, *scissors* as /ɹɪɹəɹz/, *so* as /ɹoʊ/.

This phenomenon is partly like that of an English speaker learning Spanish trilled *r*. First he can not pronounce the trill. Later he succeeds but overcorrects by trilling all his *r*'s—those that he should and those that he should not. That is, where he previously used English /r/ he now uses a trilled *r*[3] which is phonetically like Spanish /r/ but different in the fact that Spanish has two *r*-like phonemes, /r/ and /ř/, as in *pero* and *perro, caro* and *carro*, etc. He previously leveled these pairs to /pero/, /karo/. Now he levels them to /peřo/, /kařo/. The distinction between *pero* and *perro* and all similar pairs is still lost.

The difference between phonetic description and phonemic structure as understood in linguistics, as well as the understanding of morpho-phonemic alternations[4] and syntactical relations give us tools for a more accurate interpretation of the speech problems of foreign students. The case we are considering touches on phonemics, morpho-phonemics, and syntactics. Let's examine them in that order.

Phonemic problem. To pronounce the word *cool*, a speaker of English rounds his lips, makes contact between the back of his tongue and the soft palate, builds up pressure from his lungs and releases the tongue-velum closure. To pronounce the word *keel* he does something similar, except that he unrounds his lips and makes the contact between the back of his tongue and the palate farther front than for *cool*.

You can easily observe this by getting set to say *cool* and *keel* but not saying them, but instead trying to feel the position of the articulators. In a series such as *cool, could, coal, call, cap, kept, cape, kill, keel*, the rounding of the lips decreases as the vowel that follows /k/ changes from the fully rounded /u/ to the fully unrounded /i/.

Similarly the lips are rounded somewhat in pronouncing English /s/ in *swell* and unrounded in pronouncing *seat*. Various other degrees of rounding occur in other words, depending on the vowel that follows /s/. The length of the /s/ varies also, depending on the sounds that precede and follow it and the position of the /s/ with regard to stress, silence, or the various junctures of the language.

In English, however, all these varieties of /k/ and of /s/ are phonemically only one /k/ and one /s/. Hungarian has two

[3] For reasons of typography, the trilled *r* is here recorded /ř/ rather than with the tilde.

[4] Different phonemic shapes of the same morpheme. Morphemes are the minimum meaningful elements in utterances. See for example Charles F. Hockett, *A Course in Modern Linguistics* (New York, 1958).

k-like (dorso-velar) phonemes which contrast as to point of articulation, and Nootka, an American Indian language, has four dorso-velar phonemes which differ as to point of articulation and rounding of the lips. Other languages have two or three *k*-like phonemes differing as to point of articulation, rounding, aspiration, and palatalization.

English has two phonemes of the *s* articulation: /s/ and /ʒ/. This is illustrated by such contrasts as *Sue:zoo, sip:zip, ice:eyes, rice:rise*. Spanish has these two sounds—[s] as in *si, mesa, mas,* and [z] as in *mismo, asno, isla, desviar, desdicha, desgracia, israelita*—, but this difference is not sufficient to change one word into another or one utterance into another. Spanish, then, has only one *s*-like phoneme, /s/, with two major allophones or variants, [s] and [z]. [z] occurs before the consonants /m, n, l, b, g, r/. Elsewhere the phoneme is pronounced [s]. In some varieties of Spanish, post-vocalic /s/ has an [h] variant also, but this fact would add little to our discussion and we will say that our student does not speak such a variety of the language.

When the native language of the student has one phoneme in a phonetic range where the target or goal language has two, the student tends to substitute his one phoneme for the two of the goal language. This is represented schematically in the figure.

SPANISH		ENGLISH
[s]	⟷	/s/
/s/		
[z] (b,d,g,m,n,l,r)	⟷	/z/

Hence, in attempting to pronounce English *small* and *smile*, the student is not using /z/ but Spanish /s/ which happens to be pronounced [z] in that environment.[5] Therefore, even when we teach him to pronounce [z] he may learn it as part of the phoneme /s/ and will tend to say [zeim], [zɪzərz], [zou] for *same, scissors, so.*

Not until he establishes a minimal phonemic contrast between /s/ and /ʒ/ and two separate nets of phonemic contrasts between /s/ and /z/ and all other phonemes can we say that he has learned the phonemes /s/ and /z/.

From actual tests we know that students whose native language uses [s] and [z] as allophones of a single phoneme /s/ not only have great difficulty producing the contrast in the various positions in which it may occur, but they will not hear the contrast when spoken by others even though their hearing acuity is completely normal.

Each language has characteristic sequences of phonemes into which its utterances are cast. English /s/ combines with a number of consonants to form consonant clusters such as /sp, st, sk, sm, sn, sl, sw, spl, spr, str/ as in *speak, study, school, smell, snow, slow, swell, splendid, spread, street,* which occur at the beginning of utterances. Spanish permits some of these sequences, e.g. /sp, st, sk, spl, str/, but always with a vowel preceding the /s/ as in *esperar, estudiar, escuela, espléndido, estructura.* As a result, Spanish speakers have a strong tendency to add an intrusive vowel before all these clusters in English, thus changing them to /ɛsp, ɛst, ɛsk/, etc. Consonant clusters with /s/ are even more varied in utterance final position in English, whereas in Spanish they are not normally permitted. The student thus tends to omit /s/ in final clusters.

Morphophonemic problem. In addition to the problem of the phonemic

[5] For a fuller discussion of the linguistic problems of students learning a second language see the author's *Linguistics Across Cultures* (Ann Arbor, 1957).

contrast between /s/ and /z/ there is a problem of morphophonemic alternation involved in the pronunciation of /s/ and /z/. The English regular plural inflection is marked by a morpheme {-s}[6] suffixed to a singular base. This morpheme has three chief allomorphs {/s/~/z/~/ɪz/}. /s/ follows a voiceless sound in the base, /z/ is suffixed to a voiced sound, and /ɪz/ is added when the base ends in /s, ʃ, z, ʒ, tʃ, dʒ/. Futhermore, the plural inflection in English is restricted to nouns. Examples: books /bʊk-s/, *cars* /kar-z/, *churches* /tʃərtʃɪz/.

Spanish also has a plural inflectional morpheme {-s} with two chief allomorphs {/s/~/es/}. /s/ follows a vowel in the base, and /es/ follows a consonant. Examples: *libro:libros, árbol: árboles, mes:meses, plan:planes.* Compare English /plæn:plænz/ with Spanish /plan:planes/, and English /wɪndoʊ:wɪndoʊz/ with Spanish /libro-libros/.

Even after the student has learned to pronounce /z/ he will tend to use /s/ for plural after vowels and /ɛs/ or nothing after consonants. When the drill has failed to separate the two phonemes as phonemes or as allomorphs of the plural morpheme, he may tend to use /z/ after vowels and /ɛz/ after consonants because of the distribution of the plural morpheme in Spanish.

Syntactic problems. There are at least two syntactic problems connected with the /s:z/ contrast in English for a speaker of Spanish. The English third person singular of most verbs has an inflectional morpheme {-s} with allomorphs of the same shape as the plural morpheme and occurring under the same conditions except that it is restricted to verbs. The Spanish speaker has nothing similar to it in his native language. He therefore tends to omit the third person singular inflection in English. Learning to pronounce /z/ has no effect on this problem because the Spanish speaker may omit the suffix whether it is /s/, /z/, or /ɪz/.

Another syntactic problem is caused by the fact that in English the adjectives are not inflected for plural as are the nouns. Spanish adjectives, on the other hand are inflected for plural to agree with the noun head they modify. The Spanish speaker therefore tends to add the plural inflection to the adjective in English when it modifies a plural noun. He may thus say, "The talls people," "The goods men," "The news books," if he has learned to produce the sound sequences involved.

A number of brief generalized comments may be made in conclusion. (1) The problems described in this paper and those the examples are intended to represent are not matters of a particular teaching method. They are descriptions of the learning problems faced by the student regardless of method. (2) The linguistic terminology used in describing the problems is not essential to the analysis. The important thing is the description of the problems themselves, the mapping of the terrain over which the student must travel. (3) Since different languages have different structures, the problems of a Spanish speaker learning English will not be the same as those of a Japanese speaker or of the speaker of some other language. Hence the desirability of having different materials for each native language background. Using different materials does not mean that the instructions must be in the students' native language; the particular contrasts and patterns to be emphasized will vary as will the order of presentation. (4) The linguistic problems of foreign students are not ab-

[6] Braces { } are used to set off a morpheme; ~ indicates alternation.

normalities requiring clinical diagnosis and treatment; they are the normal path of learning for the speakers of each language. Therefore, it is not desirable to label the work with foreign students "speech correction." (5) Remedial classes for native speakers are usually keyed to students who are slow in their educational development. The student who is learning English as a foreign language, on the other hand, is usually a student with normal or above normal academic development. Hence, it is probably quite misleading to call the classes for foreign students "remedial." (6) In classes with students from a variety of language backgrounds it is often extremely difficult for the teacher to be informed of all the major problems of each language background. The most useful tool that the teacher could have would be some training in linguistics.

THE ROLES OF THE TEACHER OF DISCUSSION

A Symposium

Martin P. Andersen

INCREASING attention is being given to the issues of "what to teach" and "how to teach" in the first college course in discussion. This is desirable. Improvement in our teaching will come only through critical evaluation. However, the variance in the views expressed suggests that teachers of discussion are far from agreement on either the "what" or the "how."

This article outlines a teaching framework to reconcile the differences in current practice and provide maximum learning values for the students. Three roles which the teacher must play in achieving these aims are presented.

The philosophy on which this article is based is avowedly "middle-of-the-road." It stems from the belief that students' learning and growth will be maximized when the course avoids a "specialized" approach. It has experiential support and is based on assumptions which are the outgrowth of varied practice and teaching of discussion. Four assumptions, although not the major focus, are considered throughout the article.

The first assumption is that discussion is a tool to be used for effective citizen participation in a democratic society. It should provide the student with knowledge of basic principles of discussion, skill in its techniques, and a personal philosophy for its responsible practice. Secondly, while the student will use this tool primarily in small group problem-solving situations, practice in "more-or-less public" deliberations on vital issues should not be overlooked. Thirdly, all the essential elements of the concept of discussion should be given approximately equal emphasis. The final assumption is that optimum learning and growth will occur only when teacher-centered, problem-centered, and group-centered practices are variously employed.

What, then, are the roles which must be played for effective teaching of discussion? We are familiar with the classification of group-member roles described by Benne and Sheats.[1] The teacher of discussion must at times play all of these functional roles: he is information giver, procedural technician, encourager, standard setter, counselor, follower, and leader. However, he plays certain general roles as well. Specifically, three are considered: his roles as *student, instructor,* and *trainer.*[2]

At first it may appear that our famil-

The symposium was arranged by Dean C. Barnlund, Associate Professor of Group Communication, Northwestern University, as a project of the SAA Discussion and Group Methods Interest Group. Mr. Andersen is Professor of Speech, University of California, Los Angeles, and Vice-Chairman of the Interest Group. Mr. Howell is Professor of Speech, University of Minnesota. Mr. Keltner, formerly Professor of Speech, Kansas State University, is now Commissioner, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, St. Louis.

[1] Kenneth D. Benne and Paul Sheats, "Functional Roles of Group Members," *Jour. Social Issues,* IV (Spring 1948), 41-49.

[2] It is not implied that the roles considered are unique to the teacher of discussion. They apply to all teachers. However, by virtue of the substantive and procedural content of discussion, the manner in which these roles are carried out in a class in discussion will differ from that in other subject areas.

iarity with these roles makes further consideration unnecessary. We may feel that our present practice needs little improvement. There is value, however, in a periodic review of our teaching methods, both for ourselves and our students.

His Role as a Student

The teacher of discussion must first be a *student,* scholarly in his approach to both content and method. His goal is that mastery of subject matter which comes from intensive study, carefully designed research, and experimental teaching. Only in this way will he be effective in his remaining roles.

This scholarly approach will have value for the individual teacher, his students, and the entire profession. Primarily, its purpose is to give needed clarification to the concept of discussion. A review of the literature or attendance at sectional meetings on discussion at professional conventions reveals misunderstanding, disagreement, and at times, casual inaccuracy, about discussion. One writer, who has expressed concern over this problem, directs attention to one of its causes in the following statement: "In most of our literature you will find 'discussion' defined or described as the *cooperative* and *reflective* deliberation of problems under the guidance of a *leader*. Then assuming these qualities actually describe the process we are studying, we idealize them to the exclusion of many of the other possibilities of discussion. . . ."[3]

This strikes at the heart of the problem. Our study of discussion must be in a framework which encompasses *all* of its aspects. We submit that there are six essential elements in the process of discussion. They are: (1) the existence of a group; (2) interaction which is predominantly oral; (3) the sharing of leadership functions; (4) the existence of purpose, more or less clearly defined; (5) the exchange of facts and opinions; and (6) approximation of logic or reasonableness in the exchange. All six elements are present in every discussion. They constitute a theoretical framework and may be considered as dimensions which vary as the discussion process is modified by situational factors. Although the teacher of discussion may momentarily focus on a single element, say, the logic of discussion, this focus should always be within the framework of the complete theoretical concept. Further, to make any one element the focus throughout a course is committing the error of the blind men and the elephant.

As a means of increasing our understanding of this conceptual framework there are three obvious things we can do. We can widen the scope of our reading; we can study and participate in the practice of discussion outside the classroom; and we can increase our research activities.

Much of the recent literature dealing with group methods has come from the areas outside the field of speech, notably social-psychology, sociology, education, psychology, and business administration. Besides these, occasional offerings have come from social welfare, physical education, anthropology, and psychiatry. Haiman's review of materials in Group Dynamics[4] is an excellent start for the student of discussion. In addition to the books mentioned by Haiman, a number of others should now be added.[5]

[3] Dean C. Barnlund, "Our Concept of Discussion: Static or Dynamic," *The Speech Teacher,* III (January 1954), 8.

[4] Franklyn S. Haiman, "Materials in Group Dynamics," *QJS,* XL (April 1954), 201-206.

[5] C. G. Browne and Thomas S. Cohn, *The Study of Leadership* (Danville, Ill., 1958); Hubert Bonner, *Group Dynamics: Principles and Applications* (New York, 1959); Thomas Fansler, *Creative Power Through Discussion* (New York, 1950); Burleigh B. Gardner and David G. Moore, *Human Relations in Industry,* rev. ed. (Home-

In addition to these books we should not overlook the many professional journals, including those in our own field.[6] In addition to the standard psychology, sociology, and education journals, the student of discussion will find a number of others especially valuable, including *Advanced Management, Adult Leadership, Autonomous Bulletin, General Electric Review, Group Psychotherapy, Harvard Business Review, Human Organization, The Journal of Communication, Personnel Journal, Personnel Psychology,* and *Sociometry.*

It is also important that we study the actual practice of discussion. In fact, we need to *know how it is conducted* before we can reasonably be expected to *tell how it should be conducted.* Much has been written about the practice of discussion in various fields of endeavor.[7] These surveys, however, are no substitute for direct observation of discussion activities outside academic settings.

There is truth in the saying that we learn by doing. Participation in these "extracurricular" discussion activities is a sure way to gain a picture of the realities of the actual practice of discussion, in collective bargaining sessions, in training programs, in business and industry, and in the workshops conducted by community organizations. Then, too, we may frequently exert influence to make such discussions more effective. Lillywhite states: "We must certainly find time to get off the campus more frequently and more effectively."[8] Such off-campus activities aid the teacher in bridging the gap between contemporary practice and training methods and his own conceptual framework and teaching techniques.

Finally, we need to be aware of research now being conducted and frequently conduct some type of original study or research ourselves. Teachers of discussion have a greater responsibility than they have assumed to contribute to the ever-expanding body of knowledge about discussion. It is fortunate that some of the leaders in our field have continued their interest in research. Some indication of the areas in which research is needed is found in the report by Keltner and Arnold.[9] The seven problem areas listed in this report are sufficiently diverse to permit every teacher

wood, Ill., 1950); Thomas Gordon, *Group-Centered Leadership* (Boston, 1955); Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales, *Small Groups* (New York, 1955); Robert L. Kahn and Charles F. Cannell, *The Dynamics of Interviewing* (New York, 1957); Earl C. Kelley, *The Workshop Way of Learning* (New York, 1951); Josephine Klein, *The Study of Groups* (London, 1956); *Group Process in Physical Education,* ed. Hilda Clute Kozman (New York, 1951); Howard Lane and Mary Beauchamp, *Human Relations in Teaching* (New York, 1955); Donald A. Laird and Eleanor C. Laird, *The New Psychology for Leadership* (New York, 1956); Kurt Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science* (New York, 1951); Henry Clay Lindgren, *Effective Leadership in Human Relations* (New York, 1954); *Handbook of Social Psychology,* 2 vols., ed., Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge, 1954); Ronald Lippitt, *Training in Community Relations* (New York, 1949); Matthew B. Miles, *Learning to Work in Groups* (New York, 1959); J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive* (Beacon, N. Y., 1953); Ralph G. Nichols and Leonard A. Stevens, *Are You Listening?* (New York, 1957); Murray G. Ross and Charles E. Hendry, *New Understandings of Leadership* (New York, 1957); Herbert A. Thelen, *Dynamics of Groups at Work* (Chicago, 1954); and Morris S. Viteles, *Motivation and Morale in Industry* (New York, 1953).

[6] For a review see *Speech Monographs,* XXII (March 1955); also see J. Jeffery Auer, "Recent Literature in Discussion," *QJS,* XXXIX (February 1953), 95-98.

[7] Typical are the following: Martin P. Andersen, "Discussion in Agriculture," *QJS,* XXXVII (December 1951), 463-468; George L. Hinds, "Developing Industrial Conference Leaders," *The Speech Teacher,* IV (November 1955), 266-269; Irving J. Lee, *How To Talk With People* (New York, 1952); Harold P. Zelko, "Adult Speech Training: Challenge to the Speech Profession," *QJS,* XXXVII (February 1951), 55-62; and the series of articles on the use of discussion in various areas of our national life, found in *Adult Education Bull.,* XIII (February 1949).

[8] Herold Lillywhite, "Responsibility in the Teaching of Speech," *Western Speech,* XIX (May 1955), 197.

[9] John Keltner and Carroll C. Arnold, "Discussion in American Colleges and Universities," *QJS,* XLII (October 1956), 250-256.

ample latitude in which to develop a research area suited to his interests. But in addition to this needed expansion of basic research, we need to conduct and report on action research, field studies, and classroom experimentation.

The role of student must be given greater attention. It is alarming to note the small amount of discussion research being conducted by persons in the field of speech. In the issues of *Speech Monographs* for 1947-56 inclusive, slightly over 5200 theses in speech are listed. Of these only 59 deal with discussion. Of the 59, 18 were doctoral dissertations. This is only 1.5 per cent of all the doctoral dissertations in speech completed during this period. Not only are we doing a small amount of research, but little of what we do is being reported.

A survey of journals outside of speech shows that persons in other disciplines are doing basic research in areas which should be our primary interest. It is good that research is being done, but it is not good that so little is being done by teachers of discussion. In 1949, in an article reviewing discussion research, Dickens and Heffernan stated: ". . . viewed in perspective it is probably fair to say that the lead in research in group discussion during the years 1934-46 shifted from the field of psychology to that of speech. . . ."[10] No longer is this true!

We need to broaden the base of our research activity in every possible way. More of us should engage in research. This seems possible, since our numbers are increasing. We need to develop research programs in discussion at more schools.[11] We need to participate in more interdisciplinary research. Finally, we need to broaden the scope of our research interests.

His Role As Instructor

The second role which the teacher of discussion must play is that of instructor. Here he is concerned primarily with content and skills on an intellectual level. The approach is teacher-centered and problem-centered; the content includes discussion theory and technical know-how, presented by the instructor, and "public" and "group process" subjects, presented by the students. In this role the teacher imparts knowledge, gives instructions, and serves when needed as consultant, discussion leader, observer, participant, and critic.

The second role requires the ability to create conditions in which learning can take place.[12] Early in the course the students need to see that the "take home" values will meet some of their specific needs. Usually, they will then be both intellectually and emotionally motivated.

Four of the conditions for learning are significant. First, the goals for the course and the areas of freedom for the students must be clearly defined and understood. At the beginning the basic content goals, determined in advance by the instructor, are presented, and the increasing responsibilities of the students are indicated. Goal-setting is an increasing function of students and a diminishing one of the instructor. To start the course in a completely unstructured situation is not necessary to maximum learning and has too many dangers.[13]

[10] Milton Dickens and Marguerite Heffernan, "Experimental Research in Group Discussion," *QJS*, XXXVI (February 1949), 23-29.

[11] During the period 1949-1956, 22 schools granted degrees for which the recipient conducted discussion research. Six schools granted 67% (39 out of 59) of these degrees.

[12] In this connection see Carl R. Rogers, "Implications of Recent Advances in Prediction and Control of Behavior," *Teachers Coll. Record*, LVII (February 1956), 316-322, and Herbert A. Thelen (see note 5 above), pp. 129-178.

[13] See Henry C. Lindgren, *Educational Psychology in the Classroom* (New York, 1956), Chs. 7, 9.

Uncertainty, confusion, frustration, and discouragement frequently result. On the other hand, as the climate becomes more acceptant and dependency on the instructor decreases, student areas of freedom can and should be increased.

Secondly, the opportunity must be provided for practice in small-group problem-solving and learning experiences. These should continue throughout the course, both during and outside of the class. That the skills essential for effective citizen participation in a democracy can best be attained in small groups is an assumption underlying much of the contemporary investigations in small group behavior.[14]

A third, but frequently overlooked, condition necessary for learning is that the experiences be both rewarded and rewarding. The importance of reward is emphasized by one author who asserts that "Learning takes place only when the act that is performed is reinforced or rewarded."[15] For the teacher of discussion the significance of this statement lies in the fact that reward is a daily occurrence, found in mastery of a skill, understanding of a process, and the support and approval of instructor and classmates.

A fourth condition is that procedures in the classroom should facilitate change in the students' behavior. Two-way communication is essential between instructor and students, and among the students. They must feel free to talk about matters of common concern; they must feel secure in whatever contribution they make; they must view the course as an opportunity to experiment in all aspects of discussion methodology; and they must be led to see how changes in their ways of relating to others will contribute to group progress and benefit themselves. Continuous evaluation and feedback, related at first to the logical and technical aspects of subgroup presentations and later to the individual and his relations with others, aid in facilitating change.

Several aspects of the implementation of the second role are important. First, the instructor must know of and use all available resources and teaching techniques. Radio and television discussion programs may be analyzed and studied; a large number of films on discussion and related subjects are now available; tape recordings should be used; and closed circuit television provides the opportunity for experimentation. Arrangements may be made for students to present "public" discussions at meetings of community organizations or on local radio and television discussion programs. Staff members from other departments and training and personnel workers from business and industry may often be used as resource persons. The printed materials being made available through commercial concerns and the various laboratories in Group Development are helpful; and the number of good texts should now be adequate to meet the needs of most teachers.[16]

A frequently neglected resource is the findings of recent research in discussion and group process.[17] Studies related to group size, the selection of group members, spatial factors affecting discussion, status and power, communication networks, the influence of variant group members, evaluation methods, the relative effectiveness of tasks done by individuals or in groups, and factors affecting group productivity are but a few

[14] See Sloan Wayland, "Functional Roles of Small Groups in Large Social Systems," *Teachers Coll. Record*, LV (April 1954), 359-368.

[15] Percival M. Symonds, "What Education Has to Learn From Psychology," *Teachers Coll. Record*, LVII (October 1955), 15.

[16] See Laura Crowell, "Readings on Group Process," *Western Speech*, XXII (Spring 1958), 100-105, for a review of discussion texts.

[17] *Ibid.*

of the areas which have important implications for discussion practice.

A second important aspect of the instructor's role is related to the content of classroom discussions.[18] Early in the course class discussions may center around material presented by the instructor, such as the historical backgrounds of discussion, the function of discussion in a democracy, and the place of logic, evidence, and persuasion in discussion. "Public" type discussions may be presented by subgroups on social, political, or economic issues. These provide needed insights and understandings[19] but should not be the sole focus.

In considering content it should be emphasized that we are concerned with the total personality of the student,[20] not just that part in which he stores cognitive material about discussion theory, to be used only at examination time. Kelley states that "The most crucial learning at any given time has to do with the individual's current problems."[21] Hence, the content of some of our classroom discussions should deal with problems on which the students must make decisions or take action: the nature of problem-solving, sharing of leadership, the discovery and use of personal resources, home and family problems, immediate campus issues, and social and cultural activities. Barnlund states in this connection that "Problems which secure higher levels of ego-involvement and which are more intimately tied to the students' world of experience appear more likely to produce the attitudes and habits we are trying to cultivate."[22]

A third aspect of the instructor's role is how he practices what he preaches. We believe that early in the course the instructor may be directive, judgmental as to theoretical and technical matters, and participate on an "expert" level. This does not imply, as seems to be assumed by some supporters of non-directive teaching methods, that he is completely authoritarian, does not relate content to students' needs, and does not understand and accept their expression of feelings. As instructor he has a responsibility to present theoretical content materials, suggest procedures and resources, set standards, and evaluate student growth. Self-growth can be maximized for the students even though the teacher does not use a "group-centered" approach throughout; it will not be if the approach is "teacher-centered" throughout. Finally, classroom practice ought to provide experiences with varied discussion techniques, such as discussion clusters or buzz groups, the use of clarifiers, feedback, film-forums, listening teams, role-playing, case studies, process observation, agree-disagree guides, and sociometric methods. "Public" type presentations should be combined with small-group problem-solving.

His Role As Trainer

The third role for the teacher is that of *trainer*. Here he is primarily concerned with content and skills on a personal, "feeling" level. The approach is group-centered, and the content emerges from the unstructured interactions among members of the class or sub-

[18] See Keltner and Arnold, *op. cit.*; also Laura Crowell, "Group-or Problem-Centered Discussion?" *Western Speech*, XXII (Summer 1958), 134-137, and Seth A. Fessenden and Joseph A. Wagner, "Are We Interested in Content?" *Western Speech*, XXII (Summer 1958), 137-141.

[19] See Theodore Clevenger, Jr., "The Teacher of Speech and Freedom of Speech," *The Speech Teacher*, V (March 1956), 91-101.

[20] See Rupert Cortright, "This Speech Age Makes New Demands Upon Education," *The Speech Teacher*, II (January 1953), 1-6.

[21] Earl C. Kelley, *op cit.*, p. 5 (see note 5, above).

[22] Dean C. Barnlund, "The Reflective Mind in the Making," *The Speech Teacher*, I (March 1952), 94.

groups. In this role the teacher serves as resource person, to be used as the students wish. His methods are generally nondirective: he seeks to understand and accepts the emotional attitudes and feelings expressed, aids students in self-analysis, and suggests ways in which they can experiment in improving individual and group functioning.

The distinction between the roles of instructor and trainer is a fine one; frequently similar functions are performed. However, they do contrast in a number of respects. The instructor most frequently gives information, demonstrates, sets up specific requirements, and evaluates on the basis of generally accepted standards; the trainer questions, suggests methods for experimentation, makes resources available but is permissive in their use, and joins with others in establishing group standards. The former is concerned with intellectual content and understanding of skills; the latter is concerned with improvement in skills and emotional content. The instructor has a responsibility to retain his leadership function; the trainer seeks to distribute it among the members of the group. The role of one is relatively stable while the other is flexible.

As a trainer he works with the students more nearly on a "peer" level in increasing their understanding of: (1) personal motivations, typical ways of relating to others, and how these affect others; (2) motivations of others and their ways of interacting; (3) group growth and functioning; and (4) ways in which they can work more effectively in groups. The aim is to internalize these understandings for needed behavioral change.

The conditions essential to the instructor's role also apply to that of trainer, except the first, that goals and content are largely determined by the instructor. Now both are determined by the students, the trainer serving as resource person. The fourth condition, that the classroom procedures be conducive to change, is especially important.

While the amount of class time which the teacher devotes to this third role will vary, it is important that a portion be devoted to training. Even in a few weeks considerable improvement will be seen in the ability to establish and attain group goals, in growing self-reliance in group situations, and in the ability to assess and change individual functioning. Some of the unique learning values which come from an experimental training approach would not be attained if the sole emphasis were on, let us say, the logic of discussion.

There are convincing reasons why this role should be stressed during the latter part of the course, rather than earlier or throughout. First, the students will gain considerable sophistication in group processes by working together at first on intellectual tasks and technical skills. They will then assume more readily the increasing responsibilities of their own self direction. The tendency to become defensive, aggressive, and uncooperative is decreased as they become aware of ways in which groups can set and attain goals, and as they become sensitized to their own needs and capacities for participation in discussion. Toward the latter part of the course the members are well acquainted. When subgroups are chosen on a sociometric basis the members give each other needed support for learning and change.

Another reason for the teacher-problem-group-centered progression is that it tends to break down some of the resistance and prejudice the students bring with them. Some are "debaters," sold on intentional thinking, who find it diffi-

cult to accept the reflective nature of discussion; some, because of past experiences may be convinced that an authoritarian, aggressive approach is best in group problem-solving; others, accustomed only to the traditional lecture method, may need time to become accustomed to their increasing responsibilities; and still others, with racial, religious, or political biases, may discover some of them unfounded.

Perhaps the most important reason for stressing the sequence presented herein is to place the emphasis on emotional growth and change after intellectual understanding. Lindgren points out that emotional maturity is a process of growth and is stimulated by increased understanding,[23] although the two cannot be completely separated. Knowledge of what makes for good discussion, followed by increasing sensitivity to one's capacities and lacks, and opportunity to practice change in a supportive situation can lead to desired goals.

When playing the role of trainer, what is needed? Obviously, the type of atmosphere in which the student does not fear ridicule or censure, in which he can accept helpful suggestions from others without becoming defensive, where communication is two-way, in which he receives support from others, and in which his awareness of the need for change has become his motivation for learning. There must be opportunity to practice, in role-playing situations, needed skills and new ways of behaving.

The trainer must resist the temptation to revert to his instructor role; he must frequently accept decisions representing a group consensus; and he should suggest resources but cannot insist that all students use them equally or in the same manner. He encourages in every way possible increasing student independence. Through conferences he tries to discover the individual's capacities and builds on them; he discovers needs and works toward their satisfaction. He does not push the individual faster than he can go but makes sure that he has every opportunity for development in various discussion skills.

Conclusion

In the final analysis each teacher must develop a teaching framework which gives him the greatest feeling of security. However, if the course is to be of greatest value to the students then the assumptions stated earlier must be implemented. The role pattern suggested seems to be a workable way of doing this. It insures that all facets of the concept of discussion are considered. It adapts teaching practices to varying course goals and contents. It gives students practice in a wide range of discussion techniques and functions, and moves the students slowly toward the ultimate goal of behavioral change. It insures that predetermined content-centered goals will be achieved and still permits sufficient areas of freedom for small group experiences.

In the conclusion of the chapter on "Student-Centered Teaching" in Rogers' excellent book, *Client-Centered Therapy*, the following statements are found: "Much of present education appears to be operationally based on the assumption 'You can't trust the student,' " and "The approach we have been discussing is based on an assumption diametrically opposed, that 'You can trust the student.' "[24] Neither of these gives the picture as it applies to the roles which the teacher of discussion must play. A better statement would be: "You can trust the student, but cannot avoid responsibilities which are rightfully yours."

[23] See Lindgren, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-19.

[24] Carl Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

COMMENT

William S. Howell

I see Martin Andersen's "The Role of the Teacher in Discussion" as an attempt to increase adaptability by adding structure. I refer particularly to his sequential teacher-problem-group emphasis and his student-teacher-trainer roles.

Let me comment on the roles of student, teacher and trainer. The role of "student" is for the instructor an extra-class phenomenon. This is a universal of competent teaching and it means to me simply keeping up with your specialty. Any teacher of any subject should play the student role or he will resemble the professor of psychology I once knew who said, "I worked for my Ph.D. Now, let my Ph.D. work for me."

In speech, keeping in touch with off-campus public address is a part of teaching public speaking, persuasion, etc., and similar observations might be made about interpretation, radio and television, and many aspects of theatre. All teachers at the college level should have more spectator and participant interest in research, obviously. My point: Andersen's advice concerning the "student role" of the teacher of discussion amounts to a reminder that he shares the outside-of-class scholarly obligations of other college teachers.

"Teacher" and "trainer" roles seem to me to be an artificial and unnatural separation. The good teacher of speech fundamentals performs the functions here described as characteristic of "training." Two-way communication and increasing student independence should occur in all college teaching, but they are perhaps most central to the teaching of speech. In clarifying the teacher-trainer distinction, Andersen says, "The role of one is relatively stable while the other is flexible." I see no significant difference in flexibility or stability in accomplishing what he lists as jobs to be done under teaching and training. Concerning training he says, "The aim is to internalize these understandings for needed behavioral change." Once we dissipate the fog of pedagese hanging over this pronouncement, the commendable result would seem to eventuate from activities he cites as "teaching" as well as from those he allocates to "training." For example, learning the outcome of a study may cause a student to modify his practices (make behavioral change) on the spot.

Now let me comment on the sequential emphasis upon teacher, problem, and groups in the beginning discussion course. This idea appeals to me as a teacher, providing I can mix them up when I feel like doing so, and providing I can disregard any sequence relationship between the last two elements.

To my prejudiced way of thinking, emphasis upon *problem* should be dominant in the discussion course even when activities are teacher-centered or group-centered. All critical thinking methods and group interaction theory seem to me to have purpose only as they improve the attack upon a problem. Here Andersen and I part company, for he doesn't see development of the ability to practice reasoned discourse in groups as the most important outcome of curricular discussion. I would place consideration of group processes in the context of "How can we most effectively discipline our efforts to think critically together?" I believe Andersen would organize this subject matter around a broader question, "How do people interact in face-to-face communication?"

Problems of getting along together don't wait to appear until late in the discussion course. I favor handling them when they come along as an integral part of the complex business of achieving re-

flective thought through cooperative oral communication. All discussions should be problem-centered, with the instructor playing an increasingly nondirective role as students gain knowledge and experience.

I like the inclusion of public discussion as a major part of the practice of students. I think the recommendation to use personal problems as topics is dangerous. Bubbly but inconsequential verbalization tends to result. Why not encourage deliberation over civic, social, and intellectual problems of stature, those confronting our citizenry? There seems to be no difficulty in securing "involvement" of my students in a discussion of the proposed sales tax for Minnesota in this legislative year, for example. With a public problem comes opportunity to use evidence and reasoning at a level rarely possible in discussion of personal-type problems.

In his conclusion the author claims as an advantage of his triple-role interpretation of the instructor of discussion that it "moves the student slowly toward the ultimate goal of behavioral change." This suggests my main reservation about the method. It seems to move too slowly. My students show basic behavior changes the first week. Why wait?

COMMENT

John W. Keltner

Andersen's paper is stimulating and provocative. It contains much that is of value to the teacher of discussion. The basic substance of his work seems sound enough. I should like to raise a question, however, concerning the application of his teacher "roles" in the first course in discussion.

The separation of the roles of the teacher into "scholar, instructor and trainer" seems somewhat artificial. Actually, good teaching should contain the elements of all three. The separation of the roles and the subsequent division of the course along the lines of the devised roles raise a question of practical necessity. I'm sure that Andersen uses his method to good advantage. But, the following observations may be of some value.

1. A well-integrated course would require a teacher to bring all the roles to bear at almost any chronological spot in the time span of the course. Or, combinations of the various roles may be applied at any given time. To separate the temporal and functional aspects of the teacher's approach to his course as Andersen has done seems to impose upon a given group of students an unrealistic pattern of learning. I have found groups so different from one another that each new class group requires a new and fresh organizational approach to the teaching.

It seems important to me to start students where we find them. This requires some understanding of where they are when we find them. Some "training" type approach may very well suffice at the early stages of the learning experience in order to discover what kind of teaching job must be devised for this group. But almost immediately the teacher will need to apply some of the "instructor" functions in order to get the processes under way. Throughout the learning experience the teacher must demonstrate his "student" function as a pattern for the members of his group.

I think the place and the extent to which we apply the roles as described by Andersen are variable factors dependent upon our own insights and ability to assess the needs and the particular problems of the individuals in the given class. To establish these in a pre-determined order and emphasis seems quite unrealistic.

2. I am increasingly wary of the first course in discussion that attempts to cover the whole field of discussion. The essential problem in the first semester or term is the development of personal insight and skill. The interaction of personalities around the conference table is the basic material with which we must deal. This requires insight into this behavior on something more than an academic level. It appears to me that the first course should thus emphasize the personal and functional behavior aspects of discussion and that the more advanced courses should deal with the more theoretical and academic factors.

Hilgard, in his study of learning theories, poses several principles that apply here:

> A motivated learner acquires what he learns more readily than one who is not motivated.
> Learning under intrinsic motivation is preferable to learning under extrinsic motivation.
> Individuals need practice in setting realistic goals for themselves. . . . Realistic goal-setting leads to more satisfactory improvement than unrealistic goal-setting.
> Active participation by a learner is preferable to passive reception when learning.
> Transfer to new tasks will be better if, in learning, the learner can discover relationships for himself.[1]

I would propose, therefore, that the initial work in the discussion course sequence should aim at establishing motivation of intrinsic nature that is drawn from the actual problem of face-to-face discussion and group goal setting. The essential principle of self-discovery should be established at the very outset of the work. This means that a much greater and wider use of the "trainer" role as described by Andersen would be required in the type of course I would teach. However, I object to the limitation of the role as he describes it. I think there is a lot of the "instructor" role in the necessary teaching complex that is required at every stage of group growth as well as "training" and "student" roles.

3. The next problem is that of application. At the moment I'm most unhappy with any and all of the attempts in our field to develop a specific program which deals adequately with the application of training. Application takes place when the student comes face-to-face with reality in its practical setting. It is extremely difficult to anticipate this setting effectively in terms of the *personal* perceptions of each trainee.

And yet, until we do find this reality, we are dealing with a tissue of abstractions which we may never recognize in reality. This is one of the most difficult and challenging problems in the teaching of discussion and in human relations training. I have seen many good classroom performers and capable instructors fail miserably when they face reality of a different nature.

I seek constantly to find that touchstone that will provide ample "visceral perception" of what lies ahead. I have not yet found a satisfactory way to do it. Perhaps Andersen and others have. I would sincerely hope so. The least we can do is to test plans such as are proposed here to see if they actually do the job. I would encourage anyone truly interested in discussion training to give it a try.

[1] Ernest R. Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1956), pp. 486-487.

REJOINDER

Martin P. Andersen

The comments by Keltner and Howell are challenging and persuasive. Although their approaches to the teaching of discussion are sound, I find I cannot accept either view completely in preference to my own.

I perceive a greater disparity between

the views of Keltner and Howell than between mine and either of theirs. Howell sees "the ability to practice reasoned discourse in groups as the most important outcome of curricular discussion" and Keltner feels "that the essential problem in the first semester or term is the development of personal insight or skill." One emphasis is on dialectic skills; the other is on interpersonal sensitivity and skill. My position is that both are important, that neither alone reflects the complete concept of discussion, and that the "middle ground" position provides a framework of greater flexibility for adapting to the students' needs.

My triad of "student," "instructor," and "trainer" roles was not intended to imply artificial distinctions, although there are real differences among the three. Clarification of the function of each, however, can best be achieved when they are considered separately. When this is not done, one may become de-emphasized. For example, I do not believe that the "student" role can be lightly dismissed with the statement that we all share scholarly obligations. We must do something about such obligations.

The three roles are essential elements of the total teaching complex. Understanding them enables the teacher, at any given "chronological spot in the time span of the course," to bring to bear the pertinent facets of each in achieving maximum student learning and behavioral change.

The progression suggested in teacher roles and sequential course activities provides a flexible teaching pattern. Early in the course the students expect, need, and adapt more readily to guidance and teacher-centered methods. My experience has been that a gradual shift to group-centered methods can easily be made as students grow in their perception of effective interpersonal relations and willingness to assume greater responsibility for self-direction. I would concur in Howell's suggestion to mix the roles as occasion demands.

Keltner has indicated that the entire field of discussion cannot be covered in one course. I agree. However, I fear equally any approach which is segmental. At the risk of not exploring in "depth" interpersonal relations, or problem solving, or any other single aspect of discussion, I would want students to view each as important parts of a larger concept. In part, my approach is necessitated by the realities of the situation in which I teach. Dialectic skills and training in sensitivity are the core of other courses available to students.

Both Howell and Keltner have commented on the sequence of roles and approaches. I perceive Howell agreeing with me, in part, that the teacher and problem-centered approach is best at the start. In turn, I agree with Howell that "problems of getting along" don't wait until the end of the course. They must be considered as they arise. However, I see dangers in beginning with an unstructured, group-centered approach. I question whether understanding and action on interpersonal problems can take place on a "visceral" level until there is motivation for change.

In regard to content, the pattern I have suggested provides emphasis on both public problems and the intrinsic content of face-to-face group interaction. Personal problems of the students seem to me to be legitimate topics. Discussion on them need not be inconsequential verbalization, any more than discussion on a public problem need take place on the level of unmotivated disputation.

Howell's main reservation is that my approach moves too slowly toward behavioral change. I must confess that early in the course only a few make basic behavioral changes, although a fairly large number begin to have considerable sensitivity to their own and others' behavior in groups, and most have considerable understanding of the cognitive aspects of discussion. This slowness, however, does not disturb me, as long as change does occur.

Keltner's final objection is in the area of application. I share his doubt that a completely satisfactory approach to the teaching of discussion and human relations training has been found. I would not make such a claim. However, it is because I recognize the difficulty of anticipating the setting in which the student will make application of his learnings that I prefer a flexible role-pattern of teaching and course content in which no one element of discussion is overemphasized and in which all are considered. Both commentators agree that the three roles I have suggested are important. Each of us, then, must determine the sequence and manner in which they can best be integrated for effective teaching.

THE FORUM

Official Communications From The Executive Secretary

EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

Statler Hilton Hotel, Washington
December 27-31, 1959

President John E. Dietrich called the meeting to order. The first item of business was the election of a member of the nominating committee. Douglas Ehninger and Tom Lewis were nominated. Waldo Braden moved that nominations be closed. Seconded. Carried. Ehninger was elected.

J. Jeffery Auer reported that the New England Speech Association had withdrawn its petition for recognition as an affiliate association of SAA. He then gave a brief summary of the events which led to this decision.

Kenneth Hance moved that the Administrative Council urge that the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly present to the Assembly the Council's concern over relations of SAA with regional and state associations, and that the Assembly take appropriate action. Auer seconded the motion. Carried.

Auer presented a report on the proposed National Education Association by-law concerning membership of departments in the NEA. Hance moved that the Executive Vice-President instruct his delegates to vote in favor of the proposed by-law of the NEA constitution. Seconded by Auer. Carried.

Braden moved that the problem of a statement urging and promoting membership in the NEA be referred to the Committee on Constitutional Revision for drafting, pending the passage of the NEA by-law. Seconded by Thorrel Fest. Carried.

Fest moved that pending the passage of the by-law the association assume responsibility for the membership of the SAA Administrative Council. Seconded by Elise Hahn. Passed.

Magdalene Kramer presented the report of the Time and Place Committee and discussed a committee survey of college campuses as convention sites and the possibilities of meeting with affiliate associations. The committee recommended that the study of possible campus convention sites be continued and that the 1964 convention be held in Chicago in December. Auer moved to accept the recommendation to meet in Chicago in December of 1964. Seconded. Carried.

Miss Kramer presented the report of the Committee on Constitutional Revision which recommended revision of Article 9, Section 6. Auer moved to accept the revision. Seconded. Carried.

The reports of the Committees on Consultation, Professional Ethics and Standards, and Public Relations were accepted.

Donald Bryant reported in place of T. Earle Johnson for the Committee on Publications. The question was raised as to whether the association should accept subsidies for articles in the journals.

Hance moved that the Administrative Council recommend to the Legislative Assembly that the Committee on Certification Requirements of the North Central Association be continued with its present personnel and that its title be changed to read: "Committee on Certification Requirements of the Regional Accrediting Associations." Seconded. Carried. Hance moved that appreciation of the Council be extended to the committee. Seconded. Carried.

The President announced that the Legislative Assembly had approved a resolution to permit representatives to the Legislative Assembly from the Interest Groups to serve for a two-year period. The Executive Secretary was instructed to refer the report to the Constitutional Revision Committee.

The Interpretation Interest Group submitted a resolution opposing a mandatory two-year term for Interest Group representatives to the Legislative Assembly.

Fest moved that the problem of a permanent headquarters be made a special responsibility of the Finance Committee. Seconded. Carried.

Mrs. Hahn moved that the Administrative Council ask the Interest Group Adviser to prepare a handbook for the Interest Groups. Seconded. Carried. The Interest Group Adviser's report was accepted.

Braden moved acceptance of the budgets for 1959-60 and 1960-1961 as presented by the Finance Committee to the joint meeting of the Administrative Council and Legislative Assembly on December 27. Seconded. Passed.

Braden moved to commend Owen Peterson for his excellent work as Executive Secretary. Seconded. Passed unanimously.

The Council approved the report of the Committee on Committees without the name

of Magdalene Kramer, who asked to be relieved of committee responsibilities for the coming year.

The Council approved the dissolution of the Committee on Contemporary Public Address and the Committee on Recruitment and Supply.

Auer moved that a committee to prepare a brochure on opportunities in speech be created. Seconded. Carried.

Robinson moved that the reports of the Project Committees be accepted. Seconded. Carried.

Miss Hochmuth moved that the Rhetoric and Public Address Interest Group be granted sanction of the Administrative Council to seek support from foundations for awards for distinguished scholarship in rhetoric and public address. Seconded. Carried.

T. Earle Johnson submitted the report from the Committee on Publications. Bryant moved that the report be accepted and the recommendations be adopted as executive policy. Seconded. Carried.

Martin Bryan presented the report of the Committee for Assistance to Foreign Universities. Auer moved that the report be accepted. Seconded. Carried.

Braden moved that the Administrative Council grant Emeritus Membership to the following members: Perrill Munch Brown, Kate Draper, Dina Rees Evans, F. Lincoln D. Holmes, Earl W. Wiley, and Robert E. Williams. Seconded. Carried.

Braden moved that the Committee on Time and Place recommend at least two locations each for the 1965 and 1966 conventions in its report to the Administrative Council in 1960. Seconded. Carried.

Braden moved that the president ask the Committee on Time and Place to submit to the Executive Secretary a recommendation for the 1965 convention by July 1, if possible. Seconded. Carried.

Bryant moved that President Dietrich appoint committees to nominate successors for the Executive Vice-President and for the editor of *The Speech Teacher*, that the committees report to the President in January 1960, and that the elections for these offices be conducted by mail ballot among the members of the Administrative Council. Seconded. Carried.

Bryant moved the Executive Vice-President be authorized, with such assistance as he can obtain, to prepare a statement to be presented for the record of the Federal Communications Commission hearings on broadcasting. Seconded. Carried.

Dietrich moved that the Executive Secretary be asked to seek the documentation necessary to frame a letter to the main office of the Hilton Hotels expressing dissatisfaction with the accommodations of SAA members at the Statler Hilton in Washington and with the failure of the hotel to maintain adequate restaurant facilities on December 26 and 27. Seconded. Carried.

Dietrich moved that the Executive Secretary seek to obtain a guarantee of minimum room rates and maximum restaurant facilities in negotiating future contracts with hotels. Seconded. Carried.

Dietrich moved that the Executive Secretary be directed to communicate the actions of the Administrative Council on the matter of hotel accommodations to the Legislative Assembly at its first meeting in 1960 and that these recommendations be communicated to the membership at large by whatever means is deemed most feasible by the Executive Secretary. Seconded. Carried.

Nichols moved that Robert Oliver's request that Robert Brubaker be named official delegate to the World Congress of Phoneticians be approved. Seconded. Carried.

Braden moved that the Executive Vice-President inquire into the status of a manuscript on the teaching of speech for radio and television being prepared for a special issue of the *Bulletin of Secondary School Principals;* and that, if a manuscript has not been received by March 15, this assignment be discontinued and the Executive Vice-President be empowered to appoint a new editor and to renegotiate the matter with the National Association of Secondary School Principals. Seconded. Carried.

Moved by Braden that if, after investigation, the Committee on Liaison with the National Council of Teachers of English has been dropped, the President be empowered to reconstitute such a committee. Seconded. Carried.

OWEN PETERSON,
Executive Secretary

EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 1959 LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

The Second Vice President of the Speech Association of America, Ralph Nichols, presided at each of the four meetings of the Legislative Assembly in the South American Room, Statler Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C., December 27, 1959.

The chairman of the Credentials Committee, William Sattler, reported that certified members of the Legislative Assembly were identified by special ribbons.

The Speaker heard no corrections or additions to the minutes of the 1958 Legislative Assembly as published. He ruled that they were approved.

The Speaker announced that the officers of the Legislative Assembly had no oral reports. He stated that the Executive Committee and the Legislative Assembly for 1958 took twenty-four actions, that eighteen of these had been completed, and that the remaining six were listed under item *a* of unfinished business.

Elise Hahn reported for the Committee on Committees.

George Bohman reported for the special committee appointed in 1958 to study the request of the New England Speech Association for recognition as a regional group. The issue was terminated when the New England Association withdrew its request.

Bohman moved that the problem of relations between the Speech Association of America and the regional and the state associations be referred to the Consultation Committee for a report in 1960.

The Clerk read the report of the Consultation Committee. The report was received by unanimous consent.

Carroll Arnold reported for the Nominating Committee of the Legislative Assembly by distributing a mimeographed ballot.

Wilbur Gilman as the Temporary Advisor to Interest Groups distributed a dittoed report. Gilman orally directed attention to recommendations 8 and 9, which pertain to possible actions by the Assembly. He also directed attention to certain other sections of the report.

Robert Huber moved that recommendations 8 and 9 be referred to the Resolutions Committee of the Legislative Assembly for 1960. Recommendation 8 suggested that the Committee on Resolutions draft an amendment proposing an extension of the term of the Secretary of the interest group to two years, to extend the term of the delegate to the Legislative Assembly to three years, to extend the term of the representative on the Committee on Professional Ethics and Standards to three years, and to provide for an alternate for the delegate to the Legislative Assembly. Recommendation 9 called upon the Committee on Resolutions to draft an amendment proposing that Interest Groups which do not live up to their obligations be eliminated, possibly after a warning and a period of probation.

Karl Robinson reported as chairman of the Committee on Certification Requirements of the North Central Association. (Other members of the Committee were J. Jeffery Auer, Gladys Borchers, Rupert L. Cortright, and Karl R. Wallace.) Robinson described the work of the Committee, the reported deliberations of the North Central Association, the interpretation of their proceedings by the Chairman of the Committee on Recommendations of the North Central Association, Lauren Van Dyke, and his own interpretation.

Haberman moved that the three recommendations in the report be approved. Seconded. Huber moved to amend by deleting the words "or some other committee." Seconded. Carried. The motion as amended was carried.

The second vice president, Ralph Nichols, called the second meeting to order at 2:00 in the South American Room, Statler Hilton Hotel. He introduced the president, John Dietrich.

Dietrich directed attention to Information Report 36, which pertains to establishing a permanent headquarters.

Waldo Braden as chairman reported for the Finance Committee.

Magdalene Kramer as chairman reported for the Committee on Time and Place. She read a letter from the executive secretary of the American Speech and Hearing Association expressing the opinion that a joint convention of the American Speech and Hearing Association and the Speech Association of America was impractical. Kramer reported that the Committee recommended the 1964 convention be held in Chicago in December. She moved that the report be approved. Seconded. Carried.

Magdalene Kramer as chairman reported for the Committee on Constitutional Revision. The committee proposed three revisions to the constitution. The Assembly approved all three recommendations. (The revisions are herewith given, following these minutes.)

J. Jeffery Auer as chairman of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Standards reported on the attempt to draft a code of ethics. He stated that he had appointed an *ad hoc* committee to draft such a code and to report to the Committee on Professional Ethics and Standards.

Martin Andersen as chairman reported for the Resolutions Committee. He commented upon the need for submitting action reports well in advance of the convention and upon

the need for supplying adequate supporting material.

The Assembly disposed of the various action reports in the ways indicated:

Action Report A—A proposal that the Committee on Cooperation between the SAA and Related Organizations study the working relationship between the Speech Association of America and the Committee on Discussion and Debate Materials and Interstate Cooperation of the National University Extension Association. Laid on the table. (The problem was solved in another way to the satisfaction of the Committee representative.)

Action Report B—A proposal that the Committee on Professional Ethics and Standards be directed to consider ways of continuously improving the quality of convention programs and broadening the base of participation. Approved.

Action Report C—A proposal to amend the constitution so that the delegates from the Interest Groups to the Legislative Assembly serve for two years. Approved.

Action Report D—A proposal that the Legislative Assembly endorse a statement of minimal requirements for certification as teachers of speech in secondary schools and that the Executive Vice President distribute copies of this statement. Approved.

Action Report E—A proposal that the Speech Association of America grant emeritus membership to Mrs. Perill Munch Brown. Approved.

Action Report F—A proposal that the Speech Association of America grant Emeritus Membership to Kate Draper, Dina Rees Evans, F. Lincoln D. Holmes, Earl W. Wiley, and Robert E. Williams. Approved.

Action Report G—A proposal that a procedure be instituted to encourage action reports dealing with the national political scene. Not reported out of committee.

Action Report H—A proposal that the officers of the Speech Association of America assume as a part of their office an obligation to attend any meeting of a regional speech association to which they are asked to come and a willingness to participate where needed without any charge save for travel expenses. Not reported out of committee.

Action Report I—A proposal that the Speech Association of America adopt INTERLINGUA for partial use in its various journals and publish at least one article in every issue of the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* in INTERLINGUA. Referred to the Committee on Publications.

Action Report J—A proposal that the Speech Association of America recommend to the State Departments of Education that they include speech consultants and speech correction consultants within their divisions of instruction, if such consultants are not now so employed. Referred to the Consultation Committee.

Action Report K—A proposal that the Speech Association of America consider standards of speech training. Referred to the committee chaired by Karl Robinson and previously designated as "The Committee on Certification Requirements of the North Central Association."

Action Report L—A proposal that special interest groups of the Speech Association of America be designated by the word "Commission" instead of "Interest Group." Not reported out of committee.

Action Report M—A proposal that the Second Vice-President of the Speech Association of America be directed to submit to the Legislative Assembly of SAA, at each annual convention, a report on the disposition made of recommendations directed by the Legislative Assembly at the preceding annual convention. Approved.

Action Report N—A proposal that the Assembly ask the Consultation Committee to study the place of Study Committees in the activities of the Speech Association of America. Approved.

Action Report O—A proposal that the Committee on Contemporary Public Address be dissolved. Approved.

Action Report P—A proposal that the Committee on Recruitment and Supply be dissolved. Approved.

Action Report Q—A proposal that the Speech Association of America join with other professional speech associations in calling upon the candidates for the Presidency and other high public offices to meet in public debate during the campaign of 1960. Not reported out of committee.

David Potter as chairman reported for the Tellers' Committee of the Legislative Assembly:

For the representative to serve on the SAA Nominating Committee: W. Charles Redding.

For representatives to serve on the SAA Committee on Committees: Martin P. Andersen, Elbert W. Harrington, Claude L. Shaver.

For representatives of interest groups on the Executive Committee: Paul H. Boase, James McBath.

For representatives of geographical areas on the Executive Committee: Eastern: J. Calvin Callaghan; Central; Wilbur E. Moore, Southern: Donald M. Williams; Western: Ralph Y. McGinnis.

For members of the Nominating Committee of the Legislative Assembly: Frederick Haberman, Chairman; Mary Louise Gehring; David C. Phillips; Waldo Braden; Joseph Baccus.

The Speaker called for new business. There was none.

The Speaker declared the final meeting adjourned at 7:55.

WAYNE N. THOMPSON,
Clerk

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

Amend Article IX, Section 6, Line 18, concerning membership in the Executive Committee of the Legislative Assembly by inserting after the phrase "term of two years" the following: "If a member of the Assembly shall be elected to the Executive Committee to serve during the final year of his membership in the Assembly, he shall serve for the one year only and by the procedure set forth in the By-Laws (Article III, Section 5) the Assembly Nominating Committee shall provide for the unexpired term."

AMENDMENTS TO THE BY-LAWS

Article III, Section 3, Paragraph 11. In line 3, delete the parenthesis and the phrase "the territories of"; insert a comma after "Hawaii" and a parenthesis after "Alaska." The purpose of this amendment is to list correctly Hawaii and Alaska as states rather than territories.

Article V, Section 4, Line 7, delete the word "and." Line 8, insert a comma after the word "Assembly" and the following phrase "and one member to serve on the Committee on Professional Ethics and Standards." This amendment provides for election of a member of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Standards by each new Interest Group.

EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

It is a pleasure for the Executive Secretary to report that the total income for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1959, was $75,237.80. Expenditures were $69,078.51 leaving a favorable surplus of $6,159.29. Over the past five years, the Association's income has increased from $54,425.22 in 1954-1955 to this year's $75,237.80. During this time, the total income of the Association has been $334,302.43, of which $31,507.75 has been income above expenses.

At the present time, the membership stands at 7,731. For purposes of comparison, membership statistics are included from the Executive Secretary's last membership report in 1957.

	1957	1959	Incr. (Decr.)
Members who take *QJS* only	1,961	2,182	221
Members who take *Speech Teacher* only	857	1,451	594
Subscribers to two Journals	513	505	(8)
Subscribers to three Journals	223	268	45
Libraries taking QJS	1,287	1,493	206
Libraries taking *Speech Teacher*	396	599	203
Libraries taking *Monographs*	576	616	40
Sustaining Members	607	617	10
Total Members	6,420	7,731	1,311

Of particular interest is the increase (797) in subscriptions to *The Speech Teacher* by members and libraries during the past two years.

During 1959 the Placement Service Bulletin listed a total of 399 vacancies. The active membership in the Placement Service is around 1,000. Last year the office forwarded 2,647 letters of application and 1,877 sets of credentials.

BUDGETS SUBMITTED BY FINANCE COMMITTEE AND APPROVED BY ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AT THE 1959 CONVENTION

	Revised Budget '59-'60	Tentative Budget '60-'61
Publications:		
QJS	$14,000.00	$14,500.00
Speech Monographs	5,400.00	5,500.00
Speech Teacher	8,500.00	9,000.00
Annual *Directory*	4,800.00	5,000.00
Special Printing	500.00	500.00
Purchase of Old Copies	650.00	650.00
Printing and Mimeographing:		
Stationery	1,000.00	1,000.00
New Solicitations	1,000.00	1,000.00
Renewals	500.00	500.00
Placement	500.00	500.00
Convention	3,000.00	3,000.00
Personnel:		
Officers and Committees	1,500.00	1,500.00
Secretary and Clerical	22,000.00	24,500.00
Dues and Fees:		
American Council on Education	300.00	300.00

AETA Share of Convention Fee	750.00	000.00
Commissions and Discounts	2,750.00	2,750.00
Bank Charges	100.00	100.00
Secretary's Bond and Audit	365.00	365.00
Other Expenses:		
Postage and Distribution	5,000.00	5,000.00
Binding	600.00	600.00
Telephone and Telegraph	400.00	400.00
Insurance	150.00	150.00
Convention Expense	2,700.00	2,500.00
Depreciation	1,000.00	1,000.00
Provision for Doubtful Accounts	500.00	500.00
Office Supplies and Service	1,500.00	1,500.00
Rent for National Office	000.00	2,400.00
Reserve Fund for Perm. Headquarters	000.00	000.00
	$79,465.00	$84,715.00
RESERVE FUND FOR PERM. HEADQUARTERS	$ 3,000.00*	$ 3,000.00*
REPLACEMENT OF OLD AND PURCHASE OF NEW EQUIPMENT	800.00	800.00
PURCHASE CAR LOAD OF PAPER	3,500.00	3,500.00
EXPENSE OF MOVING NATIONAL OFFICE	2,000.00	2,000.00

*The Executive Secretary is obligated to meet this reserve. (By action of the Finance Committee.)

REPORT ON ELECTION OF 1959 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

For the 1959 Nominating Committee, the results were as follows: total votes cast, 741; total number of persons receiving votes, 359. The 12 persons receiving the most votes were: Bower Aly, Frank B. Davis, Douglas Ehninger, Wilbur E. Gilman, Robert Gray Gunderson, Orville A. Hitchcock, T. Earle Johnson, James H. McBurney, Emil R. Pfister, W. Charles Redding, Claude L. Shaver, and Donald K. Smith.

On the second ballot, 963 valid votes were cast. In tabulating the vote by the Hare system of proportional representation, the following three persons were selected: Bower Aly, Robert Gray Gunderson and James H. McBurney.

At the 1959 convention, the Administrative Council selected Douglas Ehninger and the Legislative Assembly selected W. Charles Redding to complete the committee.

COMMITTEES FOR 1960

SPEECH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

The name of the chairman of the committee appears first.

NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Nominating Committee: James H. McBurney, Bower Aly, Douglas Ehninger, Robert Gunderson, W. Charles Redding.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Committee on Committees: John Dietrich, Martin P. Andersen, J. Jeffery Auer, Waldo W. Braden, Douglas Ehninger, Kenneth G. Hance, Elbert W. Harrington, Robert C. Jeffrey (after July 1, 1960), Richard Murphy, Owen Peterson (until June 30, 1960), Karl Robinson, Claude L. Shaver.

Finance: Waldo W. Braden (chairman until July 1, 1961), J. Jeffery Auer, Owen Peterson (as Executive Secretary until June 30, 1960), Robert C. Jeffrey (as Executive Secretary after July 1, 1960), Owen Peterson (as a member after July 1, 1960).

Publications: Leland Griffin (1 yr.), Samuel Becker (2 yrs.), Donald C. Bryant (3 yrs.), Richard Murphy, Karl Robinson, Douglas Ehninger, Owen Peterson (until June 30, 1960), Robert C. Jeffrey (after July 1, 1960).

Time and Place: Wayne Thompson (1 yr.), Elise Hahn (2 yrs.), Carroll Arnold (3 yrs.), Owen Peterson (until June 30, 1960), Robert C. Jeffrey (after July 1, 1960).

Public Relations: Robert Haakenson (1 yr.), Carroll Arnold (2 yrs.), J. Jeffery Auer, Kenneth G. Hance, Owen Peterson (until June 30, 1960), Robert C. Jeffrey (after July 1, 1960).

Consultation: Thomas Rousse, Lester Thonssen, Loren Reid, Elise Hahn, John Dietrich, J. Jeffery Auer, Owen Peterson (until June 30, 1960), Robert C. Jeffrey (after July 1, 1960).

Professional Ethics and Standards: J. Jeffery Auer and one member to be named by each Interest Group.

COORDINATION COMMITTEES

Committee on Cooperation between SAA and Related Organizations: Kenneth G. Hance and presidents of AETA, AFA, ASHA, NSSC, and the NUEA Committee on Discussion and Debate Materials.

Committee on Cooperation Between SAA and Regional Associations: J. Jeffery Auer and the presidents of CSSA, WSA, SSA, SAES, and PSA.

SERVICE COMMITTEES

International Discussion and Debate: Franklin R. Shirley, Wayne E. Eubank, Mary Louise Gehring, Martin J. Holcomb, James H. McBath, Robert P. Newman, Brooks Quimby, Glen Mills, R. D. Mahaffey, Judith Sayers.

Committee on Archives: L. LeRoy Cowperthwaite, A. Craig Baird, Paul Boase, Giles W. Gray, Paul Carmack, Gordon Thomas, Owen Peterson (until June 30, 1960), Robert C. Jeffrey (after July 1, 1960).

Intercollegiate Discussion and Debate: Winston L. Brembeck will be the SAA representative until July 1, 1961. The other members of the committee are representatives of AFA, DSR, PKD, PRP, TKA.

Project Committees

Committee on Biographical Dictionary of Speech Education: Giles W. Gray, Edythe Renshaw, Douglas Ehninger.

Volume of Studies of Public Address on the issue of Anti-Slavery and Disunion, circa 1860: J. Jeffery Auer, A. Craig Baird, Henry L. Ewbank, Sr.

Volume of Studies in the Colonial Period of American Public Address: George V. Bohman, Orville Hitchcock, Ernest J. Wrage.

Volume of Studies in Southern Oratory: Waldo W. Braden, J. Jeffery Auer, Lindsey S. Perkins.

Volume of Studies of the Speaking in the Age of the Great Revolt; 1870-1898: Lindsey S. Perkins, Robert G. Gunderson, Hollis L. White.

Ad Hoc Committees

Assistance to Foreign Universities: Martin Bryan, Gladys Borchers, Laura Crowell, Leslie R. Kreps, Sumner Ives, Robert T. Oliver, C. M. Wise.

Constitutional Revision: Wilbur E. Gilman, Carroll C. Arnold, John Dietrich, Lester Thonssen.

Committee to Prepare a Brochure on Opportunities in Speech: J. Jeffery Auer (the Executive Secretary) and the editors of the journals.

Committee on Certification of the Regional Accrediting Associations: Karl Robinson, J. Jeffery Auer, Gladys Borchers, Rupert Cortright, Karl R. Wallace.

Committees of the Legislative Assembly

Credentials: W. Charles Redding, Virginia Miller, Mardel Ogilvie, John Wilson, Elizabeth Carr.

Resolutions: Martin Andersen, George V. Bohman, Milton Dobkin, Ordean Ness, Dorothy Weirich.

Rules: Paul Carmack, Wayne Thompson, Waldo W. Braden, and two members to be appointed by the second vice-president.

Executive Committee: Carroll Arnold, Charles Balcer, Donald Bird, Paul H. Boase, George V. Bohman, Waldo W. Braden, J. Calvin Callaghan, Paul Carmack, Mary Louise Gehring, Giles Gray, McDonald Held, Robert Kully, Eleanor M. Luse, James McBath, William McCoard, Ralph Y. McGinnis, Wilbur E. Moore, Lawrence Mouat, James Robinson, Wayne N. Thompson, Charlotte Wells, Donald M. Williams, and representatives of ASHA and AETA.

Nominating Committee *(Legislative Assembly):* Frederick Haberman, Mary Louise Gehring, David C. Phillips, Waldo W. Braden, Joseph Baccus.

Advisor of Interest Groups: Wilbur E. Gilman.

REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Second Vice President

Robert D. Clark, University of Oregon
Ernest J. Wrage, Northwestern University

Administrative Council

Paul H. Boase, Oberlin College
Hubert C. Heffner, Indiana University
T. Earle Johnson, University of Alabama
John S. Penn, University of North Dakota

The Legislative Assembly

Central Area

Alice Donaldson, Clayton High School, Clayton, Mo.
Edward E. Green, Manual Training High School, Indianapolis, Ind.
James M. Hill, High School, Topeka, Kansas
L. R. Kremer, Washington Sr. High School, Sioux Falls, South Dakota
Ralph McGee, New Trier Township High School, Winnetka, Illinois
Vanetta S. Ogland, Grundy County Public Schools, Grundy Center, Iowa
Juanita J. Rucker, Chrysler Sr. High School, New Castle, Indiana
Melba R. Wixom, Waukegan Township High School, Waukegan, Illinois

Eastern Area

Coleman Bender, Emerson College
Wiley C. Bowyer, Mineola Public Schools, Mineola, New York
Merritt Jones, New York University
Ellen Kauffman, Montclair State College
Eleanor M. Luse, University of Vermont
Lindsey S. Perkins, Brooklyn College
James D. White, Supervisor Public Schools, Farmingdale, New York
Robert E. Will, University of Rhode Island

SOUTHERN AREA

Merrill G. Christophersen, University of South Carolina
Annabel D. Hagood, University of Alabama
M. Blair Hart, University of Arkansas
Rose B. Johnson, Woodlawn High School, Birmingham, Ala.
Freda Kenner, Messick High School, Memphis, Tennessee
Marguerite P. Metcalf, Hall High School, Little Rock, Arkansas
Thomas A. Rousse, University of Texas
Franklin R. Shirley, Wake Forest College

WESTERN AREA

Herman Cohen, University of Oregon
S. Judson Crandall, State College of Washington
George W. Dell, University of California, Los Angeles
Henrietta C. Krantz, Special Consultant, Alaska Department of Health, Juneau
Howard H. Martin, Pomona College
Barbara Schindler, University of Colorado
Malcolm O. Sillars, San Fernando Valley State College
Dorothy Youngblood, James Madison High School, Portland, Oregon

The Legislative Assembly-at-Large

William Angus, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario
Chloe Armstrong, Baylor University
Albert Austen, Rutgers University
Jack M. Bain, Michigan State University
Merrill T. Baker, University of South Dakota
Leighton M. Ballew, University of Georgia
G. Bradford Barber, Illinois State Normal University
Dean Barnlund, Northwestern University
Campton Bell, University of Denver
Jack E. Bender, University of Michigan
Mildred F. Berry, Rockford College
Janet H. Bolton, University of Southern California
Marcus H. Boulware, St. Augustine's College
Eugene K. Bristow, Indiana University
Herman Brockhaus, University of Wisconsin
Wayne E. Brockriede, University of Illinois
Alfred Browning, Wm. H. Taft High School, New York City
Malcolm A. Bump, Saugerties Central School, Saugerties, New York
William K. Clark, Hiram College
Leslie Irene Coger, Southwest Missouri State College
Allen Crafton, University of Kansas
Harold C. Crain, San Jose State College
Robert R. Crosby, Ohio Wesleyan University
Moyne L. Cubbage, University of Michigan
Frank B. Davis, Alabama Polytechnic Institute
Christine Drake, University of Mississippi
Dale D. Drum, Long Beach State College
Willard J. Friederich, Marietta College
Robert P. Friedman, University of Missouri
Donald A. George, Mississippi Southern College
James L. Golden, Muskingum College
Mary Graham, Brooklyn College
Halbert S. Greaves, University of Utah
R. Victor Harnack, University of Colorado
Kenneth Harwood, University of Southern California, Los Angeles
Mason A. Hicks, Purdue University
Gordon F. Hostettler, Temple University
R. A. Johnston, St. Louis University
Harold Jordan, State University of South Dakota
Erling S. Jorgensen, Montana State University
Wendell Josal, University of Minnesota
Charley A. Leistner, Oberlin College
Thomas R. Lewis, Florida State University
Charles W. Lomas, University of California, Los Angeles
Charles A. McGlon, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
Ralph A. Micken, Southern Illinois University
Wayne C. Minnick, Florida State University
Oliver Nelson, University of Washington
Bea Olmstead, Hamtramck Public Schools, Hamtramck, Mich.
Gregg Phifer, Florida State University
Mary Margaret Robb, University of Colorado
Pat M. Ryan, Jr., University of Arizona
Alma J. Sarett, University of Florida
Morton H. Silverman, Richmond Hill High School, Richmond Hill, New York
Grace Walsh, Wisconsin State College
Robert O. Weiss, De Pauw University
Forest L. Whan, Kansas State College
Donald H. Williams, University of Texas
George P. Wilson, University of Virginia
Helene H. Wong, University of Hawaii

JAMES H. MCBURNEY, *Chairman*

ETHICS—RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE

To the Editor:

I have read (twice) with interest Mr. Edward Rogge's "Evaluating the Ethics of a Speaker in a Democracy" (*QJS*, December, 1959), uncertain if I grasped what appeared on the surface. Further

perusal justifies my earlier feelings. I offer a few observations thereon.

There is no quarrel with the thesis that the rhetorical scholar, investigating past oratorical effort, must examine the audience's attitudes, desires, etc., to ascertain the why of the speaker's selection of arguments, appeals, or arrangement. This is sound Aristotelian rhetoric, practiced for at least two millennia. The critic cannot, as Mr. Rogge correctly observes, read his own values or those of others (dissassociated from the speech situation) into the picture. But the author does not stop here. He extends the democratic principle justifying the short circuiting of logical processes. Here we must take pointed exception.

Professor Rogge wonders why we question the use of perjury if it's a "recognized practice." We question and condemn it for several reasons. First, qualitative values are never arrived at by quantitative tabulation. Simply because "everybody's doing it" doesn't label the practice morally right, the Kinsey report notwithstanding. If 86% of the girls in a given high school have forsaken their virginity, does it follow that any self-respecting parent will counsel his daughter to the same behavior? Second, democracy is structured on the premise that truth, not hyperbole, must be heard. There is no guarantee given to hyperbole, whereas there is to truth. Because Wendell Willkie after the 1940 campaign called some of his promises "mere campaign oratory," does not prove that this is the right way. Third, Mr. Rogge seems to argue that values are absolutely relative, an interesting but philosophically inconsistent position. I'm reminded of a former philosophy professor of mine who once said, you can never be sure of anything you hear. If so, then we can't be certain that his statement is true. So in the case of the absolute relativist. Fourth, some of us use speeches for our classes on the assumption there is more to be learned from them than mere stylistic devices. The scholar-critic surely cannot counsel those learning to speak with, "crowds don't expect you to tell the truth, even as they didn't in this speech we've studied; therefore, when it best fits your purpose to 'color' the truth, have no qualms about it." Simply because the political audience expects hyperbole—a statement asserted but not proved by Rogge—is this license for the critic to condone it?

There is no question but that saying the right things at the right time will lead many to heights of power. I know a man who if He had said the "right things" could have been king of a nation. He refused to compromise absolute principles and 2000 years ago was strung up on a cross for it. Can we say He was wrong?

ROBERT W. SMITH
University of Virginia

REJOINDER

To the Editor:

Professor Smith agrees that "the critic cannot . . . read his values or those of others (disassociated from the speech situation) into the picture." But does he agree? Not really, for he insists that "qualitative values are never arrived at quantitatively." How, then, are they arrived at in a democracy? Professor Smith fails to say; but apparently he holds that the critic determines what public value should be applauded. Therein lies the issue. I believe that the canons of democracy deny to any *individual*—critic or speaker—the right to designate public values.

My concern is with public values, not with any individual's private system of

values. What the Kinsey girls do in private interests me as a parent, but their private values are of no concern to me as a speech critic. The problem for both the speaker and the critic is to discover what objectives and what methods are sanctioned by the citizenry. If I implied that values are shown only by what people *do* I stated my point poorly. Although every candidate for political office might cross the point where hyperbole becomes lying I do not say that a critic should condone the crossing *unless* he believes that the electorate condones the practice. As a citizen he may seek to change the public morals. As a critic he must accept them. That public performers sometimes fail to recognize public values has been amply demonstrated by the recent silliness over television quiz shows.

If I err in believing that hyperbole is sanctioned in political speaking my error comes from a misinterpretation of the voters' values rather than from a counting of the instances of exaggeration, or from any "absolute standard" justifying it, or from any private code I may have.

Professor Smith takes my argument into the realm of teaching. I agree that it has implications for the teacher. However, since my article explored only the problems of criticism, I will accede to the Editor's request that I appreciate the problems of space limitation and therefore "avoid extending the argument."

While I do not apply my argument to the speaking directed to a subjugated people nor to the speaking of a Divine Being, perhaps the message of Jesus gained such force because He did say the right thing at the right time. He assured a desperate people who anxiously awaited the Messiah that He was the Messiah and that He brought a message which could provide eternal relief. If we view Jesus' speaking as that of a mortal man we cannot assume, as does Professor Smith, that Jesus could have said the right things necessary to establish an earthly kingdom. More appropriate to the point I make, Jesus spoke from the basic framework of values accepted by his auditors. As a poor Jew He spoke to oppressed Jews.

But perhaps the teachings of Jesus provide us with absolute values which apply in public as well as private affairs. "Can we say He was wrong?" Professor Smith asks. My Jewish friends say we can. Although I am a Christian, if I were to evaluate the ethics of the speaking of David Ben-Gurion or Chaim Weizmann as they addressed the citizens of the infant democracy of Israel I would not use a system of Christian ethics as a reference point.

If all this makes me an "absolute relativist" I find no discomfort in carrying the label.

EDWARD ROGGE
Tulane University

BLOOMFIELD'S CLUSTERS

To the Editor:

Three points in Professor David B. Strother's "Bloomfield's 'Non-Syllabic' Clusters" (April, 1959, *QJS*) merit comment. First, in a footnote the name of Bernard Bloch appears as "Barnard Block." Though the error was presumably typographical, there still should be no detraction from the fame of the great linguist who teamed with George Trager to produce one of the important early books of American linguistics, *Outline of Linguistic Analysis*. In the same footnote, which refers to Bloch's major article, "A Set of Postulates for Phonemic Analysis," the year of publication is also in error. The article appeared in *Language* in 1948, not 1954.

Second, since Mr. Strother is clearly talking about phonemes and not the allophonic qualities of "sounds," he might have used the traditional slant lines for enclosing his symbols. Square brackets traditionally deal with phonetics. It is true that this convention was not in existence at the time of Bloomfield's *Language* (1933), and it may be that he was only following Bloomfield's practice of using square brackets for both phonetic and phonemic designations. However, it was to avoid the resulting confusion that the use of slant lines was adapted for phonemes, just as the use of the square root sign has been generally accepted to indicate morphemes. Even Bloch, in the article cited, used slant lines for phonemes, and square brackets for phonetic designation.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, although it may be worthwhile to seek for a simpler and more complete and consistent description of something in Bloomfield, it is much easier to turn to A. A. Hill's recent description of consonant clusters on a rigid distributional basis, in his chapter "Phonotactics," in *Introduction to Linguistic Structures* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), pp. 68-88. Not only does Mr. Hill find clusters that Mr. Strother omits (e.g., /glímpst/ and /jíŋkst/), but he also describes intervocalic clusters (i.e., those which cross the close juncture but which are still indisputably clusters, as in /wíspiy/ and /díypliy/). This is not to say that Hill has replaced Bloomfield, or that Bloomfield is no longer of value. Indeed, Bloomfield remains as one of the continuing major influences, for it is on his far-sighted work that much of today's American linguistics rests. The point is that one should first ascertain whether a particular aspect of Bloomfield has already been brought up to date or in any other way modified, before one embarks upon his own modification.

GARLAND CANNON
Columbia University Team
American Embassy
Kabul, Afghanistan

BLOOMFIELD'S CLUSTERS CONCLUDED

To the Editor:

Until Leonard Bloomfield's book, *Language*, no longer "remains as one of the continuing major influences" on studies in American linguistics and is no longer read extensively by students in areas other than linguistics, efforts should be made continuously to improve the comprehensibility of this great work. As Mr. Cannon may have overlooked, it was not my intention to criticize or modify Bloomfield's description but *to simplify* enabling the "interested reader to perceive the structural behavior of initial and final clusters quickly and vividly." Any modifications attributed to me are undeserved.

I stated in the article that a number of clusters had been omitted by Bloomfield and I directed the reader to a source wherein a more complete listing of clusters could be found. Undoubtedly A. A. Hill's book, *Introduction to Linguistic Structures*, is another source for consonant clusters.

Mr. Cannon seems to believe that the term *phoneme*, was misused since symbols were enclosed in brackets rather than in "traditional slant lines." But according to section 3.5 of Bloch and Trager's "important early book," *Outline of Linguistic Analysis*, phonemes which occur in a given phonetic environment may be grouped into structural sets and "An exhaustive catalogue of such sets, each defined by the common function of its members, amounts to a description of the PHONEMIC

STRUCTURE of the language." In their examples, the authors enclose the consonants in brackets. I doubt, really, whether this linguistic minutia makes the slightest bit of difference for purposes of the article.

The main criticism, it seems to me, concerns errors appearing in a footnote. These errors were committed in manuscript revision and, although regrettable, I am sure they do not depreciate the great contributions Mr. Bloch has made to the field of linguistics. For calling my attention to the erroneous footnote, I welcome the letter from Afghanistan.

DAVID B. STROTHER
University of Washington

DISCLAIMER AFFIDAVIT DISCLAIMED

To the Editor:

The University of Wisconsin, following action by its regents and faculty, is participating in a strong effort to get Congress to rid the National Defense Education Act of its "affidavit of disbelief" requirement. The Department of Speech has unanimously endorsed this policy, and has asked that I communicate with leaders in speech to inform them of this action and to secure whatever assistance they might be able to give.

As you are doubtless aware, leaders of both major parties, including President Eisenhower, have already placed themselves on record in favor of a repeal of this provision. However, it appears that action will depend upon sufficient protest from many widespread sources.

I am enclosing a document prepared by a University of Wisconsin special committee which explains in detail the reasons for protest, and which outlines some methods by which individuals and groups might aid in the campaign. [Portions of the report are printed below.]

Our department urgently requests that you give all possible and appropriate publicity to this vital matter in *The Quarterly Journal of Speech.*

FREDERICK W. HABERMAN
Chairman, Department of Speech
The University of Wisconsin

The oath should be distinguished from the affidavit requirement. The oath is the familiar, respected oath of allegiance to the United States. The affidavit is a statement of disbelief. The signer swears he does not believe in, and is not a member of and does not support any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. This affidavit converts the oath into a test oath.

The affidavit requirement is not limited to students taking loans. It applies also to fellowship recipients, faculty personnel who sign direct contracts with the Health, Education and Welfare Department and it may apply to faculty and staff of foreign language, guidance, visual aid and other centers established with NDEA funds.

There are essential reasons for eliminating the affidavit.

1. It interferes with a citizen's constitutional freedom of belief. Let the *mind* of the citizen alone; it is time enough for the law to lay hold of him if he *acts* illegally.

2. It is repugnant to traditions of vigorous free inquiry.

3. It invites other undesirable controls on higher education.

4. It is vague and imprecise—a man is entitled to know precisely what it is he is being asked to swear to.

5. It is discriminatory and in a sense insulting. Why pick out university students and staff and require the affidavit of them when it is not required of other recipients of federal grants and aids?

6. A truly disloyal person would not hesitate to take the affidavit.

7. If the oath stays in, the affidavit or disclaimer is not needed. It's enough for a man to say, "I am a loyal American." It is tautological to say, "I am not a disloyal American."

NEW BOOKS IN REVIEW

ROBERT G. GUNDERSON, *Editor*

STYLE FOR THE NOBLE AMATEUR

Frederick W. Haberman

Of the making of books on writing there is no end. William Strunk, Jr., E. B. White, and Charles W. Ferguson have made good books on the subject. They all write for the "noble amateur," although only Mr. Ferguson uses that term.

Mr. Ferguson, a senior editor of *Reader's Digest,* writes about writing; his comments on speaking, a dozen or so, are asides. He exhorts us first to understand and play with words—words as music, words as pictures, words as creatures of history; and second, to develop a style of our own—by putting ourselves on paper, minding our verbs, developing habits of work, obtaining information, and establishing canons of ethics and taste.

Ferguson excoriates us for our rigidities: "We're verbal catatonics in an age of electronics." He invites us to play with language, issuing the invitation with regularity throughout the book. With his genius for cadence and his mastery of sounds, he is his own best practitioner of the philosophy that the methodology of play is the way to success in writing. Ferguson thinks of verbal play as literary calisthenics; he does not develop, as did De Quincey, a full-blown theory of a literature of play.

Mr. Ferguson compels belief that playing with words as pictures makes the language more usable, but on occasion cites examples that are pictures for the sake of pictures. Let us look at an instance. "To appreciate the full value of vision in writing and formal speech, one has only to contrast the wordy fat of generalities with the lean strength of a visual image. A man accustomed to words alone would write: 'Here a critical inquiry reveals an incidental difficulty.' A man who thinks and writes in visual terms puts it: 'Here we see the spectre of doubt crouching up a side path.'" Maybe so; but the tone is jocose and exaggerated, the sense substantially different; and besides, how does a spectre crouch up a path? Another example is Alistair Cooke's sentence: "Mostly American slums look like theatre sets and circus tents pitched on a bare field on a windy night and left to rot and sprout garbage and stray newspapers and brassy children." The last part is accurate enough, but the first part is a picture that doesn't depict. It belongs to the slick school of concrete detailers—America is a supermarket, a hot dog, a puff of March wind snatching at a pretty girl's skirt.

Mr. Ferguson's mechanism for developing ability to make pictures consists of reading gifted writers, poking into odd vocabularies, seeing objects in human or animal shapes, and adopting this unique advice: "Let a person think, and as far as possible speak, for one day a

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week in the terms common to some particular profession or trade. . . . On Monday it might be that he would choose his images from cooking; on Tuesday from engineering; on Wednesday from railroading; on Thursday from nuclear science; on Friday from agriculture; on Saturday from sport. And by Sunday he would certainly need a rest, but if he continued the process he might choose his terms from the wealth of language in the field of religion." Since I have selected Thurber for today, the words that occur to me are unicorn, tulips, booby hatch.

From cadence, alliteration, rhyme, metaphor, and etymology, Mr. Ferguson moves to the development of a style of one's own—the theme of the latter half of the book. Style he defines as "our personal appearance in print, our self-image given speech." His own style he describes in a brilliant paragraph:

> In my own case, for example, the style of writing and speaking natural to me is rotund and centrifugal, for it is my nature to take a point and roam in ever wider elliptical orbits from it. This tendency leads often to tedious reiteration if not to turgid repetition and the rhythmical monotony of a big bass drum. I tend to tantalize the reader. I fancy sesquipedalian words and shambling ambiguities that cover confusion with the semblance of profundity. The sound of words interests me more than their meaning, and I prefer a noisy obscurity to a simple truth. What I seek, if left alone, is to create an effect with words, not to convey meaning with them.

He gives advice on how to obtain style: be aware of many styles; fit the prose to the occasion; reserve a place for reasonable doses of jargon; choose words that reveal your bent. His emphasis is on *words*. He is more concerned with "turns of phrase and nuggets of thought" than with the lodestone of a great idea. Even for the noble amateur, Longinus (not mentioned by Ferguson) makes sense in his demands for excellence in idea and vigor in treatment of the emotions. Nor is Ferguson much concerned, as Buffon was, with structural design and strength. Buffon (not mentioned by Ferguson) not only phrased most memorably the conception that style is the man, but also wisely pointed out that style is "the order and movement one gives to one's thoughts."

The twin themes of playing with words and forging a style of one's own come together in a chapter on verbs. One of Ferguson's reasons for attending to verbs is his belief that "concern with any single part of speech may induce the nonprofessional to study again the whole body of principles and regulations known as grammar." This extraordinary transition enables Ferguson to offer some comments on grammar which, in turn, bring him to rhetoric. Devoting slightly over one page to this subject, Ferguson says that "some of the counsels of rhetoric will brace the struggling amateur and add thrust of interest to his efforts. Two examples will suffice to display the wonders of rhetoric. One is *prolepsis*. It does not take a profound student of language to see at a glance that the word means *leaping ahead*. . . . I now mention another and to me delightful term in rhetoric. It is *preterition*. Since 1612, *preterition*, which derives from Latin and French terms meaning *passing over* or *to pass by*, has been recognized as a way of saying a thing without saying it." Let us, then, pass over the intimation that his treatment of rhetoric is perfectly characterized by the word "desultory," since, as Mr. Ferguson reminds us on page 77, the Latin term, *desultor*, suggests "one who leaps from back to back of circus horses as they parade around the sawdust ring."

The Elements of Style was first published privately in 1918, by William

Strunk, Jr., Professor of English at Cornell University. There were other printings; the copy I have was published in 1920 by Harcourt, Brace and Howe. This is the "little book," as Professor Strunk called it, about which his former student, E. B. White, wrote a small piece for *The New Yorker* in 1957. The editors of The Macmillan Company convinced Mr. White to prepare a revision of Professor Strunk's book, prefacing it with *The New Yorker* piece and ending it with his own discourse on style. This new edition, then, is the splendid result of a collaboration between master and pupil become master.

In both the new edition and that of 1920, Professor Strunk's book contains seven rules of usage, eleven principles of composition (Mr. White says eight and ten, taking these numbers, I would suppose, from the 1918 edition), a few pages on technicalities of form, and a list of expressions commonly misused. The rules are direct commands—"Sergeant Strunk snapping orders to his platoon," Mr. White says in his introduction.

Among the seven rules on usage are three on the comma and one on the semicolon, laid down, Professor Strunk observes in the introduction of the 1920 edition, "in the belief that these four rules provide for all the internal punctuation that is required by nineteen sentences out of twenty." That's about the right proportion for noble amateurs.

The eleven principles of composition are defined, explained, and illustrated in eighteen pages. They range from admonition on using the active voice to advice on placing emphatic words at the end of the sentence. Of value to rhetorical critics is the principle concerned with the vexing problem of presenting summaries. Here is Strunk speaking in both 1920 and 1959. First, in summarizing, keep to one tense, preferably the present. Second, in "reporting a speech, the writer should not overwork such expressions as 'he said,' 'he stated,' 'the speaker added,' 'the speaker then went on to say,' 'the author also thinks,' or the like. He should indicate clearly at the outset, once for all, that what follows is summary, and then waste no words in repeating the notification." A critic, however, should be wary of summaries. "He may find it necessary to devote one or two sentences to indicating the subject, or the opening situation, of the work he is discussing; he may cite numerous details to illustrate its qualities. But he should aim to write an orderly discussion supported by evidence, not a summary with occasional comment."

The principle, "Omit needless words," is a favorite with both Mr. Strunk and Mr. White. Developing this point, Professor Strunk (slightly modified by Mr. White) says: "An expression that is especially debilitating is *the fact that*. It should be revised out of every sentence in which it occurs." These examples follow:

owing to the fact that
  since (because)
in spite of the fact that
  though (although)
call your attention to the fact that
  remind you (notify you)
I was unaware of the fact that
  I was unaware that (did not know)
the fact that he had not succeeded
  his failure
the fact that I had arrived
  my arrival

Mr. White's revisions are in key with the original. Occasionally, Mr. White adds words to Professor Strunk's explanations; occasionally he deletes words (Mr. Strunk would have smiled at seeing "Chance . . ." in place of "An unforeseen chance . . ."); he revises to achieve quicker intelligibility; he ap-

pends advice acquired from his editorial experience ("Enormous blocks of print look formidable to a reader."); he quotes Cather and Orwell rather than Browning, E. M. Forster rather than Lecky; he takes account of the new world map by dropping the example: "The sun never sets upon the British flag," and bows to the change in warfare by substituting "air-power" for "heavy artillery"; he increases the expressions commonly misused from sixty-five to ninety-two, but does not include all of Strunk's sixty-five—for example, *dependable,* which Strunk thought was a needless substitute for *reliable*; he includes in full the Beatitudes and the Lord's Prayer, to which Strunk merely refers; he eliminates a two-page section on spelling and a three-page section of exercises, neither of much importance; he changes two rules of usage ostensibly on paragraphs to one rule on structure of the whole and one on paragraphs, yet manages to keep the spirit and much of the language of the original. Mr. White is the perfect pupil now turned perfect editor. Professor Strunk would have blinked his eyes and nibbled his lips in approval. Only one of the new examples might have moved Professor Strunk to suggest that it was not his but another man's meat: "Chloë smells good, like a pretty girl should."

This is the "little book"—fifty-one pages (in the 1959 edition) on usage and composition. To this text Mr. White adds his *parvum opus*—twenty pages on style. In four pages he introduces the subject, and in sixteen offers advice drawn from his experience as a writer. To be consistent in format with Sergeant Strunk he presents this advice in the form of commands, twenty-one of them. A little alarmed at his tone of authority, he calls them "cautionary remarks," "subtly dangerous hints," and settles for the term "reminders." These reminders deal with technical advice: "Work from a suitable design," "Avoid the use of qualifiers," "Write with nouns and verbs"; with common sense: "Avoid fancy words," "Do not use dialect unless your ear is good." The last and longest reminder, "Prefer the standard to the offbeat," epitomizes his advice to the noble amateur. He opens: "The young writer will be drawn at every turn toward eccentricities in language. He will hear the beat of new vocabularies, the exciting rhythms of special segments of his society, each speaking a language of its own. All of us come under the spell of these unsettling drums; the problem, for the beginner, is to listen to them, learn the words, feel the excitement, and not be carried away." The new words come from many sources. The advertiser says that his counter top is *accessorized* with gold-plated faucets—this is the language of "mutilation." The businessman says *in short supply, up-dated,* and *finalize*—the writer, operating in a more universal setting, can express these same ideas less formidably. The lawyer, the soldier, the bureaucrat, even the literary critic, all use special vocabularies—their words are like little balloons "freighted with delicious meaning but that soon burst in air, leaving nothing but a memory of bright sound." Tolerant and humane, Mr. White wants the young writer to err on the side of conservatism, but, he says, "No idiom is taboo, no accent forbidden; there simply is a better chance of doing well if the writer holds a steady course, enters the stream of English quietly, and does not thrash about."

The end of Mr. White's epilogue is somewhat confusing (to me). Consistently, Mr. White has maintained that "all writing is communication." Now he says: "The whole duty of a writer is to

please and satisfy himself, and the true writer always plays to an audience of one." Undoubtedly, each of us is his own "most enchanted listener," as Wendell Johnson says; yet each of us plays to an audience. We want to communicate. There is no pain like that inflicted by the lack of a hearing, as Dante Gabriel Rossetti learned—and poignantly confessed by allowing his friends to dig up the unpublished sonnets which eight years earlier he had buried with the body of his wife.

Mr. Strunk, Mr. White, and Mr. Ferguson are firm advocates and tolerant judges. They take jurisdiction over civil infractions of the codes of grammar and rhetoric, not over the criminal cases. In their court you will find the case of the bold but sometimes ungrammatical man who refuses to let the English language get in his way—they look stern, but can't hide a smile. Here, also, is the timid but correct man—they sting him with a reprimand. Here is the aggressive liberal who goes back over his prose and resolutely splits infinitives that got by him in "pure" form the first time—they call him an upside-down pedant and dismiss the case. Here is the sloppy man whose adjectives, like neckties, need to be tightly pulled in—they hold up a mirror to him. Here is the jargon maker who divides people into two groups: those in the know and the rest of us—they stick pins in his arrogance.

Judges Strunk, White, and Ferguson do not accept jurisdiction over cases of rhetorical felony, cases involving moral crimes in composition. Somebody should. Look at this gallery of rhetorical rogues. There is the counterfeiter. He robs humanity by passing off one word as a substitute for another. He says *democracy* when he means "dictatorship," *peace* when he means "war," *protection* when he means "concentration camps," *free employment* when he means "slave labor." There is the debaucher. He gets the language drunk so that it loses its manliness, becoming fuzzy and incoherent. He writes, "I haven't checked the figures, but 87 years ago, I think it was, a number of individuals organized a governmental setup here in this country." There is the evader. He is the escape artist in language, the demagogue who can't be pinned down. He asserts that there are 205 Communists in the State Department, but when pressed changes the figure, then changes the subject. Potemkin-like, he deals in appearances, not realities. There is the con man. He takes in a gullible humanity making claims that are fraudulent yet staying within the law. He sells snake oil as a cancer cure, bolts personal happiness on each refrigerator as it comes off the assembly line, promises a husband with each bottle of underarm spray (one to a customer).

If someone, say Mr. White or Mr. Ferguson, were to write a book on these rhetorical felons, their habitats, appetites, and techniques of assault, perhaps we could devise ways to protect an innocent humanity.

Fortunately, like Messrs. Strunk, White, and Ferguson, we in SAA are concerned not with the outlaws, but with the noble amateurs—the undergraduates, the graduate students who want to be teachers, the teachers who want to write. For them the soundest advice is "The only way to learn to write is to write." Teachers, especially, must keep this in mind. In their daily rounds, teachers are critics rather than creative writers or speakers. Their critical muscles become powerful with exercise; their creative muscles wither from neglect. Within the teacher, the cre-

ative is forever challenged by the critical. It is not a fair fight, and with each beating, the creative becomes less venturesome. When he was about forty years old, the most learned teacher-scholar I have ever known told me that he expected to read until the age of fifty-five and then to write. Of course, he never wrote. His monument is a study with 3 x 5 cards, wall to wall.

BOOKS REVIEWED

SAY IT WITH WORDS. By Charles W. Ferguson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959; pp. xxx+214+iv. $3.50.

THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE. By William Strunk, Jr. With Revisions, an Introduction, and a New Chapter on Writing by E. B. White. New York: Macmillan, 1959; pp. xiv+71. $2.50.

THE COMPLETE GREEK TRAGEDIES. Four volumes boxed. Edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, c1959; pp. (Vol. I, AESCHYLUS) viii+351; (Vol. II, SOPHOCLES) vi+460; (Vol. III, EURIPIDES) x+1330; (Vol. IV, EURIPIDES) vi+616. $20.00.

Since the Renaissance, indeed one may say since the Golden Age of Rome, every nation of the western world and each epoch has measured its artistic and cultural achievements against those of ancient Greece. More than mere measurement, each age has used the Greek art and literature, and especially Greek tragedy, as an instrument for understanding and interpreting the modern period. As the conception of man and his universe changed, new interpretations of the extant Greek tragedies became essential; thus each age has found it necessary to reinterpret, retranslate, and readapt those ancient masterpieces. The University of Chicago Press undertook to aid in this task for our contemporary period when it launched the project of publishing in new translation all of the extant Greek tragedies under the able editorship of David Grene and Richmond Lattimore. For a number of years past these new translations have been appearing, play by play, volume by volume, in paper-back editions; hence most scholars and students of the drama are already familiar with this new venture. Now the whole corpus has been translated and issued in four handsome volumes, a boxed set whose artistic beauty of printing, binding, and illustration is most fitting to the superb content. These four volumes represent artistic and imaginative publication at its best. It is, therefore, somewhat difficult for me to restrain my enthusiasm and present an objective critical review of them.

Sixteen different individuals have translated one or more of the tragedies. Richmond Lattimore and David Grene, the editors, are responsible for more of the translations than is any one other individual connected with the project. The first volume, the slimmest in number of pages of the series, is devoted to the seven extant tragedies of Aeschylus, translated by Richmond Lattimore, Seth G. Benardete, and David Grene. Lattimore has written an "Introduction" to the volume, including a life of Aeschylus, an evaluation of his accomplishment as a dramatist, and an analysis of the *Oresteia*, which he translated. This is the most extensive of the prefatory essays in the set and one wishes it were longer. It is, in my estimation, perhaps the best critical interpretation of Aeschylus to appear in English since the publication of H. D. F. Kitto's *Greek Tragedy*. Aeschylus is without question the most difficult of the Greek tragedians to translate. From the recent appearance of Fraenkel's variorum edition of the *Agamemnon* back through the Renaissance, scholars have continued to argue over the interpretations of his lines. Lattimore renders the *Oresteia* in modern verse, which makes exciting though often difficult reading. His English version becomes even more exciting when one compares passages with the original. I am sure, however, that some of his interpretative renderings will excite considerable argument and I am doubtful about their effectiveness on the stage. By contrast, David Grene's translations are clearer, though not always as exciting. Space will not permit me to compare and illustrate the various translations, nor to discuss at greater length the potential stage effectiveness of each. Indeed, a settlement of the latter point awaits stage production under imaginative direction with trained actors.

The second volume devoted to the seven extant tragedies of Sophocles represents the work of David Grene, Robert Fitzgerald, Elizabeth Wyckoff, John Moore, and Michael Jameson, with Grene translating three of the seven plays. The problems in translating Sophocles are by no means of the same nature nor the same magnitude as those encountered with Aeschylus. As one would expect, with so many translators involved the style of the verse varies greatly. But so does it with Sophocles' plays

in the original. In general, the Sophoclean verse is much clearer, much easier to follow, and hence easier to render from the stage.

The third and fourth volumes together are devoted to the nineteen plays of Euripides, including the *Cyclops*. In these volumes the following translators are involved: Richmond Lattimore, Rex Warner, Ralph Gladstone, David Grene, William Arrowsmith, Witter Bynner, John Frederick Nims, Ronald Frederick Willetts, Frank William Jones, Charles R. Walker, Emily Townsend Vermeule, and Elizabeth Wyckoff. Again, the range of style and effectiveness is great but all of the translations are remarkably well done. Lattimore wrote a brief "General Introduction" on Euripides in which he dwells largely upon his "faults." He concludes as follows: "His faults are obvious. Equally obvious is his genius. He is the father of the romantic comedy, the problem play. He has given us a series of unforgettable characters. There has never been any one else like him." These are truths certainly but by no means the penetrating insights that he gives us in his essay on Aeschylus. In addition to these brief introductions, there are prefatory essays on each of the plays, usually written by the translator. In some instances, Grene or Lattimore did the introductory essay for another's translation. Finally, there is a "Chronological Note on the plays of Euripides" by Lattimore.

The editors, translators, and the University of Chicago Press are to be congratulated on this work. They have placed all students of drama in their debt.

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THE LIVING THEATRE. By Elmer Rice. New York: Harper, 1959; pp. xii+306. Trade $5.50, text $4.00.

A book of essays about the theatre by the author of at least two plays, *The Adding Machine* and *Street Scene*, which are included in almost everyone's list of required reading in American drama is likely to be a significant contribution to theatrical literature. Mr. Rice is not only an important dramatist whose first successful Broadway play predates O'Neill's earliest one-acts, but he also helped to found the noted Playwrights' Company in 1937 and during the depression persuaded Harry Hopkins to set up the Federal Theatre Project. No doubt for the young student and for the theatre-going public Mr. Rice presents much interesting information, but anyone who has had some contact with professional theatre will find little in this book that is new. Nevertheless, it should make an excellent supplementary text for a course in modern American drama.

In fact, in the foreword Mr. Rice tells us that his book grew out of a twenty-eight week course in contemporary theatre which he gave in 1957 in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at New York University. He assures us, however, that it is not a series of lecture notes but an entirely new treatment of the "theatre as a social institution" and "the relationship of its technical and human mechanisms to the projection of dramatic literature." He begins with definitions of creation and communication, differentiates between the nature of drama and the nature of theatre and then shows how social environment produces differing types of theatre in such countries as Japan, the Soviet Union, England, and the United States. As a playwright, he is especially conscious of the ways in which the interpretation of the dramatist's creation is affected by economic problems, real estate interests, labor unions, and the limitations of actors, directors, and technicians.

For students familiar only with college and community theatres there are unusually enlightening chapters on the rising costs of production in the commercial theatre, "Commercialism versus Art," and a description of the tribulations of producing his Pulitzer Prize winning *Street Scene*, which was turned down by every important manager in New York. In other chapters, although he does attack incompetent actors for clogging the acting labor market and directors who publicize themselves by imposing their own highly personal methods on play scripts, he is surprisingly impartial in his comments on commercial theatre. As might be expected, Mr. Rice is disturbed by the power of the New York newspaper critics to determine the fate of a play and by the "smash-hit" psychology of present-day audiences. In view of his background as a lawyer and his life-long fight for civil liberties and freedom of expression, his chapter on censorship is of particular importance. Unlike the motion picture and broadcasting industries, the American theatre, he believes, is still independent of social pressures. It is noteworthy that in spite of the fact that he was the director of the Federal Theatre Project in New York, he does not advocate government subsidy as the solution to the chaotic economics of the Broadway theatre.

In attempting to deal in twenty-seven chapters with all aspects of the contemporary theatre except dramatic literature, he must of necessity be brief in his comments. Since he has made so many thought provoking statements, it is regrettable that he has not confined himself to fewer topics and recorded for us more of his personal experiences during his forty-five years in the American theatre.

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THE THIRD VOICE: MODERN BRITISH AND AMERICAN VERSE DRAMA. By Denis Donoghue. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959; pp. 286. $5.00.

Mr. Donoghue's aim is two-fold: he wants to elucidate the essential characteristics of dramatic verse, and he wants to evaluate modern American and British verse drama. In pursuing these aims, he asks many important and interesting questions. For example, just what is meant by the term "poetic drama"? Is poetry proper for the modern theatre, a theatre dedicated to the quotidian world? How does the nineteenth-century theatre help us to understand our present confusion about poetry in the theatre? Do the plays of Yeats, Eliot, and other modern verse dramatists point ahead to new possibilities in verse drama?

Drawing freely upon the insights and methods of the best modern critics, Donoghue answers these questions incisively, objectively, and above all provocatively. Take, for example, his definition of poetic drama: "A play is 'poetic' . . . when its concrete elements (plot, agency, scene, speech, gesture) continuously exhibit in their internal relationships those qualities of mutual coherence and illumination required of the words of a poem." A close examination of this definition should reveal Donoghue's insistence on the importance of other "concrete elements" besides language in his conception of poetic drama. Such insistence is a major indication of his objectivity. Despite his intense concern with words (besides the numerous minute line analyses, he devotes a whole chapter to Eliot's verse line and another to the speaking of verse), he is constantly aware that in drama language is not all. This position, as he himself takes pains to point out, is not completely shared by many poet-dramatists and critics, including Eliot.

Donoghue's objectivity and keen eye for fruitful detail are reflected in everything he does. He cannot explain the limitations of *The Cocktail Party* without going on to show what he feels is Eliot's great contribution to modern verse drama in *The Confidential Clerk*. He cannot show us the "rhetorical bias" in Yeats' plays without also showing us Yeats' more successful endeavors. And he cannot show us Fry's weaknesses as a dramatist without taking into account the critical opinion of a bevy of important critics who oppose his "denunciation." His tendency to see things "whole" plus the ability to provide clear illustrations of both the actual and ideal in verse drama makes this an important study.

Any hesitation in acclaiming this book may stem from irritation with the occasional vagueness resulting from Donoghue's reliance on the terminology of the "New Criticism," his somewhat associational rather than thematic organization, his sometimes cryptic style, or his somewhat vague idealization of Ibsen as a poetic dramatist. These reservations, however, by no means detract from the great value of his work. *The Third Voice* should be welcomed enthusiastically by anyone interested in drama or literary criticism.

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STAGE SCENERY: ITS CONSTRUCTION AND RIGGING. By A. S. Gillette. New York: Harper, 1959; pp. xiv+315. $4.50 (in quantity orders).

As activity in the amateur-educational theatre increases, it is perhaps not surprising that books appear that fulfill the old description of "more and more about less and less." In this case, however, the "less" does not denote the value but rather the scope of the material covered. Professor Gillette has written a practical and detailed manual for "a course in scenic construction and rigging, and in back stage organization and management"—the first book exclusively devoted to these areas—with "attention . . . focused on the illustrations that accompany the textual material."

Chapters are concerned with the organization of the backstage and the production staffs, the relationship of the scene designer and the technician, the scene shop, scenery materials, two and three-dimensional scenery construction, the stage and its equipment, assembling and shifting, rigging, and some special problems the author solved by not-so-common methods —all of them profusely and accurately illus-

trated by 103 pages (7″x11″) of superbly executed line drawings. There are no photographs.

The book discusses several items of information infrequently encountered elsewhere, such as designs for paint and hardware cabinets, the continental parallel, the slip stage, a cable-driven revolving stage, etc. The information on rigging is probably the most comprehensive now in print, including even direction for flying Peter Pan. The two chapters, 67 pages, on constructing scenery are quite comparable in coverage to the several standard, recent books that include this area. The book's format and appearance are a hymn to the printer's art. Glossary, brief bibliography, and good index are most helpful.

It seems futile, and often unfair, to complain that authors omitted things they never intended to include in their books; yet, in a book on stage scenery, is it not reasonable to expect that the problems of painting the finished set should be discussed? Of course, one might then argue that there should be directions for dressing the set, and for lighting the painted set, and so on and on. But lighting, for example, is, if not a separate course, at least an individual unit of study in most colleges. In the same way scenery, from the blueprints to the finished setting, is usually a unit of study—and this implies at least painting, if not also dressing, the set. Books on these separate phases are hard to come by.

For this reason, therefore, it seems doubtful that many courses will be so limited in scope that this book will serve as an only text, in spite of its attractive price. As a supplementary class reference book, as a workers' handbook in the scene shop, and as an aid to the advanced student in the special problems of rigging, however, this book should prove its worth.

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STANISLAVSKI'S LEGACY: A COLLECTION OF COMMENTS ON A VARIETY OF ASPECTS OF AN ACTOR'S ART AND LIFE. By Constantin Stanislavski. Edited and translated by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood. New York: Theatre Arts Books, 1958; pp. x+182. $3.50.

Published in a multiple anniversary year—founding of Moscow Art Theatre and appearance of the troupe in America—*Stanislavski's Legacy* apparently provides a wide sampling of the famous actor-director-teacher's commentary on art and life, designed to reveal "the essence and variety of his work."

While purpose and title imply a significant bequest, *Stanislavski's Legacy* actually presents an assorted miscellany—rather promiscuously arranged—of subjects ranging from descriptive and poignant "Memories of Chekhov" to reading the riot act to slovenly "Young Actors in Mob Scenes." Relying primarily on material from unpublished papers, speeches, letters, and conversations, the editor has divided the collection into four parts.

The first section, comprising almost half the book, concerns the actor at work in opera and theatre, and includes fragmentary statements as well as extended essays on the inspiration and perspiration necessary for the creation of a role. Drawing from life as well as from educational experiences, Stanislavski discloses his serious approach to the theatre as an art. As early as 1901, he was urging thorough training outside the professional theatre: "My company is made up of university men, technicians, people who have completed their education—and it is in this fact that you will find the power of our theatre."

The second part, about one-fourth—and the best written—of the book, describes Stanislavski and the Art Theatre's relationship with Chekhov from 1898 to 1904. Compared with a similar review in Stanislavski's autobiography, *My Life in Art* (1924), this section (1907) reveals not only the interpendence of playwright and director but also the difficult problem confronting the future biographer. For example, in describing reactions at the end of *The Seagull's* first act (1898), Stanislavski's "Knipper stifled an hysterical sob" in *Legacy* (1907) became "Knipper fainted on the stage" in *My Life in Art* (1924). Moreover, for the special production of *The Seagull* at the Nikitsky Theatre, *Legacy* reports the brooding figure of Chekhov alone in the house, whereas *My Life in Art* multiplies that number by ten. Further comparisons may lead the reader to suspect the emergence of Stanislavski in a new role—fiction writer.

The third and fourth parts, comprising the last quarter of *Legacy*, include statements concerning the public, critics, and scene designers. Other than the essay on "The Art of the Actor and the Art of the Director," previously published in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (another translation), the most interesting item concerns a stenographic record kept at rehearsal: in one section Stanislavski directed a melodrama; in another he urged his young actors to work

intelligently in crowd scenes. Both sections illustrate the director at work and provide the clearest examples of Stanislavski as the practicing artist.

While *Stanislavski's Legacy* contributes little that is new or significant to the wealth of available material, several factors may be observed. His best writing spans the period before 1908, with 1907-1908 as the important years. Then, too, the stenographic records kept at rehearsal have not been tapped and may prove eventually the clearest statement of Stanislavski as actor and director. Moreover, a new biography and assessment of Stanislavski should be written. While two acting texts, two production books, and his autobiography remain our chief inheritance, *Stanislavski's Legacy* continues to support the image of Stanislavski as the serious professional who kept before him the objective of theatre as an art—undoubtedly his most important contribution to our era.

EUGENE K. BRISTOW
Indiana University

TEXTUAL AND LITERARY CRITICISM. By Fredson Bowers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959; pp. lx+186. $3.75.

Richard Tottel, as every admirer of Thomas Wyatt knows, included in his mammoth *Miscellany* of 1557, "They Flee From Me," a poem ostensibly from the canon of Sir Thomas. In our own century, a textual critic, working from Wyatt's manuscript, showed that Tottel—doubtless in quest of metrical smoothness—had in fact rewritten Wyatt's poem—adding, dropping, shifting—and, in so doing, the pioneer anthologist downgraded a very great love poem into a passing slick one. Happily, Wyatt's bereft lover stands resurrected in all his tattered, jagged splendor.

Professor Fredson Bowers of the University of Virginia in his presently published Sandars Lectures in Bibliography (1957-58) has made out a conclusive case on the need for searching out and correcting errors of text as a *sine qua non* for informed literary criticism. Most textual distortions are far less spectacular, and correspondingly less detectable, than Tottel's enormity. Bowers demonstrates it is of the first importance that a critic work with the text which comes closest to his author's executed intention. "But," one asks, "is this not to cavil? Is this not often a matter of the comma casually misplaced, of the infinitive badly—but *not importantly*—split?" Bowers proves *not*.

What difference can possible errors in transcription make to what Bowers calls the "total values" of a work? A great deal. Willard Farnham has wondered whether Macbeth stood ready for action upon "this bank and school of time," and not that "bank and shoal" where generations of school children have placed Macbeth. Now, *there's* a distinction that makes a difference.

Bowers' best chapter is on the third (1860) edition of Whitman's *Leaves of Grass*. The 1860 edition of *Leaves* contained about one hundred more poems than had the second (1856) edition. Bowers has worked through the manuscripts of eighty of the new poems, and by analyzing Whitman's work of the years between, the critic has been able to track in a direct, concrete way the emergence of the poet's genius.

Problems for the textual critic abound in the handing down of prose, as well as of poetry. I leave aside the notorious cases of, say, Joyce's *Ulysses*, or Lawrence's *Lady Chatterly's Lover*, novels whose lurid legal pasts have given rise to a bargain counter's worth of disguises (often fake and cheap) in order to give the slip to the censor. (And it has been just this year that Mark Schorer has been able to purge the *Lady* of all textual sin.) A more prosaic book—one so prosaic, in fact, as Sinclair Lewis' *Babbitt*—in its first printing contained "about a hundred inconsistencies and errors." Lewis acknowledged and tried to correct these mistakes; still, for abstruse reasons of publishing, only the fourth printing of the novel (and there have been many after the fourth) remains relatively unblemished with its twenty-one corrections.

Citations—fascinating, various, and depressing—of critical textual errors may be found by the score in Bowers' book. The distinguished bibliographer more than makes his case that the responsible literary critic must study the transmission (which is ideally the manumission of the creator's intention) of any text he is working on. No absolute rules obtain: at times an earlier text comes closer to the writer's wish than a later one which may have been unauthorized, pirated, or worse, helped along to ruin by a Tottel. "All truth," said William Blake, who himself had his publishing woes. "All truth lies in particulars." And in every case of textual restoration, hard work is all.

HERBERT FEINSTEIN
San Francisco State College

A TREASURY OF GREAT AMERICAN SPEECHES. Edited by Charles Hurd. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959; pp. 364. $5.95.

SELECTED AMERICAN SPEECHES ON BASIC ISSUES: 1850-1950. Edited by Carl G. Brandt and Edward M. Shafter, Jr. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960; pp. ix+426. Cloth $3.50, paper $2.25.

Anthologies of speeches in American history are always welcome. These two books offer unique approaches to such collections.

The editor of *A Treasury of Great American Speeches* offers the reader a panoramic view of speechmaking in America from 1645 to 1960, reported in the style of today's newspapers. One hundred speeches, or speech segments, by ninety-two speakers are reported. Each is preceded by an adequate historical description of the speaking situation, much as the newspapers today would take readers to the scene with "leads" telling the essentials of "who, what, when, where, and why." In about half of the cases, the editor has supplied the reader with sequels, but "only where such sequels are significant."

Over three ceturies of speechmaking are divided into five historical periods: "Foundations" (1645-1826), "Growing Pains" (1833-1865), "New Horizons" (1873-1931), "Depression, War and Reconversion" (1933-1944), and "Looking Forward" (1946-1959). Speeches are arranged in strict chronological order, so that those of Franklin Roosevelt, for example, do not appear together.

The volume is made more usable by inclusion of an alphabetical list of speakers and an index of the speeches by category: "Inspiration and Exhortation," "Humor," "By Women," "Eulogies," "Arts and Sciences," "Presidential Speeches (While in Office)," "Independence and the Constitution," "Secession and the Civil War," "World War I and League of Nations," "World War II and United Nations," and "Miscellaneous." The editor's failure to cross-classify some of the speeches weakens the categorical index. For example, Cornelia Otis Skinner's, "A Toast to Doctors," is certainly a humorous effort, but it is classified only under the heading, "By Women."

Since the excerpts are extremely brief in some cases, the book is of little value to the student of American public address, for any serious study of the speeches is impossible. However, the speeches are well chosen, and many names appear in this collection that are not to be found in other anthologies. The real value of the book is that it offers the reader a sketch of American history through the words of those who made it dynamic by virtue of their speaking.

The editors of *Selected American Speeches on Basic Issues,* 1850-1950, chose to limit their anthology to a hundred-year period, seventeen speakers, and nineteen unexpurgated speeches. They divided the hundred years into three segments: "Time of Civil Strife: Slavery and States' Rights" (1850-1889), "The Dawn of the Twentieth Century: American Nationalism and Expansion" (1896-1906), and "World Wars I and II: Crises and Controversies" (1915-1941).

Each period is preceded by an excellently capsuled historical over-view, and each speech is preceded by a brief discussion of the speaker and the significance of his speech. The editors succeeded in their attempt to include speakers on opposing sides of the issues presented. For example, the issue of slavery and states' rights is represented by the 1850 compromise speeches of Clay, Calhoun, and Webster; by Stephen Douglas's "Kansas-Nebraska Bill;" Lincoln's "Cooper Institute Address;" and Grady's "The Race Problem in the South." The free coinage of silver controversy is represented by Bryan's "Cross of Gold" and Ingersoll's "Chicago and New York Gold." The battle over imperialism is joined by Beveridge's "The Star of Empire" and Carl Schurz's "The Policy of Imperialism." The League of Nations debate pits Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah against William Howard Taft.

In terms of the speeches selected, the collection of Brandt and Shafter offers little new for the library of the student of American public address, but the manner in which they are put together, the essays preceding them, and a selected, annotated bibliography make the volume a must on the buy list.

ROBERT C. JEFFREY
Indiana University

ADVENTURES OF A BIOGRAPHER. By Catherine Drinker Bowen. Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1959; 235 pp. $4.00.

There are two kinds of people who would profit from reading this book. The first of these is the student who wants to know what it is that causes men and women in the prime of life to spend hour after hour pouring through dusty library volumes, what this mania called historical research is all about. For make no mistake, Catherine Bowen is a powerful historian—not a mere fact collector, but an imaginative artist capable of re-creating the past, a writer for whom history is as much a part of life as reading, writing, and arithmetic. This book captures the thrill of discovery, the very

matrix of historical investigation, as few others do. Page after page of vibrant descriptive prose attest repeatedly to the author's joy of discovery, to the mystery that draws her again and again to recreate the past, whether recent or Reformation. Here are essays on the tortuous search for a subject, on interviewing and evidence, and best of all, on the art of vivid reporting. Detail and more detail make up her images—detail, incidentally, which many of us blinded by tradition or training would probably overlook. In short, here is both an artistic and a scientific examination of a past event. The art is in the telling; the science is in the collection of data.

There is a second person who might profit from reading this book. It is the Ph.D. who wants to do a book about the speaker he has been years studying. Recently, a friend of mine in history was asked to review a biography written by a speech scholar. After my friend had read the book, he told me he could find nothing in it to suggest anything other than a typical biographical approach. What made the speech orientation different, he wanted to know. Mrs. Bowen supplies an answer—one which explains why my colleague's book failed to impress or sell. Referring to Justice Holmes, she writes: ". . . I planned to quote his words at length—speeches, dissents, legal opinions. Readers will not suffer many lines set off in small print, unless they are placed in scene; I had learned it long ago. Let the reader see Holmes as he spoke, hear the timbre of his voice, glance at the room where he stood and know the occasion."

The public speaker cannot be portrayed without scene. Mrs. Bowen ought to know; her books have been best sellers.

Goodwin F. Berquist, Jr.
The Ohio State University

THOMAS LODGE, GENTLEMAN. By Pat M. Ryan, Jr. Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1958; pp. 122+xxxviii. $4.25.

Lodge has not been neglected by literary historians, but there may still be justification for a concise monograph. It is disappointing to find that in *Thomas Lodge, Gentleman* a potentially worthy project has foundered.

Mr. Ryan's intentions are, to be sure, disarmingly modest. He makes no claim to "the painstaking scholarship of others" in his own account of Lodge's life and works. Though he does not say so, his pretensions as a critic are equally modest, and when he speaks in his own voice he does not attempt any large development of ideas. He conceives his work as simply a "garland" to mark the fourth centenary of Lodge's birth. For his main outlines he gives due credit to the study by N. Burton Paradise, published in 1931, and for additional details he acknowledges his debt to more recent publications.

Granted the legitimacy of the enterprise, one basic trouble lies with the quality of the writing. Readers may vary in their response to the occasional attempts at verbal liveliness—an article in the *Dictionary of National Biography* is a "profile," and an early reference to the *Ur-Hamlet* is "precious stuff." Perhaps more typical, however, is a graceless sentence like this: "But underlying Paradise's *Wounds* dating hypothesis is a tacit assumption that Kyd's play made its appearance sometime after 1586; whereas *The Spanish Tragedy's* most recent editor, Charles T. Prouty, has advanced 1587 as a reasonably safe guess for this work's date of composition." Though the actual sense seldom presents difficulty, the reader may well pause at the statement that Lodge's translation of Seneca "was first published in 1613 and/or 1614."

The book appears to have been produced by offset printing from typewritten sheets. To judge from some of the pages, an unlettered typist must have worked from foul copy, and no great pains were bestowed on proofreading. Thus Mr. Ryan traces (or, rather, reports that Paradise has traced) an "apocphal thread" in Lodge's biography; he refers (or quotes Paradise as referring) to the prose of "Lyle and Sidney"; he writes of "Gabriel Harvey's scatching *Four Letters*," of "puritannical tracts" and of "ecstacy"; on consecutive pages "satire" recurs as "sutire" and "sattire." Worse than such obvious monstrosities are a number of wrong dates and garbled quotations. When the reader sees the same year referred to on page 20 as 1583 and 1588, he will know at least that not both of these can be right; he will have less reason to suspect that 1601, on page 83, should be 1610.

Some merit may be ascribed to the zeal which has gone into amassing a "Selective Bibliography," to be found, separately paginated, at the end of the volume. This contains several hundred titles, and is fuller in some respects (as Mr. Ryan points out, with a characteristic misprint) than the "Lodge bleanings" of Tannenbaum. But as a whole *Thomas Lodge, Gentleman* must stand as a modest monument to ineptitude. No alert reader, after a few min-

utes with the book, will be likely to trust it in matters of detail, even if his confidence in the author can survive the identification, on an early page, of Mary, Queen of Scots, as a half-sister to Queen Elizabeth.

RHODES DUNLAP
University of Iowa

ALEXANDER HAMILTON: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX. By John C. Miller. New York: Harper, 1959; pp. xii+659. $8.50.

Professor Miller has contrived to accomplish what many others have attempted: he has provided for Alexander Hamilton a full-scale biography that is at once sound and readable, fluent and well-documented, discriminating and laudatory. Relying on his own reading of the sources, Mr. Miller tends to restrict his conclusions to inferences soberly drawn from available evidence. If his practice of self-denial makes his life of Hamilton less speculatively romantic than some of the neo-Freudian interpretations, the same practice will commend the work to scholars and to those general readers who prefer genuine biography to fantasia.

The thirty-six chapters are divided into five parts appropriately called "The Union Against Great Britain," "The Union Against Chaos," "The Union Consummated," "The Union Against Foreign Aggression," and "The Union Above All." The recurrence of the concept of *Union* in the several sections of Professor Miller's book is not accidental. Hamilton's dedication to the principle of American union is found to be the central purpose of his public life, just as the phenomenon of paradox is seen to be the explanation of his personality. It is a measure of Professor Miller's work that those who have pondered Hamilton and his ways for many years will read the new biography with profit, for the book provokes new insights into Hamilton and his endeavors. Yet the man remains as heretofore in some degree a mystery.

Students of rhetoric and public address would do well to keep in mind that this book is not an essay in rhetorical criticism. It is a well-balanced treatment in which the man and the statesman are united with unusual discernment. Although this treatment should aid an understanding of Hamilton as orator, it is not designed to explain his ways as a writer and speaker.

The work is well-documented, the footnotes being grouped by chapters on pages 577-622. A useful bibliography is grouped under the following heads: *manuscripts, newspapers, contemporary pamphlets, magazines, travelers' accounts, histories, collections of documents, constitution, financial and economic, monographs, memoirs, letters, diaries,* and *collected works;* and *biographies.* The index is adequate.

Some errors in proofreading doubtless distress the author more than they will his readers. This reviewer, whose name appears misspelled as *Ally*, finds himself in distinguished company: Talleyrand appears as *Tallyrand*, and Melancton Smith as *Melancthon* Smith. More regrettable than typographical errors is the failure to observe that the date of Hamilton's birth is a vexed question. Although 1755 may be alleged as the most probable date, it is not the year established by Hamilton himself; in the opinion of this reviewer no date is established beyond controversy. But minor errors do not impair confidence in the substantial merit of the book.

BOWER ALY
University of Oregon

THADDEUS STEVENS, SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH. By Fawn M. Brodie. New York: W. W. Norton, 1959; pp. 448. $7.50.

The term *objective* has become suspect when used to describe historical or biographical writings, and yet the word demands its place in any description of Mrs. Brodie's treatment of Thaddeus Stevens.

Her predilections and prejudices are clear enough; they concern justice and injustice, courage and cowardice, temperance and incontinence, and all the long list of virtues and vices. These selfsame tenets, tenaciously held as they are, enable Mrs. Brodie to keep controversial, contradictory Thaddeus Stevens in a strong light and in a sharp focus. With her loyalty to principles, she steers a true course between the rock of admiration evident in Ralph Korngold's study (1955) and the shoals of indignation apparent in Richard Current's work (1942).

If the adjective *objective* is forbidden then surely the word *detached* is permitted in describing her book. Mrs. Brodie has combined careful research and circumspect writing to produce a sound study of a man whose life and actions virtually defy analysis.

The first quarter of the book treats Stevens' private life and early political career in Pennsylvania. The chapters that relate the Gettysburg murder in which his name so prominently figured and the story of his relations with his

mulatto housekeeper are genuine contributions to Stevens' biography.

The remainder of the volume recounts the "Old Commoner's" twenty-year career as Congressman from Pennsylvania, twenty crucial years that spanned the Compromise of 1850 and President Johnson's impeachment trial in 1868, the year of Stevens' death.

Of special interest in this portion of the book are Mrs. Brodie's analysis of Stevens' differences with Lincoln before and during the war and her account of Stevens' part in the events that led to Johnson's impeachment. Again the author makes significant additions to an understanding of her subject.

Add to Mrs. Brodie's other virtues her vigorous style and her keen appreciation for Stevens' spoken words and the conclusion that she has written a book indispensable for speech libraries is inevitable.

The volume's greatest fault is the publisher's. As is too often true in current publishing practices, the footnotes follow the text. The excellence of the notes in this volume makes this practice more than usually exasperating.

In reviewing Mrs. Brodie's earlier work, Bernard DeVoto concluded that her account of Joseph Smith's life was "the best book about the Mormons so far published." That her work on Thaddeus Stevens is the best book about the Scourge of the South so far published is unmistakable.

ROBERT P. FRIEDMAN
University of Missouri

JONATHAN PRENTISS DOLLIVER: A STUDY IN POLITICAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE. By Thomas Richard Ross. Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1958; pp. xiii+366. $6.50.

Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver experienced the misfortune of dying too soon and of dwelling in the midst of the oratorical giants, La Follette, Bryan, and Beveridge. Unhappily, Dolliver's eloquent oratory, adjudged by the aforenamed Hoosier statesman as "the greatest . . . of the contemporaneous English-speaking world," has suffered neglect from historians and rhetoricians alike. This *Study in Political Integrity and Independence*, published at the centennial of Dolliver's birth, adds a much-needed chapter to rhetorical and political history at the turn of the century.

A native of West Virginia, son of a Methodist circuit rider, Dolliver won national acclaim as a Chautauqua speaker (estimated income, $75,000), and as a political orator during the period from 1885 to 1910. For twenty-two years he served in the Congress, twelve in the House as Representative from Iowa's big Tenth District, and ten as a Senator, the position he held when stricken suddenly at the age of fifty-two.

Perhaps Dolliver missed world-wide fame by refusing to permit his name to be submitted to the convention as running mate to the ill-fated McKinley, content apparently to coin the campaign slogan of '96, hailing the Republican nominee as the "Advance agent of Prosperity." Ever a loyal Republican, he "first strained [his] voice for Blaine" at the convention of 1876 and often declared thereafter that "Iowa will go Democratic when Hell goes Methodist." Nevertheless, he risked embarrassing the Devil by leading the insurgent rebellion against the Old Guard during the bitter Payne-Aldrich Tariff debate of 1909, a revolt which led ultimately to Bull Moose. Like his comrades, La Follette and Beveridge, Dolliver was far in advance of his party and the nation at large. With age he grew increasingly liberal, fighting the good fight for conservation, federal aid to education, civil rights, tariff reform, and the elimination of corporate greed. Many of his contemporaries believed with some justification that had he lived out his Biblical allotment, the rift in the Republican ranks in 1912 might have been avoided, as he was the one compromise candidate on whom both Taft and Roosevelt might have agreed.

Professor Ross of Davis and Elkins College has given us a lively, well-written biography, spiced with the epigrams Dolliver showered on the land. Relying mainly on primary sources, the letters, diaries, newspapers, and above all, Dolliver's speeches, the author paints an accurate historical picture, embellishing his account with astute and skillful rhetorical criticism, perhaps due, in part, to the acknowledged assistance he received from Gordon F. Hostettler's dissertation on Dolliver. The writer's preoccupation with minute details of local Iowa political intrigue (a virtue, no doubt, for Hawkeye readers), occasionally makes the reading heavy, sometimes confused. But the treatment of oratory, local and national, in the Congress, and on the hustings, apparently rings true to the original tone. Ross ably demonstrates his mastery of rhetorical theory as well as historiography, and his intensely moving account

deserves a place in every course in the history of American public address.

PAUL H. BOASE
Oberlin College

NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1959. Series in CURRENT THEORY AND RESEARCH IN MOTIVATION, Volume VII. Edited by Marshall R. Jones. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959; pp. ix+243. Paper $3.00, cloth $4.25.

Scholars in the field of speech have learned to look forward to the annual publication of these unique symposia which unfailingly shed light on their interests and problems. Those who read this latest report will find it filled with helpful insights which bring many of the moot issues of motivation into sharpened focus.

The University of Nebraska Department of Psychology, and Press, merit the gratitude of our profession for organizing and conducting these symposia and for making them available in such attractive format. The current volume opens with an excellent introduction by the editor, whose careful and competent handling of typography, footnotes, and bibliographies contributes greatly to the readability of the work. For the first time in this series, helpful subject and author indexes are appended to the text.

The present volume contains six papers by distinguished psychologists, together with critical comments by the panel members on one another's contributions. Five of the papers are directly pertinent to the psychology of communication and speech.

T. C. Schneirla, Curator of the American Museum of Natural History, in "An Evolutionary and Functional Theory of Biphasic Processes Underlying Approach and Withdrawal," postulates *approach* and *withdrawal* as the prototypes of all reaction in men and animals. He maintains that for organisms in their early stages of development, low-intensity stimuli evoke approach responses, and high intensity stimuli, withdrawal. It is interesting to note that Schneirla regards the James-Lange theory of emotion as still valid and useful in the analysis of behavior.

Eckhard Hess, University of Chicago, reports his elaborate experiments on "imprinting" as a factor in motivation: "The general concept of imprinting is that it is an early experience which has a profound influence on the subsequent adult social and sexual behavior of an animal." His findings throw light on the effects of early environment on later behavior patterns. Hess holds that, whereas *recency* is maximally effective in *learning*, *primacy* plays the leading role in *imprinting*.

Although the paper by Raymond B. Cattell, Research Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois, is probably caviar to the general reader, it has much wisdom for the more sophisticated. The author makes a bold attempt to "establish the reign of mathematical law" in the area of motivation. He readily admits that "what is fundamental is apt to be difficult." There are obvious analogies between his mathematical approach to motivation and that of information theorists and cyberneticists. He uses the method of factor analysis, asserting that the factors involved are of two kinds: "(a) *drive* factors in which the loaded attitudes prove to have varied cultural content but to be *united by the same emotional quality and the same biological goal*, . . . and (b) *engram* factors, or acquired aggregates of attitudes united about some cultural object, . . . which are obviously diverse in the emotional and drive satisfactions involved." He calls the *drive* factors *ergs* and the *engram* factors, *sentiments*. His discussion of the culturally-derived *sentiment* factor is provocative and intriguing to the student of persuasion.

In discussing the cross-fertilization values of inter-disciplinary research, Cattell seems to be speaking for many of us who perforce do a good deal of borrowing from other residents of academe. He says: "I have been in trouble myself with both the anthropologists and physiologists for fishing without a license in their restricted waters."

Unlike a good many other writers on motivation, Cattell makes a clear-cut distinction between *incentive* and *goal*: "In fear, the security-seeking erg, it is plain that when some unfortunate is being chased by a blood-thirsty character with a knife, his *goal* is a nice quiet spot as remote as possible from the gentleman in question, while the current *incentive* is the knife. . . . In the hunger drive a smell of cooking is a powerful *incentive*, but few would be content with this as a *goal*." Cattell rejects the univariate experimental approach to motivation as wholly inadequate, saying, "it is a problem which calls for the whole armory of multivariate experimental analysis devices." When the reader reaches the end of the paper, he is ready to accept Cattell's claims: "The extensive theories developed here . . . positively bristle with directly answerable questions for

the researcher. They also promise a harvest of potent practical applications."

"Pride and Shame in Children" seems altogether too restrictive a title for the material presented by Harry Levin and Alfred L. Baldwin of the Department of Child Development and Family Relationships at Cornell University. Their study is of direct interest to all students of speech, perhaps most of all to speech pathologists and therapists. They present considerable experimental data on the personality factors which determine the quality of an individual's speech.

After discussing the studies of Paivo and Lambert on stage fright, Levin and Baldwin offer an interesting new audience-anxiety scale. Having designed and applied tests of *exhibitionism, self-consciousness, anxiety,* and *readiness to volunteer,* and measured their intercorrelations, they have come up with some startling and significant findings. In passing, as the editor says, "They have developed some new concepts, designed some clever experiments, and found, like many another man whether a psychologist or not, that it is easier to predict the behavior of the male than that of the female."

Irving L. Janis of Yale University reports extensive research on attitude change by himself and Carl I. Hovland, *et al.,* during the past decade. This is summarized in their book, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953). The discussion centers around what the authors call "decisional conflicts" and the characteristic ways in which they are resolved. It would seem Janis has laid the groundwork for an entire new schema of persuasion. Certainly it would be unwise for anyone to teach or write about persuasion without considering what he has said.

This book should be placed on the "must" list for all serious students of motivation through speech. They will find the bibliographies alone invaluable.

ANDREW T. WEAVER
University of Wisconsin

THE MEASUREMENT OF MEANING. By Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957; pp. 342. $7.50.

The relatively slow scientific and philosophical progress in the behavioral sciences has stemmed largely from the inherent complexity of the domains of human action and interaction. The conventional experimental approach to the exploration of new fields demands as its initial step the formulation of hypotheses directed toward reducing the confusion in a class of phenomena by viewing aggregations rather than individualized events. If the complexity of the area under investigation precludes the formulation of working hypotheses, research is largely impossible.

The Measurement of Meaning chronicles the breakthrough of such an impasse; it summarizes the work of psychologist Charles E. Osgood and associates at the Institute of Communications Research, University of Illinois. The domain explored was that of intensional or connotative meanings of words. The preliminary approach was made using L. L. Thurstone's multiple-factor analysis, a method for studying relationships without first postulating hypotheses. Several such analyses indicated that human judgments as reflected in verbal behavior may be reduced to three principal dimensions—evaluation, activity, and potency.

The measuring instrument evolved from these analyses, the *semantic differential,* was, over a period of years, applied to such diverse areas as political issues, schizophrenia, delinquency, dream symbols, market analysis, non-representational art forms, and fidelity of message transmission. It has attracted the attention of scholars in many disciplines and seems to hold great promise wherever communication is central, especially in speech. The measuring instrument is deceptively simple in appearance, consisting usually of a set of ten to a dozen seven-step, bi-polar adjectival scales designed to tap the basic dimensions of meaning. The subject rates a concept by making an X in the appropriate scale cell. Ease of administration and scoring makes this an ideal measuring device in the audience situation.

The reporting is superior throughout the book. The experimental designs are stimulating and original, and uniformly high standards are maintained in the data analyses and interpretations. The text is developed in a scholarly manner with excellent attention to detail; its comprehensiveness in describing the complete story of an extensive quantitative study from its genesis in a study of synesthesia to the final formulation of the Osgood representational mediation process theory of meaning should make this book of importance to all students of experimental methods in communication.

RAYMOND G. SMITH
Indiana University

ROOTS FOR A NEW RHETORIC. By Daniel Fogarty, S.J. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1959; pp. xvi+158. $5.00.

I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, and Alfred Korzybski, a capsule summary of classical theory, and suggestions for a new rhetoric—all in one hundred and fifty-eight pages—necessitates either selectivity or superficiality. Daniel Fogarty, Dean of the School of Education, St. Mary's University, Halifax, Canada, was selective. He has written a useful book.

His concern is with communication rather than persuasion. Rhetoric is "the science of recognizing the range of the meanings and of the functions of words, and the art of using and interpreting them in accordance with this recognition." His book, then, is addressed chiefly to teachers of English composition courses and of speech courses employing a fundamentals approach. Anyone interested in persuasion is likely to find this a rewarding study, however, partly because of the clear analyses and comparisons of the work of Richards, Burke, and the general semanticists, and partly because of a stimulating final chapter, "Choices and Possibilities for a New Rhetoric."

Using both personal interviews and written critiques of his first draft by the men involved (S. I. Hayakawa represented the semanticists) to supplement printed sources, Fogarty provides concise, understandable descriptions of the major philosophical underpinnings of Aristotelian and modern theories. In them he finds support for his contention that instruction in oral and written communication should provide college students with whatever insights are available into such areas as definition, abstraction, epistemological relations, logic, dialectic, metaphor, interpretation, and motivation. The startling aspect of his proposal is that this exposure should precede, and perhaps replace, at least some of the traditional concerns of freshman English and introduction to speech. Aristotle, so the argument runs, intended that students be familiar with his philosophical works before studying the *Rhetoric*. With philosophy now divorced from composition and speech courses, students innocent of any consideration of processes such as definition and abstraction are taught the forms of a language whose nature they do not really understand.

If one grants Fogarty's basic premise that clarity is the most desirable quality of communication in modern society, his case carries much weight. For those who discount the alleged utility of leadership by committee, it is at least provocative. Either way, you'll find the book worth reading.

HARRY P. KERR
Harvard University

LEVELS OF KNOWING AND EXISTENCE: STUDIES IN GENERAL SEMANTICS. By Harry L. Weinberg. New York: Harper, 1959; pp. xiv+274. Text $3.25.

This book, we are cautioned at its outset, "is not supposed to be a general semantics primer" (p. xiv). And yet, to a considerable extent, it seems so to be, to this reviewer at least. It had long been our impression that general semantics was concerned with "linguistic epistemologic scientific research and education" (IGS letterhead). Though there can be no question that Mr. Weinberg's book is concerned with "linguistic, scientific, education" (general semanticists generally admit to a minimization of general semantics "research"—except of its own canon), the feeling we are left with on reading this book is that GS has grown out of its former "epistemologic" orientation; GS may no longer be a simple methodology simply related to other methodologies. It has become a full-blown philosophy consisting of an epistemology (theory of knowledge) as well as an ontology (theory of reality or being) and an axiology (theory of values)—not to mention a philosophy of religion, admirably treated in a separate chapter. Though this may indeed be considered with approbation, somehow the prospect of subscribing to *a philosophy of general semantics* may not only leave something to be desired axiologically, but the very thought calls to mind such neo-diluvian yawps as "cultism." Verily, the struggle with the serpents of symbol behavior is Laocoön-like.

Though "the structure of the language used to describe and define them" offers Weinberg "one unifying thread, one invariant under transformation" with which to consider "many and diverse things . . . through all their differences" (p. 265), one wonders if the general semanticist's concern is actually with language or its structure. The general semanticist, Dr. Weinberg says, "is not so much interested in the grammatical structure of the language as he is in its implicatory structure" (p. 29). Now if it may be presumed that by "the grammatical structure of the language" is subsumed its sound, shape, and sense, one may seriously question the meaning, if not the very existence, of an "implicatory structure" of language. Weinberg may

have perhaps been forced to warp *his* findings to fit his *predecessors'* maps.

Despite prefatory replications, the bibliography might well have been extended, especially if the book is to be used as a text. And paradoxical as it may sound to general semanticists, a more additive, symmetrical system of presentation, perhaps a more felicitous written style, might also be desired. Yet this is not to be construed as implying anything other than that the book, regardless of one's knowledge of or attitudes towards general semantics, should be widely read.

JOHN B. NEWMAN
Queens College

OUR LANGUAGE AND OUR WORLD. Edited by S. I. Hayakawa. New York: Harper, 1959; pp. xii+402. $5.00.

Five years ago, S. I. Hayakawa edited *Language, Meaning and Maturity*, a collection of articles from the first ten volumes (1943-1953) of *Etc: A Review of General Semantics*. The present collection, called *Our Language and Our World*, is the second from the same journal, and spans the years 1953-1958.

Divided into four important sections, I—"Communication in Public Affairs," II—"Education and Re-Education," III—"The Arts: Highbrow and Low," and IV—"Language and Thought," the book lists twenty-nine articles by contributors from many fields, but most of whom would also answer to the appellation of "general semanticist." Although Korzybski first developed his theory as useful for education and psychotherapy, the scope and catholicity of the writings suggest the pervasiveness of his ideas not only for language, but for civilization as well.

Speech scholars, unfortunately, do not seem to be too interested in the language problems—at least from the general semantics point of view—since only one who might be so classified (Martin Maloney) appears in the collection. This was not the case a dozen or so years ago when general semantics appeared to be fashionable in the field of speech. Nonetheless, the articles are of more than a modicum of value to students in speech.

The articles themselves are not the usual dry, humorless, pedantic evaluations of aspects of our society, which are found so often in many scholarly journals. Influenced, perhaps, by the editor himself, whose contributions include such diverse elements of popular culture as "Sexual Fantasy and the 1957 Car," and "Popular Songs *vs.* the Facts of Life," the articles have a wide range. Fictional and satirical approaches to language, such as Louis B. Salomon's "A Gospel-True Fable," and Jay Haley's "The Art of Psychoanalysis," compete with do-it-yourself injunctions, and epistemological delineations of civilization as illustrated by S. I. Hayakawa's "How to Attend a Conference," and Chang Tung-sun's "A Chinese Philosopher's Theory of Knowledge." Most of these contributions search out and creatively indicate those new relationships, which according to Korzybski, are at the heart of significant contributions to knowledge. As such, they are valuable to anyone dealing with problems of communication in a complex society, shedding new insights into our language, and provoking also new views of our world.

ANTHONY HILLBRUNER
Los Angeles State College

INTRODUCTION TO GROUP DYNAMICS. By Malcolm and Hulda Knowles. New York: Association Press. 1959; pp. viii+95. $2.50.

GROUP DYNAMICS, PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS. By Hubert Bonner, New York: Ronald Press, 1959; pp. viii+531. $6.50.

The appearance of these two new books on group dynamics constitutes additional evidence of the development of theory and research concerning the nature, processes, and outcomes of group work. Although designed for entirely different audiences, both books reflect the increasing activity in this general area over the past fifteen years.

Introduction to Group Dynamics is appropriately titled. This brief book is designed to give an over-view of group dynamics, or to put it another way, a definition by generalization of what group dynamics means. The authors say their purpose is "to paint a panoramic picture, in broad sweeping strokes, of the new and complicated field of group dynamics." Group dynamics is discussed in five short chapters: "What Is Group Dynamics?" "Understanding Individual Behavior," "Understanding Group Behavior," "Practical Applications," and "What Does It Add Up To?" Although the picture is painted often in strokes that are a good deal more broad and sweeping than one would wish, the picture that emerges is generally clear, recognizable, and understandable. Despite the tendency to overgeneralize (which is probably inevitable in a book of this size and scope), this is one of the better brief statements of the

purpose, approach, and methods of group dynamics.

Group Dynamics, Principles and Applications, is a rather long, comprehensive treatment of the subject. In fact, one may offer as a negative criticism of this book that in the attempt at completeness, a thinness develops in some areas. This is most noticeable in the chapter on "Group Dynamics in Political Behavior." It is doubtful that this topic deserves the space it receives in light of the sparse research findings and, indeed, of the inadequately developed theory on the application of the principles of group dynamics to political behavior.

On the other hand, this work treats thoroughly and competently many important aspects of group dynamics. Especially well done are the chapters on "Cohesive and Disruptive Forces in Group Behavior," on "Group Leadership," on "Group Dynamics in Education," and on "Human Relations in Industry." The final chapter in the book presents an excellent critique of group dynamics—a type of essay usually missing in works on this subject. More than that, the author maintains a critical approach throughout the book and does not hesitate to point out weaknesses as well as strengths in both the theory and the research in group dynamics. It is surprising and refreshing, for example, to find on pages 492 and 508-509 sympathetic references to two QJS articles on group dynamics.

Group Dynamics, Principles and Applications is a book carefully written and complete in scope. It retains perspective on a subject which writers often deal with in an emotional way. All in all, this is a sensible, scholarly book, and one which deserves a careful reading by those interested in group processes.

N. Edd Miller
The University of Michigan

MASS COMMUNICATION, A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE. By Charles R. Wright. New York: Random House, 1959; pp. 124. Paper $0.95.

For a person new to the field, this book can serve as an introduction to some of the important research in mass communication. However, one would hope that the reader will not stop after this introduction. Given the length of this book (101 pages of text), it is necessarily a shallow treatment of the material. Research on the nature and functions of mass communication, a comparison of the American system of mass communication with three other types of systems, the sociology of the audience, the cultural content, and social effects of the media are touched upon. The acknowledged influence of Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton is quite strong. This is seen in the emphasis on descriptive and functional approaches to media research. The important work of those who have approached the media with a psychological or experimental orientation receives only a passing nod. In spite of the book's limitations, much of the material in it is important for students of speech, as well as for students of the media. The description of some of the writings of Lazarsfeld, Katz, and Merton on opinion leadership is as relevant to the student of face-to-face communication as to the student of mass communication. The section on the nature and function of mass communication can help the student to think in new ways about the processes of communication. The material drawn from research on the effects of mass communication also has relevance far beyond the domain of the media. For these reasons, to say nothing of its low cost, this book would appear suitable for adoption as a supplementary text in an introductory course in broadcasting, film, or speech.

Samuel L. Becker
State University of Iowa

RADIO FREE EUROPE. By Robert T. Holt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958; pp. xiv+242. $5.00.

It is unfortunate for the impact of Professor Holt's otherwise excellent study of Radio Free Europe that major changes were made in the organization, personnel, and policies of RFE in the fall of 1957, just as the book was going to press. Professor Holt had no alternative, other than holding the book up for another year while he went back to Munich to investigate the new systems, than to let his material appear as he had written it. A very careful, if rather brief, explanation of the changes which have occurred since late 1957, particularly in the shaping of policy directives and in the table of organization, is provided in a preface. As the author points out, this preface is best read after one has completed his reading of Chapter 3, which deals with "Organization, Personnel, and Setting," and of Chapter 4, "Policy Formulation and Programing."

This one problem, however, does not affect the considerable value of the rest of the book. Professor Holt is a veteran of psychological warfare in the European theatre, and has studied

RFE's operations and development in both its New York and Munich centers. His close, intimate knowledge of the workings of international broadcasting, and his association with many key figures in the RFE organization give his book a close-up view which is vivid and impressive.

After recounting the origins of RFE and its basic purposes and policies, the author gives us that structural picture which has changed since the preparation of the volume. He then goes on with such unchanged subjects and elements as the effectiveness of RFE's programming, the problems of getting through to the listeners despite the jamming activities of the USSR and its satellites, and the advantages and disadvantages which accrue to RFE by reason of its status as a nonofficial instrument of American policy.

A political scientist, Holt is sensitive to the actions and reactions of people and peoples, as well as of their governments. His honest and candid treatment of the morale problem between the American members of the staff and the European exiles who work with them is most revealing. In a detailed and exciting chapter, he traces RFE operations from the Berlin to the Poznan riots, as a study of the development of a major propaganda campaign. His most dramatic material is found in a chapter on the uprisings in Poland and Hungary, and the part which some critics felt that RFE had played, unwittingly, in the promotion of these doomed rebellions. But Professor Holt is a scholar, an investigator, and a historian, not an apologist, and his lucid and balanced account gives the reader a clear picture of a privately supported broadcasting operation heard more frequently, by more people, than the European broadcasts of either the British Broadcasting Corporation or the Voice of America.

EDWARD STASHEFF
The University of Michigan

MEMO TO A COLLEGE TRUSTEE: A REPORT ON FINANCIAL AND STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS OF THE LIBERAL COLLEGE. By Beardsley Ruml and Donald H. Morrison. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959; pp. xvi+94. Paper $1.00.

This "memo," prepared for the Fund for the Advancement of Education, is directed not just to the college trustee but to all of us. It is frankly controversial, but it is not dogmatic. The reader is invited to form better conclusions if he can.

It is primarily about the "financial and structural problems of the traditional, independent four-year liberal college," although many of the suggestions apply to liberal education in multi-purpose institutions. The liberal arts college finds itself today "the central hope for educational salvation," and the practical problem is to raise its performance "so that it can meet in some fair measure what the evolving national welfare requires."

The approach could have been that of finding sufficient support to "protect a curriculum and methods of instruction of unquestioned merit and revealed value." Instead, the authors took the position that much could be done by the colleges themselves by a thorough analysis of internal affairs.

The goal really is higher salaries for teachers, and there is no beating about the bush. Salaries should go as high as $25,000 to $30,000, but colleges must earn the right to pay such salaries.

One obstacle to these higher salaries, say the authors, is an outmoded curriculum which has developed out of the selfishness, the divided loyalties, and the political nature of the faculty as a group. Trustees should reclaim management of the curriculum. The responsibility might be given to the president, to a faculty-centered committee, or to a "Council for Educational Policy and Reform" of broad representation.

Another obstacle emphasized in the report is inefficient methods of instruction. The "recitation" should be eliminated as a method unsuited to college teaching. Lecture sections can be large, up to 300-400 students. Lecture-discussion sections can vary from 25-150. Seminars and tutorial classes can be small, as small as we wish. Student loads can be reduced to twelve class hours a week. By selecting carefully the courses that should be offered, by deliberately choosing the method by which each course should be presented, and by asking each student to take one large lecture class in each semester of his four years, a smaller but stronger faculty will result, salaries can be higher, students can be exposed to as many small classes as they have a right to expect, and faculty loads can be kept to about nine class hours a week.

A stricter financial accounting is also necessary. The authors discuss a number of aspects of this subject, but one may be singled

out for illustration. They suggest that, if it is at all possible, a college allocate 100% of the tuition to salaries of the instructional staff.

The test will come when a number of liberal arts colleges attempt to put these suggestions into practice. We shall then find out if financial reorganization can produce more money for staff members. We shall then determine whether there is a better agency to plan a curriculum than a faculty as a group, with all its faults. We shall then see, even though present studies may show that there is little difference between large and small classes in the amount of subject matter a student gains, whether a professor on the end of a log and his students scattered about on innumerable other logs is a proper environment to accomplish the real purposes of liberal education.

The report is a blueprint for efficiency, an efficiency that will surely strengthen the faculty. The question is whether it will weaken the students. The authors believe it will not. But even if it does, if the laborer is worthy of his hire, and if the prices cannot be raised, is there any alternative to lowering the quality of the product?

ELBERT W. HARRINGTON
University of South Dakota

BRIEFLY NOTED

THE PROFESSIONAL WRITER IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND: A STUDY OF NONDRAMATIC LITERATURE. By Edwin Haviland Miller. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959; pp. xv+282. $5.00.

Through discreet limitation of a vast and complex subject, Edwin Haviland Miller has produced a distinguished book, deserving a wide reading. As "complete" as one has a right to demand, and sturdily (never tediously) documented, *The Professional Writer in Elizabethan England* is so congenially phrased that one might, if he wished, read it straight through—almost at a sitting. Yet each of its seven principal chapters proves to be a cameo of individual excellence, worthy to bear the scrutiny of a subject specialist.

The first, "Authors in Their Milieu," gives a general introduction to the varying social strata—both the titled minority and the less illustrious majority—of Elizabethan authors. "Just as England's destiny was shaped by middle-class statesmen in the sixteenth century," Haviland reminds us, "so middle-class writers and printers dominated the printing trade and, for better or worse, gave to literature a middle-class foundation." And, in developing the maxim that "poetry and livelihood have rarely been synonymous," he touches critically upon some commercial realities of their epoch.

Chapters Two and Three are devoted to careful surveys of "The Audience" and "The Taste of the Audience." Succeeding chapters, in order, deal authoritatively with "Patronage," "Writers and Stationers," "Censorship," and "The Elizabethan Grub Street." Among these the chapters on audience and censorship hold particular interest for readers of this journal. The lively discussions of "falconry" (an illicit means of exploiting multiple patrons) and literary piracy (encompassing, for once, even the field of drama) also warrant attention.

Some will wish, though, that the author—or his publisher—had filled in those occasional gaps which occur in the footnoting of quoted matter. It is frustrating, for instance, not to find here in what late sixteenth-century book or pamphlet "an anonymous writer" exclaims (p. 72): "Woe is me, the playhouses are pestered when the churches are naked. At the one it is not possible to get a place, at the other void seats are plenty."

PAT M. RYAN, JR.
University of Arizona

COMEDY AND SOCIETY FROM CONGREVE TO FIELDING. By John Loftis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959; pp. xiv+154. $4.00.

Probably no body of dramatic literaure has been tied so closely to the times in which it was written as that referred to in this volume. For this reason, the book becomes inescapably a better sociological treatise than a contribution to dramatic criticism. This does not invalidate its value, however; rather, it points up the barrenness of the period. Should a director decide to produce one of the handful of good contemporary plays, such a study might be helpful to him; by the same token, it would probably be just as beneficial to read the writings of Addison and Swift in order to perceive the two major contrasting attitudes toward class and society.

The author follows in detail the eighteenth-century shift from an attitude of contempt for the merchant class to one of respect, as manifested in a drama which was destined soon to lose its place as the most popular form of literature. Possibly the most significant contribution in the work is the author's challenge

to the genre "sentimental comedy," and more specifically, to the reasons most often given for its existence. The traditional belief, of course, is that as a direct result of the emergence of the middle class (a term Loftis abhors) public taste switched to sentimentalism. He believes there is no correlation between the two, contending that "sentimentalism reflected a search for freedom from the emotional inhibitions of the Restoration tradition" and owed its origin to a multitude of causative factors, not simply to the demands of an unsophisticated audience.

Important, too, is the author's review of the drama's decline, since he points out, among other things, the advent of the novel, journalism in its many guises, and opera, all of which simultaneously not only filled the void but sold themselves to the public on their own merits as well.

The book, then, is limited in its practical value. As socio-literary history, however, it does examine closely a period about which there has been the usual oversimplification.

WILLIAM R. MCGRAW
University of Oregon

TRAGEDY. SERIOUS DRAMA IN RELATION TO ARISTOTLE'S POETICS. By F. L. Lucas. (Revised edition.) New York: Macmillan, 1958; pp. 188. $2.50.

Originally published thirty years ago, and having gone through seven printings, this work has now been considerably revised by its author. Lucas keeps the original plan of analysis —that of reviewing each of Aristotle's constituents of tragedy. At the end, Lucas shows how comic relief may fit into this concept of tragedy.

Tragedy is certainly one of the most easily understood commentaries on the *Poetics*. Although the author admires Aristotle for giving "not so much the right answers as for [asking] the right questions," Lucas reveals that he is not blind to the master's faults. Much space is taken up with a demonstration of how the concepts of tragedy have changed from age to age. "Though Aristotle's laws have been broken," he says, "their history is the history of Tragedy." Of particular interest to the present reviewer were the author's comments on the different views of tragedy held by the ancients as well as by the modern philosophers, Hume, Hegel, *et al.*, and on what constitutes the "soul" of tragedy.

New material in the book is evident in several places. Lucas expands into a whole chapter his discussion of Aristotle's life, the scope and importance of his works. His analysis of "imitation," among other terms, is carefully done. In the main, however, the expansion of the work results from a fuller discussion of the relation of the *Poetics*, not only with drama ancient and modern, but also with other forms of literature.

There are very few faults in the work. One regrets that the author sometimes fails to cite his quotations and always fails to provide translations for material quoted in French, especially when, in his own words, he has revised the work for the "general reader." When he says, "let us be thankful that drama has learnt at last to live in prose," he seems to forget the gallant efforts of Eliot, Anderson, and Fry in verse.

One of the pleasures of reading this, or any other book by Lucas is the direct and perceptive style in which he expresses his ideas. "The supposed difficulties in understanding [Hamlet]," he comments, "have been mainly invented by critics with too much leisure and too little perception. . . ." In his evaluation of character, he maintains, "Perhaps we have lost something in . . . this world of the Welfare State, this stage whose god is sex; though the change seems so inevitable that we can hardly imagine any alternative." In short, this is a book which should be read by any student of Aristotle.

RICHARD HARRIS
San Diego State College

GUIDE TO PLAY PRODUCTION. By the Committee on Playlist of the National Council of Teachers of English, Joseph Mersand, Chairman. (Second edition.) New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958; pp. xiv+178. $3.50.

All drama directors will welcome the second edition of the *Guide to Play Selection* as a valuable aid to school, college, and community theatre groups. The book is divided into five major parts. Part I lists selectively full-length plays which range from the Greek and Roman age to our day. After each historical period there is a short convenient bibliography for theatre and drama students. Part II lists one-act plays; Part III lists television plays; Part IV lists guidance and mental health plays; and Part V lists no fewer than 536 anthologies of long and short plays. In addition to these features, there is a comprehensive list of publish-

ers and agents which is of great assistance to directors, and a general bibliography on play production including the areas of acting, directing, scenery, stage lighting, and theatre management. Finally, the *Guide to Play Selection* has a well planned index to plays and authors. This book is certainly recommended for theatre directors.

PAUL C. HARRIS, JR.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

A GUIDE FOR SPEECH, DRAMATICS, RADIO AND TELEVISION. By Hubert Wheeler, Raymond A. Roberts, Robert Reid, *et al.* Jefferson City: Missouri State Board of Education, Tentative Report, Publication 118-G, 1959; pp. viii+223. Apply.

This guide was prepared by the Study Production Committee of the State-Wide Secondary Curriculum Committee of the State of Missouri and published with a foreword by Hubert Wheeler, Commissioner of Education. In the words of the authors, this guide "written by teachers, for teachers, considers some of the persistent problems of speech education and suggests some possible solutions. General statements of the objectives of speech education are included; but the guide attempts to go further to give concrete practical suggestions, which the writers hope will help the teacher attain these objectives."

The book is divided into seven chapters: I and II consider the general objectives and patterns of organization in secondary education and the place of oral communication in this program; III presents the objectives, relationships, evaluations, of speech and dramatics in secondary education; IV gives a philosophy and suggested methods for teaching informal speech, i.e., conversation, telephoning, reading, public speaking, discussion, debate, parliamentary procedure, interviewing, listening; V clarifies the "Instructional Program in Dramatics" with aims and organization for curricular and co-curricular programs including acting, theatre, vocabulary, production, drama appreciation, history and play writing; VI concentrates on listening, viewing, evaluating, and writing for radio and television; VII explains co-curricular activities with aims, administration, training for, and judging festivals and contests.

Every chapter gives consideration to objectives, practical methods and procedures, types of evaluation, and bibliographies of recent books, films, records, rating forms, scales, and blanks for judging. The volume will be welcomed by administrators as well as secondary school teachers. It contains no "official" course of study but on every page are suggestions which can be adapted to the secondary program in speech, drama, radio, television, and the extracurricular speech program.

There can be no doubt that this excellent volume will stimulate and improve speech education in Missouri. It may well serve as a guide to state departments of education in each of the fifty states. It is to be strongly recommended as a required reference for prospective teachers of speech in college methods courses.

GLADYS L. BORCHERS
University of Wisconsin

VOICE OF THE DEAF: A BIOGRAPHY OF EDWARD MINER GALLAUDET. By Maxine Tull Boatner. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959; pp. xii+190. $4.50.

The Gallaudet family, Thomas and his son Edward, is closely identified with the education of the deaf in this country. Thomas, a youthful clergyman, was urged in 1815 to establish a school for the deaf in Hartford, no such school being then available in the United States. He crammed for his profession in Paris with Abbé Sicard and brought Sicard's protégé, Laurent Clerc, to Hartford as an assistant.

Forty years later, Edward Miner Gallaudet was invited to open a federally supported school for the deaf in Washington. From 1857 until 1910 he managed it. In the early years the support of Congress—and hence the life of the school—was frequently in doubt. Gallaudet was responsible for two notable features of the national school as we know it: a collegiate department, the only college for the deaf in the world, and a teacher-training unit, patterned after one in Italy. The nurture of the school that was to bear his name was a labor of dedication; the emergence of the college was noteworthy in itself and was testimony to both the perseverance and astuteness of Edward Miner Gallaudet.

The author, an experienced teacher of the deaf, is able to trace with understanding an important dispute: the oral method *vs.* signs in the education of the deaf. This argument pitted Alexander Graham Bell, an advocate of the oral method, against Gallaudet, who championed a *combined method*, signs plus speech, and who resisted all attempts to make speech the central object of education of the deaf.

The book suffers from inadequate proofreading ("pronounciation," "each . . . were"), and from bulky enumerations of names of prominent persons, remindful of the society page—individuals with whom Gallaudet transacted business or exchanged social amenities.

In spite of the work of the Gallaudets and their successors, a serious shortage of teachers of the deaf persists. This biography might well be placed in the hands of young people, potential teachers of the deaf. If it led a few capable ones to cast their lot with schools of the deaf, this writing project would indeed have a serendipity.

JOHN W. BLACK
The Ohio State University

HEARING THERAPY FOR CHILDREN. By Alice Streng, Waring J. Fitch, LeRoy D. Hedgecock, James W. Phillips, James A. Carrell. (Second edition.) New York: Grune and Stratton, 1958; pp. v+353. $6.75.

This revision follows the first edition by three years and retains the same basic content and format. Minor additions have been made, but other parts have been rewritten for clarity and the elimination of slight errors.

There seems to be an inconsistency between the title, "Hearing Therapy For Children," and the broader purpose expressed by the authors "to include in one book the special skills and knowledge needed by those professional groups who work with hearing handicapped children." It is in the fulfillment of the purpose suggested by the title, hearing therapy, that the book makes its outstanding contribution. To this end the last three chapters, approximately one-half of the text, are directed. The first six chapters fall under the broader purpose and contain background information for therapy. Problems of deafness, pathologies of the ear and their medical treatment, clinical and public school audiometry, and hearing aids for children are treated in these chapters.

The value of the last three chapters lies in the practical, basic, and rather complete approach to the therapy needs of hearing handicapped children according to the extent of their hearing involvements. The psychological and educational needs, language, speech, lipreading, and auditory training are adequately covered.

The last chapter, which deals with the education of children with severe and profound losses, deserves special mention. It is here that the language and speech methods used in education of the deaf are clearly presented in one place for the first time. This information alone could recommend the book to anyone dealing with the severely hearing handicapped or deaf.

This book remains the outstanding and most complete treatment of therapy for hearing handicapped children.

VINCENT H. KNAUF
Indiana University

HEARING LOSS, WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT. By Greydon G. Boyd, M.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1959; pp. 190. Paper $1.45.

The object of this paperbound book is to give hard of hearing people an understanding of their problem and its treatment. Generally in layman's terms the anatomy, physiology and pathologies of the ear as well as surgery and medical therapy are lucidly explained. The audiological rehabilitation of the hearing handicapped is also covered and the book includes the measurement of hearing, auditory training, lip reading, speech correction, and vocational training. The Appendix contains a listing of hearing rehabilitation centers in the United States.

This is a very commendable attempt to bring generally good and practical information to the hearing handicapped at a reasonable price. A positive and objective attitude toward the management of hearing loss prevails throughout the book. People with hearing losses, having read this book, will at least understand the contribution of each of many services available.

VINCENT H. KNAUF
Indiana University

READING THE BIBLE ALOUD. By J. Edward Lantz. New York: Macmillan, 1959; pp. xiv+144. $3.50.

The Bible has been made intolerable to innumerable persons, both the ostensibly devout and the openly skeptical, by the insufferable interpretation which has frequently characterized its oral reading. Any serious attempt to combat this distortion should be encouraged, and J. Edward Lantz can be commended immediately for making a basically sound approach to the problem.

Sensitive teachers of speech will have an uneasy moment on an early page when the author states that when a person "reads the

Word of God aloud, his voice in a sense becomes the voice of the Lord made audible," a comment which is bound to recall painful memories of students whose interpretative troubles were traceable to an unrefined form of this conviction. Fortunately Mr. Lantz later clarifies his position when he says, "The Bible is sacred, but to present it with a so-called 'holy' tone usually results in that tone being artificial and sanctimonious rather than truly holy. . . . Make the voice sincere, genuine, and heartfelt, and it will be holy in the best sense of the term."

The opening chapters, dealing with understanding the Bible and selecting appropriate passages for reading aloud, will strike theologically oriented readers as somewhat superficial, but the core of the book, contained in the chapters headed, "Getting Ready to Read Aloud" and "Presenting the Reading," is much more substantial. Mr. Lantz makes it clear that reading is a different function from both preaching and acting, and he gives attention to many specific problems and principles of delivery. He illustrates with examples undoubtedly drawn from his own experience as minister and speech teacher and provides useful reference lists.

The author's suggestions are consistently relevant, though seldom new or provocative, and his style is clear, though sometimes repetitious. The book should be helpful and practical.

JOHN W. BACHMAN
Union Theological Seminary

PREACHING, THE ART OF COMMUNICATION. By Leslie J. Tizard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959; pp. 106. $2.25.

An incomplete manuscript by the English preacher, Leslie J. Tizard, has been published posthumously under the title of *Preaching, The Art of Communication*. However, four of the five short essays are more concerned with a definition of "the preacher" than with an exposition of how he should preach. The *ethos* of the preacher is, of course, highly important to his preaching; although Tizard's comments on "What Preaching Is," "The Personality of the Preacher," and "Pastoral Preaching" might have been made more germane to sermon composition and delivery with proper orientation, as these chapters now stand, they are more philosophical than pedagogical.

Part IV, entitled "The Art of Communication," suffers from a lack of proper organization. Although many of the comments are valuable and discerning, they need a less random framework. There is present the common tendency among texts on preaching to state a philosophy without explaining to the novice how this philosophy may be put into practice. For example, Tizard recommends extempore preaching, but he does not offer sufficient guidance to those preachers who have been reading sermons to encourage them to "take the plunge" that he recommends.

It is regrettable that the author was unable to explicate his ideas as he may have intended. What we have is provocative and interesting, but it must be classified as proper advice too generally stated to provoke widespread acceptance of the philosophies it proposes.

PAUL D. BRANDES
Ohio University

TEACHING SPEECH. By Loren Reid. (Third edition.) Columbia, Mo.: Artcraft Press, 1960; pp. xii+424. $5.60.

The third edition of *Teaching Speech* contains substantial additions and improvements to an already superior book. Three excellent new chapters have been added: "The College First Course," "Discussion," and "The Lost Art of Studying." There are other revisions of a minor nature throughout the book, but each of the new chapters is a full development of an area touched lightly, if at all, in the earlier editions.

As in the other editions, Loren Reid's pleasing, yet incisive style of writing contributes materially to the value of the book. For example, whereas most authors write formal and pedantic prefaces and forewords, Reid has penned a refreshing and revealing essay which is certain to encourage young teachers to surmount the difficulties of their early teaching experiences.

Students will read the book with both pleasure and profit. It will certainly continue to be much in demand for courses in the teaching of speech.

CHARLES W. LOMAS
University of California, Los Angeles

SHOP TALK

ROBERT L. SCOTT, *Editor*

THE GENTLEST ART

Although the writing one can find on the subject does not treat it in this vein, the experienced, alert critic with ballots stacked about him knows that making evaluations of speech contests is indeed an art. He knows that he may not achieve the degree of artistry necessary as he checks among the boxes provided or scribbles anecdotes on reverse sides, and this knowledge may cause some tension. It is to add minor insight into this minor art so that its practice may be productive of greater good that ST turns his hand this issue. With the experience of the year behind us, except for a few tardy tournaments or festivals at a state, national, or universal level, we can turn with leisure to inspect ourselves and our art.

Wherein lies the art of speech contest judging? What are its purposes? What are its principles? By what shall we measure its products? It is with these questions we shall be concerned.

Unfortunately the literature on speech contest judging is written in the spirit of Francis Bacon. Experts seek to describe the phenomena of contest speeches, to categorize and analyze them. Their inquiries lead to sets of generalizations about contest speaking, neatly labelled and referred to various gradations of quality. Supposedly the well-trained critic or judge who takes the trouble to acquaint himself with the meaning of the labels used will be able to render a dependable decision or evaluation. But all this overlooks the artistry of contest judging.

Rather than starting with such categories as debates, declamations, or one-act plays, or even with given instances of the events themselves, let us start with the artist. This is not to suggest that the "scientific" approach has been wrong or ill advised, but only that it is not in itself complete.

What motivates the artist, or we should say the critic-judge, who, with the proper attitudes and insights, may become an artist? ST remembers some years ago receiving an invitation to serve as a judge at a rather large speech contest. He turned for counsel to his department chairman, a man of great wisdom and experience, since he doubted that he was interested in judging that contest or any contest for that matter. "Take it," the kindly old chairman met his objections in a gruff, straightforward manner. "There's a little money in it, and, after all, we must keep up good relations with the high school teachers." A primary conclusion is indicated: contest judging is an art akin to those of finance and public relations.

But not just anyone should judge speech contests (most of the Baconian writers would agree with this statement): therefore we must ask, just what sort of man is the contest artist-judge? Obviously those who have been sought out in the past are experts in the studies of rhetoric or poetic. These experts not only evaluate the products of those engaged in activities which are fundamentally rhetorical or poetic, but they themselves produce written or oral discourse. Awed by the ancient and honorable arts

involved as well as by the sight of some of the better modern critics at work, a few who have written about contest judging have put rather touching faith in credentials and argue that the road to good judging can be easily read by the signs of academic degrees or titles.

Our observations lead us to conclude that contest judging is a derivative art partaking of the realms of rhetoric, poetic, finance, and public relations in creating its optimum amalgam. Obviously, then, we are concerned with that art which enraptures and persuades for personal monetary profit while building personal and institutional prestige and good will. One can easily see that, although peripherally relevant to the concern of the critic-artist, most of the discussion of his function as a contributor to the education of the students contesting is really not central to his purpose. Although space and the writer's disabilities will not allow a complete theory of artistic contest judging to be articulated, several concepts, or "guidelines," may be set forth at this time.

The first and great guideline is *always leave the students and their coaches happy*. The artist-judge will use all available means to this end. This commandment is akin to the "always leave them laughing" of the entertainer. Most successful artist-judges are entertainers in some sense and to some degree. They can themselves read poetry in such a way as to make the student grateful for any positive comment dropped his way, or they can awe the debater with their analysis and forceful presentation of argument.

The means of actual demonstration is potent but perilous. The wise artist will not depend wholly on the inspiration of the moment. He knows that he can prepare well in advance bits and pieces to interpret or that he can arm himself with incisive criticism of some favorite source of material for the current debate question. But he must use his gems as if they were the inspiration or insight of the moment. As rhetorician or rhapsodist, he knows that all must be relevant—or made to seem so. Many contests provide for periods of oral comment by the critic; the artist will welcome these and prepare for them. He must take care not to allow his material to become stale. We all know the critic who used favorite material too many times.

Critics are ordinarily presented with stacks of ballots or comment sheets. Most cope with these as best they can, but the artist uses them to achieve his purpose. One must write either a great deal or a very little. It is ordinarily better to write a great deal and easier to do so. Most of what is written must be laudatory, and suggestions for improvement must be made to seem but extensions of what the contestant himself has already done. The beginner ought to practice writing critiques at home and arm himself with commonplaces. As he gains skill, comments will fall easily and copiously on the sheet. Writing little is more difficult. The comments must be cryptic and should set the student or coach eagerly seeking more enlightenment from the artist. Such comments are not easy to compose and if used too often the seer will become a repetitious bore. In a welter of comments, however, the gems will sparkle and fade into the background.

One must admire the artist who can scrawl "Bravo!" at the bottom of a sheet, expressing probably relief that the contestant has finished but leaving the student ecstatic. It's the artist's manner throughout the critique, however, that makes the single word in context effective. Some can bring coaches scut-

tling to their sides with "Have you read Sanduski on this point?" One must use his references to prime articles sparingly, but even a slender stock can be put to advantage. Ambiguity will be ever-present in successful criticism: "You certainly meet meaning head-on." Being candid may help inspire the critic and will not hinder him if he remembers to dull his meaning. For filling in the blank spaces, one should prepare a large supply of meaningless suggestions with just a touch of higher learning about them, e.g., "You gesture well with the left hand, but must sharpen the ictus."

Nothing will go as far to establish the reputation of care and concern as the checking of scales; the artist should be happy to see many of these on the sheet. One must never use the lower end of any scale. If five points are provided, for example, use only the upper three. One of ST's colleagues, driven by an insistent inner demand for quality and objectivity during a long afternoon of declamation, marked the box labelled "poor" in several instances. He has been pointedly omitted from the list of judges invited to that contest since. The effectiveness of artistic criticism is attested to by the recent tendency of contest managers to provide a five-point scale, the lower end of which is marked "excellent."

One must not conclude, however, that he must just avoid all negative comments; art is not that simple. A few negative comments, judiciously balanced by the positive, give the air of honesty and of a sincere desire to assist the student gain perfection. One must avoid, as a matter of fact, extremely favorable reaction to an individual when making oral comments to a group, if one does not want to alienate or antagonize.

In making negative comments, one is well advised to find some minor matter that the coach can concentrate on in future work with the student. Never risk asserting that the choice of material is poor, for the choice probably was made by the coach himself. At most, suggest that the material does not take maximum advantage of the contestant's potentials.

Much can be learned by observing the polished artist at contests. He does not limit his efforts to making oral and written comments but knows that he must mix and mingle among the coaches and contestants. A good memory for names helps; one must regret that the fourth category of Roman rhetoric is so neglected today. The governing mode of the critic-judge's conversation must be comparison—of this year to last, of one group of schools to another—to the advantage of those present, of course. An experienced judge will let others do most of the talking as he mingles with them, putting questions and nodding sagely to indicate mild approval of their opinions.

The true art of contest judging cannot be reduced to a perfect system. Its successful practitioners provide startling variety. But even the most flamboyant reveal an essential subtlety that is characteristic of this art. A few extremely effective artists have a reputation for being fearlessly outspoken, for being rough and tough. But upon close observation one sees that they are like big cats playing with kittens, their claws carefully retracted.

Properly practiced, contest judging will bring prestige and good will to the judge and the institution he represents. His monetary reward will probably remain slight, but he will have the satisfaction of having made hundreds of contestants happier, better motivated students. Good contest judging is not easy, requiring as it does insight into

several subsidiary arts and an application which is always most gentle.

SHOP TALK SPEECH CONVENTION CALENDER

NATIONAL

Speech Association of America: The Jefferson, St. Louis, December 28-30, (1961, New York; 1962, Cleveland; 1963 [August], Denver).

American Educational Theatre Association: University of Denver, August 28-30; (1961, Waldorf-Astoria, New York, August 28-30; 1962, University of Minnesota, August 24-26; 1963, University of Oregon, August 26-28; 1964, University of Pittsburgh, August 27-29).

American Forensic Association: with SAA in St. Louis.

American Speech and Hearing Association: Statler-Hilton, Los Angeles, November 1-5.

National Society for the Study of Communication: with SAA in St. Louis.

NUEA Committee on Discussion and Debate Materials: with SAA in St. Louis.

REGIONAL

Western States: Oregon State College, Corvallis, November 24-26.

RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

American Association for Cleft Palate Rehabilitation: Brown Palace Hotel, Denver, May 12-14.

SUMMER INSTITUTES AND WORKSHOPS

Illinois State Normal University will offer a summer workshop for teachers who direct plays but have had little or no background in directing and theatre work.

Los Angeles State College is offering "Contemporary American Political Speechmaking" as part of the Institute for American Studies. Present plans are to have students attend sessions of the Democratic National Convention and to have political figures address general sessions on the campus. Anthony Hillbruner of the speech department is chairman of the Inter-Divisional Committee on American Studies.

Professor Muriel Morley, Department of Speech, King's College, University of Durham, England, will offer a special course in speech pathology at San Diego State College.

Texas Technological will sponsor another American Theatre Tour this August. Students may take credit courses in connection with the 5000 mile, 20 day tour of theatres in the western states. The department will also sponsor a two-week high school speech workshop in July.

A three-week workshop in speech correction under the direction of Kenneth Dimmick will be offered at the University of Arizona this June.

The University of Houston will sponsor the Eighth Annual Speech Round-Up for high school students in July. There will be lectures in public address, debate, theatre, and radio-television each morning and laboratory sessions in the afternoons.

At the University of Minnesota, Duluth, the eighth annual eight week summer clinic for children with speech and hearing difficulties will begin on June 20.

The subject of the 1960 Summer Speech Institute to be held at the University of Wisconsin, June 30, is "The High School and College Theatre—Architecture and Stage Design." An extensive list of visiting lecturers will discuss problems of theatre building in high schools and colleges. The department, in cooperation with the Federal Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, will offer a two-week course in Clinical Audiology in August. The course will be conducted by Claude Hayes and John Peterson, with visiting lecturers, Leo G. Doerfler of the Pittsburgh Eye and Ear Hospital, and Earl D. Schubert of the Cleveland Hearing and Speech Center. Traineeships are available. The department will also sponsor five summer clinics for speech and hearing handicapped children within the age-range of three to fourteen years and, in cooperation with the Extension Division's Wisconsin Idea Theatre, its annual summer program for professional and non-professional workers in community theatres.

CALL FOR NEWS

Although items for Shop Talk will be gratefully received at any time, your attention is directed to the deadlines for material to be included in the four issues of *QJS* for 1960-61. Departmental reporters and all others are invited to address their letters to Robert L. Scott, Department of Speech and Theater Arts, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 14, Minnesota. Deadlines:

August 15 for the October issue
October 15 for the December issue
December 10 for the February issue
February 15 for the April issue

Forensics

There is a little evidence filtering in that not all students and faculty advisors engaging in forensics are satisfied with debating or discussing the nationally approved questions all year long. Gerald M. Phillips, for example, writes that on April 27, Washington State University and Portland State College will be host to a college discussion conference dealing with the question of world population explosion. (Invitations to attend will be extended upon request.) However, after debating a "different" proposition at its national tournament in Cleveland a year ago, Delta Sigma Rho polled chapters to determine their response to the proposition. The reply was overwhelmingly against using a topic other than the national intercollegiate proposition. Some schools indicated that they did not attend because the national topic was not used; most of those who did attend would have preferred the national question. The general opinion was that it is too difficult for the students to prepare late in the year to debate another proposition. Whether students cannot or will not is not quite clear. But either alternative is rather damaging to those who argue that intercollegiate debating has definite educational values.

For the past several years at least one director of forensics has requested through his representative on the committee for selecting the intercollegiate proposition that the colleges and universities be polled to determine whether they would like two approved propositions—one for the first half of the season and another for the second.

Speaking of propositions, recently the Oxford Union debated "That in the opinion of this house America is responsible for spreading vulgarity in western society." According to a clipping from ST's favorite clipping service, the proposition lost by 176 votes thanks to the efforts of Orson Welles who argued that vulgarity and ugliness are neither truly American nor truly European but are the outgrowth of supersalesmanship and crass commercialism. The choice is not between American and European values, but between what is human and what is merely commercial. From all accounts, this was one of Welles' finest performances. As one American newspaper put it, "It's a neat trick to convince Oxford that somebody else is *not* vulgar."

The taste of English debaters, often remarked upon in this journal, is again attested to by one of the propositions the touring Cambridge team suggests: "Resolved: that communism's strongest ally is the stupidity of the West."

From time to time, various experiments with forms of forensic activities have been undertaken. The most recent one called to ST's attention is the committee hearing. Last November Indiana State Teachers College, Terre Haute, invited students from eight other schools to participate in a hearing on the subject "Shall we curb the highest court?" A committee to interrogate expert witnesses was formed by faculty and students. The witnesses were mostly professors of law and government from various colleges and universities. In the evening, a symposium-forum open to the public was held. More than 500 attended the affair. Information about the purposes, structure, and success of this forum can be obtained from Otis J. Aggertt, Indiana State Teachers College.

The tour idea is taking an increasingly strong grip on forensics programs. In November Washington State University debaters with guests from Western Reserve University toured the state debating the high school question before audiences which totalled more than 4,000 at eleven high schools and a junior college. The University of Arkansas inaugurated a new program of touring this year by presenting short debates and speeches for twenty-two high school assembly programs.

If anyone has a large uncommitted surplus in his forensics budget, he may be interested in the annual University of Hawaii intercollegiate speech tournament in May. One may explain to his administration that it is most appropriate, if not mandatory, that our newest state be welcomed by delegations from every college and university. There may be a touch of sadness, however, when those attending realize that speech students may no longer rely on statehood for Hawaii as a topic. Details concerning the affair may be had from Don Klopf, Department of Speech, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii. The fact that there are no entries fees may encourage inquiries. ST is negotiating with the Editor-in-Chief for expenses to "cover" the tournament for the *QJS*.

HIGH SCHOOL QUESTIONS. The Committee on Discussion and Debate Materials of the National University Extension Association announces that the problem for high school discussion and debate for 1960-61 has now been chosen. From the general problem three discussion questions and three debate propositions have been phrased.

Problem Area: How can the security of the free world best be maintained?

Discussion Questions

1. How might the North Atlantic Treaty Organization best serve the security of the free world?
2. How might the United Nations best serve the security of the free world?
3. What should be the essential features of a world government?

Debate Propositions

1. Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be transformed into a federal government.
2. Resolved: That the United Nations should be significantly strengthened.
3. Resolved: That the United States should initiate a federal world government.

Each state league is free to chose from these questions and propositions or to phrase its own. Each year, however, the majority of high schools use the suggestions of the NUEA Committee.

The committee publishes *The Discussion and Debate Manual* and sponsors a free materials program each year. Any questions about materials or the general function of the NUEA Committee should be directed to Bower Aly, Executive Secretary, Committee on Discussion and Debate Materials, Box 5302, University Station, Eugene, Oregon.

RARE REPRINTS. A leaflet "Reprints of Scarce and Desirable Books for Library Use" from Peter Smith, Publisher (20 Railroad Avenue, Gloucester, Massachusetts), lists several items that might be of great interest to ST readers. Many who have looked covetously at the libraries of their more mature colleagues may now buy C. S. Baldwin's *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* ($4.25), *Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice* ($4.25), and *Medieval Rhetoric to 1400* ($4.50). J. W. H. Atkins' *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Vol. I, Greek, $3.50; Vol. II, Graeco-Roman, $6.00) is also available.

CENSUS. After completing the editing of the geographical section of the 1960 *Directory*, the Executive Secretary reported that the ten schools with the most members are the same as last year, although their order has changed somewhat. LSU has replaced Michigan State as the institution having the most members and is one of only two non-Big Ten schools in the top ten. The schools with the most SAA members are LSU, 53; Michigan State, 52; Illinois and Wisconsin, 44; Michigan and Northwestern, 39; Ohio State, 38; Queens, 37; Purdue, 34; and Iowa, 33. The Executive Secretary admits that the totals are subject to possible error since some members who receive mail at their home addresses fail to return directory slips and so are not listed by institution. The number of negligent members, however, probably varies only slightly from school to school.

RADIO-TELEVISION

Chico State College, using the facilities of the speech and drama department, produces a series of educational television programs for a half hour each day over the commercial station in Chico. Two of the five programs are aimed at high school audiences, two at the intermediate grades, and one at primary grades.

Illinois State Normal University is expanding its program in radio and television under its new director, Ralph L. Smith. Closed-circuit television is being used to allow college students to observe educational techniques, and departments are being encouraged to experiment in television for teaching.

A notice from the National Educational Television Film Service of Indiana University indicates that a new series, *Decision*, is ready for distribution. Each of the six half-hour films deals with a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision involving a question of constitutional interpretation. The series was developed with the advice and guidance of Herbert Wechsler of the Columbia University School of Law. Erik Barnouw, who wrote and supervised the productions, is national chairman of the Writers Guild of America.

The Department of Speech and Dramatic Arts at the University of Arkansas has been conducting an experiment in the use of closed-circuit television as a teaching technique for speech improvement. The program, made possible by a grant from the U.S. Department of Education, aims to test the effectiveness of closed-circuit instruction as in-service training for elementary classroom teachers in speech improvement of third grade children, and to test the improvement achieved with these children through seventy-six bi-weekly programs. The investigation is under the direction of Sara Ivey and Norman DeMarco.

A note from the University of Houston indicates that the department of radio-television is exploring the possibility of teaching a course in television on television.

John R. Shepherd of the University of Oregon reports that the study of Educational Television Resistance (a three-year study being conducted under a Title VII grant) is progressing according to schedule. Pilot studies are now underway with the first wave of the field survey having begun in late March.

A report on the first two years of an experiment in inter-institutional teaching by television in the state of Oregon has been published. For further information contact Glen Starlin, chairman of the Department of Speech. The University studies originated a new telecourse beginning April 5. The program, produced in conjunction with the School of Music, is designed to teach certain principles of music for the non-college viewer.

A news release from the department of telecommunications, University of Southern California, begins "FM radio broadcasts can be heard in an elite fourth of the homes in Los Angeles." A survey under the direction of Kenneth Harwood and Michael Kittross indicated that the twenty-five percent of homes in Los Angeles County that have FM sets in working order are richer than average in education, income, and material wealth of all kinds.

Ohio University has been granted $57,000 from the United States Office of Education under the provisions of the National Defense Education Act for the purpose of evaluating the program analyzer and film as methods for training television teachers. The project will be conducted from February 1960 to May 1961 with F. Craig Johnson as chief investigator, Edward Penson as associate investigator, and Elizabeth Andersch as education coordinator.

Programs for Business, Industry, and Government

Not only do some colleges and universities sponsor programs of instruction for various groups outside the academic walls, but some members from the ranks desert. A letter to ST from Robert Haakenson, who resigned in January as chairman of the department at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, to accept a position as Manager of Community Education in the Public Relations Department of Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Philadelphia, indicates that he is now responsible for the organization and administration of a speakers' bureau for the firm. "One hundred and eight Professional Service Representatives have been trained in the nationwide speaking program," he writes, "and as many as three hundred more may be added." Participating as consultants in the recent expansion of the program were Gale Richards, University of Southern California, and Robert Crawford, Queens College.

The speech department at the University of Houston has conducted or is planning to conduct courses of training for the following organizations: Houston Council of Engineers, United States Steel, Humble Oil and Refining Corporation, Houston Police Department, Desk and Derrick Society, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, United States Chamber of Commerce, and the Texas Home Economics Association.

A note from Michigan State University indicates that Murray Hewgill has replaced Huber Ellingsworth as director of forensics. Professor Ellingsworth has become Associate Director of the International Cooperation Seminars in Communications. These seminars are a training program for foreign nationals who come to the United States under foreign aid agreements. The week long seminars, held in the Washington, D. C. area under the direction of David K. Berlo, are interdisciplinary and involve staff members from Michigan State in psychology, sociology, anthropology, business, education, and English, in addition to communications. Participants from the department of speech are Ralph Leutenegger, Charles Bedrey, Frederick Alexander, David Ralph, Gordon Thomas, Erwin Bettinghaus, Murray Hewgill, Donald Ecroyd, and Kenneth Hance. Participants from other institutions include Thomas Lewis, Florida State University; Karl Wallace and Halbert Gulley, University of Illinois; Edward Kramer, Southwestern Louisiana Institute; Theodore Clevenger, University of Wisconsin; Roger Nebergall and William Carmack, University of Oklahoma; Sam Becker, State University of Iowa; Ernest Bormann, University of Minnesota; David Phillips, University of Connecticut; and Thomas Starcher, University of Maryland.

RELATED ORGANIZATION? The following information is gleaned from a folder which reached the Shop desk recently: "A Symposium on Basic Questions in the Structure of Languages will be jointly sponsored by the American Mathematical Society and the Association for Symbolic Logic in conjunction with the meeting of the Society at the Hotel New Yorker in New York on Thursday to Saturday, April 14-16, 1960. Financial support comes from the Institute for Defense Analyses." ST admits that he's a bit

awed, especially since "the remainder of the Society program consists of a Symposium on Stability of Problems in Hydrodynamics, several invited tours of the Product Display Center at IBM World Headquarters, and sessions for invited and contributed papers on Friday and Saturday."

SOLICITATIONS. ST notes a tendency within SAA to encourage its members to contribute convention papers instead of relying wholly on readers privately enlisted by various program sponsors. The *Debut* papers at the 1959 convention indicate this tendency. The Rhetoric and Public Address Interest Group has already announced that *Debut* will be repeated in St. Louis this December (see *QJS* last issue, p. 120). Several of the other interest groups have extended the opportunity to submit abstracts for consideration in forming convention programs.

READING HOURS

A reading program, "Abraham Lincoln," composed of poetry, anecdotes, and speeches, was presented at the Baruch School of Business Administration, the City College of New York, on February 11, by President Buell Gallagher and members of the speech department.

At Illinois State Normal University, a Readers Bureau has been established under the direction of Ruth Yates to present programs throughout the area.

The University of Arizona Readers Theatre, under the direction of Alethea Smith Mattingly, will offer two evening programs during the current semester: "Hedda Gabler" and "Alice in Wonderland."

A new student organization at the University of Missouri, the University Readers, has been presenting monthly programs this year. The October program, "Literary Witches and Ghosts," was a Halloween feature by KETC-TV, St. Louis. The group has presented various programs for local groups ranging from Senior Citizens to the Optimists Club. The department of speech and dramatic art presented a reading of Christopher Fry's "Boy With a Cart" for Religion in Life Week in the new campus chapel.

Students from Washington State University toured the state February with readers theatre productions of *Henry V* and *Taming of the Shrew*. They appeared for forty-three high schools, two colleges, and five community groups.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AVAILABLE. Recognizing the increasing interest in producing group reading, the Oral Interpretation Interest Group appointed a readers theatre bibliography committee at the 1958 convention in Chicago. Under the chairmanship of Clark S. Marlor of Adelphi College the committee (Janet Bolton, Leslie Irene Coger, Moiree Compere, Elaine Foster, Gail A. Jaffre, and Ted Skinner) enlisted the aid of other experienced directors of group readings in compiling the bibliography of plays, poetry, and prose. The committee's report expresses special gratitude to Josephine Nichols, Ray Irwin, Helen Speer, Chloe Armstrong, Keith Brooks, and Florence Roll.

The bibliography can be obtained from the secretary of the interest group, Francine Merritt, Department of Speech, Louisiana State University. ST assumes that requests accompanied with self addressed, stamped envelopes will be appreciated.

THEATRE SCHEDULES

Agnes Scott College: *The Heiress, Electra.*

Brooklyn College: *The Critic.*

Chico State College: *The Male Animal, Romeo and Juliet, Cinderella, The Crucible, Pajama Game.*

Illinois State Normal University: *Androcles and the Lion, Winnie the Pooh, The Would Be Gentleman.*

Johns Hopkins University: *The Braggart Warrior.*

Kent State University: *What Price Glory, Desire Under the Elms, Street Scene, Summer and Smoke.*

King's College: *Hamlet, Major Barbara.*

Northern Illinois University: *Dark of the Moon, The School for Wives, Liliom, The Skin of Our Teeth.*

Northwestern University: Three plays to be drawn from the following list will be presented together with a children's play in repertory on an outdoor platform stage (with provisions for indoor staging in case of inclement weather): *Mary of Scotland, Charley's Aunt, The Skin of Our Teeth, The Merry Wives of Windsor,* and e.e. cummings' *him.*

Purdue University: *Desire Under the Elms.*

San Jose State College: *Candida, The Bald Soprano* and *The Love of Don Perlimplin, La Boheme* (in English), *Right You Are.*

University of Nevada: *The Curious Savage, The Glass Menagerie, Aladdin and His Wonderful Lamp.*

University of Wisconsin: (Summer Bill) *The*

Waltz of the Toreadors, The House of Bernarda Alba, Picnic, The Time of Your Life.

Wellesley College: A *Streetcar Named Desire, Look Back in Anger, The Playboy of the Western World, The Way of the World.*

West Virginia State College: *The Curious Savage, Comedy of Errors, Duet for Two Hands.*

Theatre Notes

The Canadian Players Ltd.'s production of *The Taming of the Shrew* at Agnes Scott College in February was preceded by a workshop on producing Shakespeare. The workshop was sponsored by the speech and drama department and was led by members of the Canadian company.

Brigham Young University players under the direction of Harold I. Hansen, chairman of the department, left in January for a seven week tour of the Pacific under the sponsorship of the USO, the Defense Department, and the AETA. They will present *Blithe Spirit* at military installations in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Guam, The Philippines, and Hawaii.

At Johns Hopkins University in January, "Greek and Latin Comedy," a lecture by Henry T. Rowell, professor of classics, was followed by a presentation of Menander's *The Arbitration.*

The Festival of Arts celebration at the University of Oregon featured the arts of the theatre this past February. Coincidentally, the Northwest Drama Conference was held on campus with Kenneth Macgowan, Samuel Selden, Mordecai Gorelik, and Morris Carnovsky giving the principal addresses. Horace Robinson, Director of the University Theatre, was chairman of both events.

Buildings

A new Fine Arts Center is being built at Brigham Young University. The speech area will include a major theatre with seating capacity for 600, an experimental theatre, and an arena theatre.

The department of speech at Illinois State Normal University is now located in the new Centennial Building. One wing contains the Westhoff Theatre with a seating capacity of 454 and a new silicone reactifier light control board.

The new three and a half million dollar Speech-Music Center at Kent State University is in the process of being furnished and equipped in preparation for use in June. The building contains a clinic, a 500-seat theatre, radio and TV studies, and classrooms. The School of Speech is no longer a component of the College of Arts and Sciences but together with six other departments—architecture, art, industrial arts, home economics, journalism, and music—is a part of the new College of Fine and Professional Arts. John J. Kamerick is the dean of the new college.

The speech and drama department of the University of Nevada will move into its section of the new Fine Arts Building early this summer. The speech and drama wing will contain a large proscenium-type stage, with adjoining shop, rehearsal hall-experimental theatre and other related facilities, and an intimate, continentally arranged auditorium seating 275. In addition, there will be a readers theatre room, a forensics seminar room, two large rooms especially designed for work in speech correction, and space for television production work.

The speech and hearing clinic of the University of Oklahoma will start construction this spring of a $200,000 addition to its building. The addition, which will double the capacity of the clinic, will be built under provision of the Hill-Burton Act.

Appointments

Agnes Scott College: Elvena M. Green, assistant professor and technical director of the theatre.

Brigham Young University: Carol Michie, costume designer.

Illinois State Normal University: Ralph L. Smith, associate professor and director of closed-circuit television and radio programs; Keith C. Davidson and George A. Soderberg, assistant professors.

University of Nevada: Roland Ellmore, instructor and director of the television and radio program.

West Virginia State College: Sylvester F. Clarke, assistant director of the theatre.

Leaves

Brigham Young University: Robert Struthers to work toward a Ph.D. degree at the University of Minnesota. Wayne Phillips has been appointed technical director of the theatre in Professor Struther's absence.

City College of New York: Irving Branman for the year to institute courses in the teaching of English at Robert College, Istanbul, Turkey.

Illinois State Normal University: Dorathy Eckelmann for seven months to study speech disorders of neurological origin. Eric C. Bick-

ley, technical director of theatre, has returned after a one year leave during which he studied at Michigan State University and the University of Illinois. Doris Richards is back at Normal after a two year leave for study at Western Reserve University.

Louisiana State University: Oran Teague, who last year was named Assistant Principal of the Laboratory School, for one year to study at the University of Missouri.

University of Houston: John W. Meaney, station manager of KUHT-TV, for six months to serve as a consultant in the Office of Education, Washington, D. C.

University of Arizona: Klonda Lynn has returned this semester after a sabbatical, most of which was spent in Europe.

University of Illinois, Chicago Undergraduate Division: Wayne N. Thompson, on sabbatical to do research on "Aristotle's Theory of Communication."

University of Illinois: Richard Murphy, editor of *QJS*, on sabbatical leave the second semester and summer. He is in England, Scotland, and Ireland, supposedly working on the texts of famous British speeches. The editorial office is open the year round, however, and manuscripts, letters, and such will be responded to.

Lee Emerson Bassett, 1872-1959

Lee Emerson Bassett, Emeritus Professor of English and Head of Speech and Drama in the Division of Fine Arts, Stanford University, was born in Salem, Wisconsin, on November 26, 1872, and died in Palo Alto, California, December 19, 1959. He commenced his higher education at Lawrence College, but later transferred to Stanford, where he was graduated with honors and elected to Phi Beta Kappa in 1901. In his senior year at Stanford he was invited by President Jordan to assist the debaters and the student players. After his graduation he was appointed instructor in English, with special responsibilities in the oral interpretation of English literature. During 1907-08, he studied at Oxford University, specializing in phonetics. In 1919 he was appointed chairman of the Division of Public Speaking in the Department of English. Shortly before his retirement in 1938, he became Executive Head of Speech and Drama in the Division of Fine Arts, and was invited by President Wilbur to remain in that capacity for a year after retirement.

During his thirty-nine years of service at Stanford University, Professor Bassett emphasized the need for a scholarly approach to the study of English literature. In his articles, in his *Handbook of Oral Interpretation*, and again in his *Handbook of Extemporaneous Speaking*, he stressed scholarship as the most important factor in effective oral communication.

He took an active part in regional and national professional organizations, and served as president of the Western Speech Association and the Speech Association of America. Northwestern, Colorado, Washington, Utah State, and the University of Hawaii invited him to teach during the summer, or for the year if Stanford could spare him. Even after his retirement, his wise and friendly counsel was sought by various groups in the community and state. During 1939-40, he served as a consultant with Max Reinhardt, in establishing a school of the theatre in Hollywood. Upon his return to northern California, he continued his interest of twenty years in the Palo Alto Toastmasters' Club, re-named the Lee Emerson Bassett Chapter in his honor.

In addition to his intense interest in public speaking and oral interpretation, Professor Bassett was active in the theatre. Among many plays which he directed in the early years of his appointment at Stanford, one of them, *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*, performed in 1903, was revived in 1953 by the Stanford Players as a fiftieth anniversary commemorative production.

Lee Bassett was a modest and unassuming man, not disposed to preempt the center of the stage. He was a good listener, with a knack for interjecting a witty remark at the appropriate moment. Former students remember him with affection, and Stanford presidents, from Jordan to Sterling, considered him a pillar in the structure of the University. His colleagues, who often visited him in retirement, fondly recall his fine mind and courteous manner. Students and colleagues will gratefully remember the amiable professor with a deep voice and a quizzical smile who combined exacting standards with unfailing helpfulness.

Norman D. Philbrick
Thomas Andrew Bailey
Leland Taylor Chapin
Stanford University

W. Norwood Brigance, 1896-1960

W. Norwood Brigance, Professor of Speech and Chairman of the Department at Wabash College, died of cardiac failure induced by

virus pneumonia, January 30 at the Crawfordsville, Indiana, Culver Hospital.

Professor Brigance was born in Olive Branch, Mississippi, November 17, 1896. He received the A.B. degree from the University of South Dakota, 1916, the M.A. degree from the University of Nebraska, 1920, and the Ph.D. degree from the State University of Iowa in 1930. After teaching high school for six years and serving as research assistant to the Nebraska Legislative Reference Bureau, in 1922 he came to Wabash College where he remained until his death. On leave from the college from 1936 to 1938 he served as Professor of Speech and Chairman of the Department of English at the University of Hawaii. He served as a member of the summer school faculties at the Universities of Nebraska, Southern California, Wisconsin, and Hawaii; and as lecturer in summer speech conferences at the Universities of Iowa, Michigan, Louisiana State and Missouri.

His contributions to the field of speech can only be suggested here. He was the author, or co-author of twelve textbooks in the field, and a regular contributor to the speech journals. He gave unstintingly of himself in the service of the Speech Association of America. He served as vice president of the Association in 1935 and again in 1945, as president in 1946 and as a member of the Executive Council continuously since 1940. For the Speech Association he edited the two volume *History and Criticism of American Public Address*, published in 1943, and served as editor of the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* from 1942 to 1945.

No recital of Norwood Brigance's work can reveal the spirit of the man or the influence he exerted. Whatever office he held in SAA, he was inspirer rather than routine officer. Against inertia and apathy he drove through the first Association volumes of cooperative scholarship, the *History and Criticism*. His *Jeremiah Sullivan Black* (1934) pioneered the field of critico-rhetorical biography. He was an avid letter writer, and dispatched his suggestions, critical comments, and encouragement to students and scholars throughout the country.

His teaching career was spent in a small men's college. Through the years he resisted all inducements from universities who wanted him on their staffs. At Wabash he pursued his interests in teaching and scholarship, went on numerous lecture tours, and through his efforts and those of his students enriched the programs of many colleges and universities. Serving as pallbearers were some of his former students: J. Jeffery Auer, John W. Black, Ray Ehrensberger, Myron Phillips, and Byron K. Trippet (president of Wabash College).

No article, however long, can encompass this man. His prodigious professional labors did not keep him from a responsible role in his home community. He somehow found time to be president of the Kiwanis Club, chairman of the City Planning Commission, and speaker to a host of local organizations. And he did not know how to give less than his best to any task he accepted. To this writer, who was privileged to know him as a colleague and friend for thirteen years, he will always be remembered first and preeminently as a great teacher. In one of his last published articles he paid tribute to great teachers he had known. Of them he said, "Each had 'given energy to truth.'" W. Norwood Brigance belongs in their company. For forty years by precept and example he taught the highest ideals of responsible citizenship in a free society.

VICTOR M. POWELL
Wabash College

ACE ANNUAL MEETING

The American Council on Education is an organization of colleges and universities and affiliated learned societies, set up and supported by them, to improve American higher education and to solve common problems. SAA is a member of ACE and sends three persons to each annual meeting.

Representation at the yearly ACE meetings serves three prime purposes: (1) to place the weight of SAA behind the ACE program; (2) to benefit from the deliberations; and (3) to remind presidents, provosts, and deans (the chief kinds of persons present) that there is such a thing as SAA, that there exists a study and discipline called Speech, and that both the society and its member teachers are interested in education generally.

The meeting this year, October 8-9, was in Washington, D. C., and had a record attendance of 937. It was addressed solely to problems of college teaching, the subject itself being a sign that the presidents really value the teacher after all, or behold a renaissance of interest in his art and welfare, or haven't quite forgotten him and think it's about time to get around to him, or have discovered that he's in short supply and are confronting the necessity of keeping and recruiting the labor sup-

ply. Led off by a few key-note addresses, the conference got down to business with six panel discussions on these topics: faculty compensations, salaries, and benefits; faculty-administration relationships; the graduate college and teacher preparation; faculty responsibilities for international education; faculty-student relationships; utilization of new media for instruction.

As SAA's sole representative—the two other SAA delegates could not attend—I could not be everywhere, and so attended mainly the section on new media. (I managed, however, to pick up something of the flavor of the other panels.)

The new media considered were closed and open circuit TV, sound-on-film, audio-video magnetic tapes, and "learning machines." It was assumed that these were here to stay, and most of the time was directed to reports of their use in more-or-less experimental situations by persons who had learned to use them well in certain subjects (e.g., chemistry lecture and laboratory and formal logic). Occasionally discussion of the reports would rove in general directions and genuine concern was expressed lest the *primary* use of the new media, that of *improving* teaching, be forgotten. The official summary of our section warned: "They should never be viewed simply as money-saving devices."

That there are gains in using the new media, either in their settled use or in merely experimenting with them, most persons agreed. For example: they secure more thorough teacher preparation than would otherwise hold (one trial will convince the worst skeptic); they place greater responsibility for learning on the student where it often belongs; they require interdepartmental cooperation on both problems of presentation and research into teaching methods and their effectiveness.

The latest problem being felt and having no general answers was set up (and finally left) as a question: What is the teacher's legal right to the new media materials he produces, and what, how, and when are his responsibilities for keeping them up to date?

There was much concern for "Total faculty compensation," a phrase signifying all the benefits accruing to the teacher as distinguished from other professional persons. Salary may be king, yet other benefits, both solid and intangible, may enjoy queenly status—pension, insurance of all kinds, recreational and cultural advantages, and freedom to teach and inquire. So significant is the total package, and so complex and subtle have aspects of it become, that at a few institutions "public relations experts" prepare expositions (and doubtless veiled persuasions) designed to keep current staff happy and to entice the prospective employee.

Out of various contexts came real concern for the motives and values of the young teachers—the opportunity to do research as well as to engage in direct didactics, the chance to teach his specialty, tenure policy and prospects of promotion, the weight of initial salary and benefits for the young man as compared with pensions for the older man, and the comfort of a decent office.

In discussing faculty-administration relationships, a number of persons directed attention to "communications," particularly to communication up and down the hierarchical ladder of the institution. An important figure was held to be the department chairman who, as a hybrid creature—half administrator and half teacher—is perfectly situated to explain president and dean to the teacher, and vice versa. Committees also were believed to be important, but some presidents felt that faculty committees should be content with policy matters and stay out of administration, and as usual, committees were deplored as chronic time wasters. Somebody had studied their number and habits in two large institutions and concluded that their work added up to a 25-man department employed full-time.

Many persons believed that increasing enrollments meant not only greater numbers of teachers but *better* teachers, i.e., persons prepared as college teachers and not chiefly as scholars and researchers. There was real controversy over the place of the graduate college in teacher training, and no concensus appeared. The public schools have been able to agree on the nature and standards of teaching and upon the qualities of the teacher and his preparation. But universities in particular seem not to disentangle teaching from scholarship and research, if indeed they can be sharply distinguished. So, the argument goes, in preparing the college teacher what can be and should be done depends upon what he is.

Of much concern was the kind and competence of education which American faculty take to their missions abroad. That the education for such missions has sometimes been inadequate and that colleges and universities should take up the implied challenge were rapidly acknowledged. Most of the partici-